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1 INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
1.1 The irregular migrant as a policy problem 
The presence of irregular migrants causes a tough problem for policy makers. Political and 
popular aversion against the presence of irregular migrants has mounted in most West-
European societies for years, yet their presence remains. Their exact numbers are obviously 
unknown - only estimates of various kinds and sources are available1 - making the perceived 
magnitude of their ‘threat’ to the social order to a large extent a matter of political opinion. In 
recent years irregular migrants have almost become a ‘public enemy’ in many countries of the 
EU. Television and newspaper images such as those of irregular migrants storming the 
barbwire fences of the Spanish enclave Ceuta in 2005 confirm both the image of irregular 
migrants desperate to reach Europe’s shores as well as the image of a Fortress Europe, a 
continent desperate to keep them out. Especially since the 1990s policy attention for this 
category of immigrants has increased manifold, albeit with distinct differences in approach 
and intensity among the various EU member states. National governments, especially in 
Northern Europe, and the European Union have placed the fight against illegal immigration 
at the top of their political agenda. 
 
Irregular migrants did not always have such a bad image in Western Europe. Not so long ago, 
in the 1960s and 1970s, illegal immigration was seen as a ‘normal’ by-product of the guest 
worker schemes. Many immigrants skipped the recruitment station, travelled on tourist visa 
to the chosen country of destination, sought and found work and then applied for a work 
permit. In many labour-importing countries this was not an uncommon practice and the 
work permit was seldom refused (Engbersen 1997, Sinn et al. 2005). The immigration of 
guest workers was an important part of Europe’s post war economic growth through their 
contribution of scarce (manual) labour, especially in industry. When the oil crisis and the 
restructuring of industry in Western Europe echoed in the economic recession, the guest 
worker programs were terminated throughout Europe. With the deterioration of the 
economic climate, immigration passed from being a ‘solution’ to becoming a ‘problem’ 
(Sciortino 2000). The problem was of course that many of the ‘guests’ chose to stay and that 
immigration continued through legal channels, such as asylum and family reunification and 
formation, and through illegal entry. Against this background, illegal immigrants gradually 
transformed from ‘adventurers’ into ‘vagabonds’ in the public and political eye (Bauman 
1998). 
 
Immigration policy since the 1970s in especially the Northern member states of the EU can 
be characterized by continuous attempts to stop, curtail and limit legal and illegal 
immigration2. At the same time the emerging scientific literature on immigration has 
pondered the question why it is so hard for liberal states to control migration processes, 
pointing to the real and perceived inability of governments to gain control over immigration 
(Cornelius et al. 2004, Castles 2004, Joppke 1998, Sassen 1996). Despite strong rhetorics, 
hard political choices and a plethora of new policy initiatives, immigration to Western Europe 
increased steadily over those same years. This lack of policy-results can’t be wholly ascribed 
to laxness or to politicians that failed to put their money where their mouths are. 
Immigration policy has received much political attention, has seen vast increases in funding 
and staffing and has been at the centre of the cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs3, one 
of the most dynamic policy fields in the European Union (Monar 2001, Mitsilegas et al. 2003, 
WRR 2003). The image of a Fortress Europe was introduced, by those who oppose it, to 
describe a policy development aimed at keeping out (bogus) asylum seekers, illegal 
immigrants and ‘unwanted’ immigrants in general. The external borders of the EU (including 
sea- and airports) have been transformed into formidable boundaries. A sad testimony to this 
development is the increase in migrant deaths along certain parts of the Mediterranean 
borders (Carter & Merrill 2007, Carling 2007). Borders have been strengthened with guards, 
watchtowers, concrete and fences. They have also been equipped with expensive state-of-the-
art technology, such as infrared scanning devices, motion detectors and video surveillance. 
Moreover, visa requirements have been stepped up, and the visa themselves have been 
modernized and are increasingly difficult to forge. And yet, despite funding and political 
backing for the fight against illegal immigration and the strengthening of borders and border 
control, the presence of irregular migrants remains a fact of life for most EU countries.  
 
1.2 Turning inwards: internal migration control 
The gradual realization that borders alone cannot halt illegal migration has led to a widening 
of the scope of immigration policy. Policy moved away from the border to the international 
level, but it also turned inwards to the local level and the level of institutions (Guiraudon 
2001; Zolberg 2002; Lahav & Guiraudon 2006). States are now trying to shut the doors to the 
welfare state, work, housing, education and other institutions of society. Access to public 
services has become an instrument of migration policy (Van der Leun 2003, Pluymen and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1  See Jandl (2004) for a brief overview of research on estimates of illegal immigration. 
2  Invited immigration at the top end of the labour market has been common practice throughout the years and 
recently many European countries have even reinstated recruitment policies for certain segments of the 
labour markets, most notably the ICT sector (see for example De Lange et al 2003).         
3  Justice and Home Affairs is known as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice since the entry into Force of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.  
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Minderhoud 2002). The central notion in the development of these policies on irregular 
resident migrants is exclusion. Engbersen (2001: 242) suggests that the Fortress Europe may 
be turning into a Panopticon Europe “in which not the guarding of physical borders is 
central, but far more the guarding of public institutions and labour markets by means of 
advanced identification and control systems. Panopticon Europe guards the ‘system border’ 
of rich welfare states”. These policies of exclusion from work and welfare presuppose a 
government with a profound bureaucratic ‘grip’ on and knowledge of the institutions of the 
welfare state and the (illegitimate) use thereof by irregular migrants. Information is a 
keyword in these internal exclusion policies. In more recent years internal migration control 
in general has become increasingly closely linked with digital and technical surveillance. 
Within the blooming field of surveillance studies there is an emergent group of researchers 
that combine the insights from the ‘surveillance literature’ with that from the literature of 
‘migration studies’ (for example Lyon 2007, Haggerty & Ericson 2006, Zureik & Salter 2005, 
Caplan & Torpey 2001, Koslowski 2002, Torpey 2000). These studies focus on different 
aspects of the relationship between migration and surveillance (borders, identity documents, 
security) and have different disciplinary backgrounds (history, law and social sciences). 
However, most of these studies do not focus on the internal migration control of irregular 
migrants (some exceptions are Vogel 2001, Samers 2003) or only marginally deal with the 
issue. This book will try to build on this new field of ‘migration surveillance’ both 
theoretically and empirically.  
 
Effective internal migration control implies that irregular migrants have to be detected. The 
mist, in which the presence of irregular migrants is usually shrouded, has to be lifted in order 
to exert control. Surveillance is thus linked with information and knowledge production. 
Control systems depend on information to make society, in the words of James Scott (1990), 
‘legible’ so that the state can act and implement policy. In Engbersen’s Panopticon Europe it 
is enough for the gatekeepers of the welfare state to know who does not belong. Controls of 
documents and (government) registers are routinely done to keep out those who lack the 
proper documents and registrations. In this book it is argued that this logic of societal 
exclusion does not suffice anymore in the eyes of some European governments. These 
governments wish to take their internal exclusion policies a crucial step further and are 
looking for ways to make expulsion policies – the ultimate exclusion - more effective. Again 
governments turn to modern systems of surveillance, but this time not just to determine that 
someone ‘does not belong’, but to determine who someone is as expulsion is impossible to 
execute without a correct and documented legal identity. This development in which the 
‘older’ policies of societal and institutional exclusion of irregular migrants are increasingly 
supplemented with policies aiming to identify and expel irregular migrants is the core focus 
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of this book. To what extent do governments make this ‘turn’ in internal migration policy and 
what does it look like in day to day policy practice? These two strands of internal migration 
control on irregular migrants, though both focused on exclusion, make very different 
demands on the ways governments organize their paper and digital surveillance systems. 
Denying access requires no other identification than a label of ‘not belonging’, expulsion 
requires full fledged identification of the individual and his background. For expulsion 
policies to be effective, the organization of the state’s knowledge production will have to be 
thoroughly reorganized. The story of the development of internal control on illegal aliens 
should therefore be a story of organizing and reorganizing digital and human surveillance 
and the underlying ‘knowledge production’ that fuels the system of surveillance. In the 
current information age where filing cabinets are rapidly replaced with searchable databases 
and where technology simplifies interconnectivity and (remote) accessibility, technological 
innovations will play a lead role.   
 
1.3 Research questions: internal migration control at crossroads? 
The move towards internal migration control and the ongoing technological sophistication 
and use of surveillance systems in modern society, raise questions on how internal migration 
control will develop in the future. How will West-European states organize the internal, 
domestic counterpart of the ‘fight against illegal immigration’? External migration control, 
both at the border and at the paper borders of visa and passports, has seen the use of the 
latest technology to stay ahead of immigrants and smuggling organizations that are trying to 
circumvent the states’ best efforts. Internal control will require increased surveillance and 
surveillance powers and - if border policy is any indication – it is likely that especially the rich 
welfare states of the Northwest of the European Union will fund and use the latest 
technologies that are at their disposal. While internal migration control is likely to display the 
latest development in its instruments and methodology, its goal is likely to remain the same. 
David Lyon (2004: 142) claims that surveillance, irrespective of new methods and 
technology, is always used for ‘social sorting’, for the classification of populations as a 
precursor to differential treatment. In the case of illegal aliens differential treatment will 
usually amount to exclusion, which is the general underlying rationale of internal migration 
control. Internal surveillance of irregular migrants can however take two forms: (1) an 
‘established’ form of societal exclusion and (2) a ‘new’ form focused on identification that 
ultimately leads to expulsion, which is hypothesized to be upcoming in certain EU member 
states. Both require a different use of (new) surveillance technologies. Another likely factor of 
importance in the development of internal migration policy is the European Union. In the 
case of external migration control the European Union and related cooperation schemes such 
as the intergovernmental Schengen agreements, were instrumental in the development of 
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new policy initiatives. Europeanization was not only important in the development of 
common EU-policies, but also and perhaps especially as a ‘policy laboratory’ where new 
concepts and innovations were developed that were implemented nationally (Monar 2001). 
As internal migration control develops at the national level in various member states it is 
most likely that some sort of ‘counterpart’ develops at the level of the EU, either as a full EU-
policy or as a supplementary and supporting framework and infrastructure. These 
considerations lead to the formulation of the central research questions for this study, which 
read as follows: How do national and EU-policies of internal migration control aimed at the 
exclusion of irregular migrants develop? Do states increasingly supplement more 
‘established’ policies of societal exclusion with policies of exclusion focused on identification 
and expulsion? And what is the role of (modern) systems of information and surveillance in 
the construction of these policies of exclusion and control?  
 
1.4 Case selection: Germany and the Netherlands as most likely cases 
This study will focus on two countries that can be regarded as ‘most-likely cases’ in view of 
the research questions. If we expect that internal migration control on illegal aliens will grow 
and develop around (advanced) systems of information and control (surveillance) these 
countries should fit the profile best and first. To put it more bluntly: if internal surveillance 
on illegal immigrants doesn’t develop and evolve in these countries it is unlikely that it will 
surface in other EU member states. The countries in this study are The Netherlands and 
Germany. These two countries constitute a most likely scenario because they share a number 
of relevant characteristics, which are outlined below. 
 
Firstly, they share a basic common political approach towards immigration. Both countries 
do not wish to be seen as countries of immigration, have developed immigration policies 
geared to limiting or even stopping immigration since the 1970s and face a popular opinion 
that is by and large negative towards (illegal) immigration. In recent years illegal 
immigration has become an important and politically sensitive topic. In their global 
comparison of immigration and immigration policies Cornelius et al. (2004) group these 
countries together under the heading of ‘reluctant countries of immigration’. There is in other 
words a fertile political soil for the development of internal migration control. Over the years, 
especially since the mid 1990s, their immigration policies have become much stricter. 
Germany adopted very strict asylum legislation after the ‘asylum compromise’ of 1993 and 
the Netherlands adopted stricter legislation in 1994 and especially through the enactment of 
the Aliens Act 2000. Furthermore, during the 1990s and 2000s the legislation for family 
reunification and formation has been tuned up with new barriers and restrictions. Along the 
way, the irregular migrant came to feature more and more in policy documents and white 
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papers. Irregular migration was an important issue in the well-known German Süssmuth 
report and internal control on irregular migrants became a spearhead in Dutch immigration 
policy in the early 2000s. Notwithstanding more recent political overtures to attract highly 
skilled labour migrants, the general development of immigration policy in these two 
countries is one of curtailing unwanted migration, both those who come through legal 
channels (asylum, visa and family reunification and formation) as well as those who come 
illegally. 
 
A second common political feature is their founding membership of both the European 
Union and the Schengen group that negotiated the Schengen Agreement and Convention. In 
other words, these countries share a long history of European political cooperation. In 
general, through their membership of the EU, but also more specific on matters of border 
control and immigration policy through the multilateral negotiation of ‘Schengen’, related 
instruments such as the Dublin Convention and more recently the Prüm treaty that has 
already been nicknamed “Schengen III”. ‘The fight against illegal migration’ has been an 
important part of the Schengen cooperation and has featured at the top of the European 
Union’s agenda for Justice and Home Affairs for years now. Not only does this breed a 
common understanding of certain cross-border and supranational policy problems, it also 
provides a platform for politicians and bureaucrats to learn, discuss and copy each others 
policy innovations for domestic use (Guiraudon 2000, Monar 2001, Broeders 2008).   
 
In the third place they share a number of economic features that are relevant in relation to 
irregular migration. They can both be characterized as advanced and affluent welfare states 
that are in more or less permanent need of recalibrating and restructuring (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck 2003, WRR 2006). In the debate on irregular migration the welfare state often 
plays a key role. Popular belief often holds that irregular migrants will ‘abuse’ the welfare 
state and its entitlements and that this will undermine the sustainability of the system as a 
whole in the long run. It is however doubtful that the availability of entitlements is a powerful 
magnet for would-be unauthorized entrants themselves as compared to other demand pull 
factors (Cornelius et al. 2004, WRR 2001). To irregular immigrants ‘the welfare state’ is 
probably more an indication of general affluence and a certain level of social stability, than a 
possible source of income. An economic characteristic that is of greater importance to them is 
the size and structure of the informal economy. For most irregular migrants it is this part of 
the economy where they hope to find employment. In Schneider & Ernste’s overview of 
informal economies worldwide, the Netherlands and Germany are grouped together. They 
estimate that the shadow economy in these countries adds up to somewhere between 13 and 
16 per cent of GNP (Schneider & Ernste 2000: 81). According to Sciortino (2004: 37) the 
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degree to which states allow – or cannot avoid – the development of a robust informal 
economy, is the main factor that makes irregular migration and residence possible and 
feasible. The size of the irregular migrant population in both countries is for obvious reasons 
difficult to ascertain. In the Netherlands counting the uncountable has some degree of 
scientific sophistication. Various estimates based on different models and approaches put the 
number of irregular migrants in the Netherlands somewhere between 46.000 and 116.000 
according to the Central Bureau of Statistics (Hoogteijling 2002: 49). Engbersen et al. (2002: 
62) put their number anywhere between 47.000 and 72.000 when counting the irregular 
migrant population excluding irregular Europeans, and between 112.000 and 163.000 
including European irregular migrants. For Germany there are no scientific estimates of the 
irregular migrant population available. Various ‘guestimates’ put the irregular migrant 
population anywhere between an absolute bottom of 100.000 (based on the police statistics 
for suspects with irregular residence) up to one million migrants with irregular residence 
(Kreienbrink & Sinn 2006: 27).  
 
A fourth common feature is the size and level of professionalism of their respective 
bureaucracies. Both have a sizable, professional bureaucracy in which corruption does not 
play a major role. The government has a certain grip on the major institutions of society 
(such as the labour market, education, welfare state provision etc.) through a dense system of 
regulations, controls and oversight. Public provisions are as a rule only accessible through 
bureaucratic procedures that require individuals to identify themselves with legal documents, 
detailed registrations and involve routine cross-checking between various public and semi-
public authorities, making policies of societal and institutional exclusion a realistic option 
(Vogel 2001, Van der Leun 2003). They are also modern bureaucracies, in the sense that 
computerization and the use of other new technologies are considered important parts of the 
working process. That goes for the use of data systems and ICT in public services to facilitate 
the interaction between governments and citizens, but also for the use of modern technology 
and data systems for the ‘coercive’ parts of the state apparatus, such as the police, intelligence 
agencies and increasingly the authorities dealing with immigration issues.  
 
These four characteristics make Germany and the Netherlands a most likely case for the 
expected developments outlined above. To state the obvious: these are of course selected 
similarities and common features at a high level of abstraction. If one were to look below this 
level of comparison, or emphasized other, more divergent, characteristics it would be 
possible to draw another picture. One could, for example, draw on the literature on 
bureaucratic styles and traditions that awards a different label to the countries in this study. 
In this typology Germany is considered legalistic and the Netherlands pragmatic (cf. Van 
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Waarden 1999: 339). Also the polities vary considerably. The German Federal structure in 
which the Länder have much legislative autonomy contrasts with the Dutch decentralized 
unitary state that combines centralism with some autonomy and quite some discretionary 
power for lower levels of government, most notably the municipal level. These differences are 
real and may produce different outcomes, even when the intent of policy is the same (Scharpf 
2000). Throughout the study differences such as these play a (sometimes significant) role. 
Where this is the case it is discussed, but the emphasis remains on the broader question of 
(changes within) policy development and its implementation. Though differences like these 
may provide interesting explanations for some of the findings, it is the general direction of 
the policy development that is the subject of this study. At this general level, the shared 
characteristics described above constitute a most likely setting for the expected 
developments.  
 
The choice for a selection of ‘most likely cases’ means a choice for the homogenization of the 
sample of countries on key aspects that are considered important for the development of 
surveillance and internal control on irregular migrants. It would also have been possible to 
choose contrasting cases - i.e. a most different system design - instead of selecting the 
countries on the basis of their shared characteristics. A more varied spread of cases might 
have included a Nordic or a Mediterranean country. A country such as Italy, with a large 
population of illegal immigrants, a tradition of periodic regularizations and a bureaucracy 
with a looser grip on a more ‘informal’ society and economy would be a contrasting, but 
hardly an interesting case. It would be a ‘least likely’ case, a country that would not provide 
much insight in the build up of internal surveillance. The primary reason for not choosing a 
‘most different’ approach is that the developments under scrutiny are relatively new. Both the 
political sense of urgency on the issue of illegally resident immigrants and the technical 
possibilities to implement internal surveillance on a grand scale with modern means are 
fairly recent. The history of control of immigration and asylum in Europe has shown that the 
two countries included in this study have usually been in the forefront of policy development, 
while countries such as Italy (or Spain, Portugal and Greece for that matter) trail at a distance 
and/or often have a different outlook and interests. For one thing these countries have only 
recently shifted from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration (Cornelius et 
al. 2004). The aim of the study is to see whether a structure of surveillance on irregular 
migrants is emerging and developing. Research on Italy is likely to reveal that this is not or 
only very recently the case. Even though the new Berlusconi government enacts strict anti-
irregular immigration policies, these policies are unlikely to display much use of 
sophisticated surveillance technology in the internal migration control on irregular migrants. 
A Mediterranean case would not add much to the knowledge on the structure and 
 22 
potentialities of the (digital) surveillance of irregular migrants, nor would it mean that it is 
not being developed in other member states of the European Union. Obviously, Germany and 
the Netherlands are not the only countries that are likely to display the signs of this 
development. Other, equally interesting cases could have been selected, such as Denmark, 
France or Sweden. Pragmatic reasons such as the state of research on the issue of irregular 
migration in other countries have led a restriction to a Dutch and German case. Germany and 
the Netherlands are seen as ‘representatives’ of a number of countries that are most likely to 
provide insight in the development, use, potential and imperfections of internal surveillance 
on irregular migrants.  
 
1.5 Outline of the study 
The political and legal developments in the internal migration control on irregular migrants 
will be analyzed in the Netherlands and Germany in two broadly defined ‘policy sectors’: that 
of ‘guarding the access to the labour market’ and that of ‘police surveillance, detention and 
expulsion’. The developments in the EU’s ‘fight on illegal migration’ will also be analyzed, 
focusing on those developments that are of value to Dutch and German domestic policies of 
internal migration control. The analysis will deal with both policy making and the 
implementation of policy by executive bodies of the state. The selection of the ‘policy 
domains’ is based on highlighting the importance of knowledge production and identification 
in the development of policy aimed at controlling irregular immigrants. They are what might 
be called ‘panopticon-sectors’ par excellence. The build-up of a system of information and 
control on irregular migrants aiming at their exclusion will most likely manifest itself first in 
these domains. They are also policies that highlight the state as a coercive actor. The central 
questions of this book are about the development of control. Though control may take many 
forms, the prime interest here is in the policies the state develops in taking an active and 
forcible control of migration processes. Considering that irregular migrants usually have 
taken great pains to reach the countries of the EU and are therefore not easily persuaded to 
leave, this usually means forcible exclusion and forcible removal. This emphasis on the 
coercive side of the state is also in line with a growing literature that maintains that the 
nation state seeks to reassert itself through control policies in a time when globalization 
challenges its dominant position (see for example Schinkel 2008, Wacquant 2009, Bauman 
2004, Lyon 2003). The ‘penal state’, the ‘security state’, the ‘surveillance state’ all point in the 
direction of states trying to gain control over processes and populations that are volatile and 
unpredictable. In the migration literature ‘control’ is a general theme. And as will be analyzed 
in the following chapters the ‘migration control state’ owes a lot of its policy ideas and 
instruments to developments in security, the penal system and in the ‘surveillance state’, and 
vice versa.   
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 1.5.1 Chapters 
Chapter two outlines the general theoretical framework of this study. It combines insights 
from the migration control literature with those of surveillance studies, especially the 
‘branches’ that deal with state surveillance and the surveillance of mobility. In this chapter a 
vital distinction is made between two essentially contradictory logics of exclusion that 
emphasize a different use of registration and identification systems. The first logic of 
exclusion relates to societal and institutional exclusion, meaning that documentation and 
registration are only used to determine ‘belonging’ and thus access, or in the case of irregular 
migrants: denial of access. The second logic of exclusion relates to the ultimate aim of 
expulsion and requires documentation and registration systems that are able to identify 
individual irregular migrants in order to make expulsion possible. The term logic refers not 
only to a political policy choice, but also to an organizational and operational logic that 
derives from it. The radically different demands these logics ask of bureaucratic organization 
and (digital) surveillance weave a central thread through the empirical chapters. The general 
question whether Germany and the Netherlands are shifting towards an internal migration 
policy in which societal exclusion policies are increasingly supplemented with policies of 
identification and expulsion is inextricably entwined with the question whether their 
bureaucracies and their digital infrastructure are able to instrumentalize the second logic of 
exclusion. In the empirical chapters that follow the general theoretical framework of chapter 
two will be supplemented and combined with theoretical insights that are more directly 
related to the specific subject that is dealt with in the empirical chapters. Additional insights 
from the fields of political economy, criminology and EU studies, will be used in the chapters 
on the labour market, ‘police surveillance, detention and expulsion’ and on EU developments 
respectively.     
 
Chapter three deals with the issue of guarding the access to the labour market. Generally, 
irregular migrants are trying to better their lives and the main method to do this is to work. 
Exclusion from the labour market, both formal and informal, is therefore a prime target in 
any policy trying to discourage irregular settlement. Erecting paper walls around the labour 
market, through all sorts of work permits and identification requirements, has been going on 
for quite some years. Elaborate networks of (often interconnected) registers and databases 
have been set up in Germany to close off the labour market to irregular migrants (see for 
example Vogel 2001). The fact that the labour market is traditionally densely regulated and 
documented combined with the growing emphasis western governments have placed on 
shielding it off to irregular migrants, leads to the expectation that it becomes a workshop for 
new systems of information gathering and knowledge production. Question remains whether 
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this traditional site of the societal and institutional exclusion of irregular migrants is also 
turning towards the second logic of exclusion aimed at identification and expulsion?  
 
Chapter four focuses on a chain of government agencies that constitutes the core of the 
coercive state when it comes to internal migration control: the police, the detention system 
and the immigration authorities responsible for expulsion. Police surveillance is the day-to-
day control on irregular residence. The apprehension of irregular migrants is perhaps the 
most elementary form of organizing internal migration control. Residing illegally is not 
permitted – and in some countries a criminal offence - and control seems to be intensifying. 
Compulsory identification (carrying of identity cards), though not always introduced within 
the framework of the fight against illegal immigration, is spreading through Europe and is 
making internal control easier. All police work is based on accumulating, accessing and 
exchanging information, and internal migration control is no different. However, popular 
and political demand on the police is high across the board. For surveillance on irregular 
migrants to be effective, the issue has be politically prioritized and backed by resources. The 
detention system is dependent on the police for the ‘supply’ of irregular migrants and 
depends on police and immigration authorities to provide the necessary identification and 
documentation to release irregular detainees into expulsion. Without identification expulsion 
is impossible which makes new methods, systems and procedures to obtain this information 
vital for this ultimate mechanism of internal migration control. The second logic of exclusion 
then requires the detention system to function as a ‘factory of identification’. The question is 
if and to what extent Dutch and German detention systems can fulfill this role?  
 
In chapter five the focus is placed on the contribution of European schemes, policies and 
instruments to the domestic policies of internal migration control in the Netherlands and 
Germany. In a unified Europe, internal migration control means that national states also 
have to turn to the European level to construct the tools necessary for their policies of 
exclusion. Joint ‘policies’ on return and the use of the political weight of the EU to put 
pressure on countries of origin reluctant to take back their own citizens are part of this 
strategy, but the main European contribution is through the provision of new instruments of 
digital surveillance. The member states of the EU are currently developing a network of 
databases in the field of (irregular) immigration. The Schengen Information System (II), the 
Eurodac database and the Visa Information System are vast databases, often including 
biometric data, aimed at controlling migration flows and identifying and sorting legal and 
irregular migrants. These systems are able to ‘re-identify’ parts of the population of irregular 
migrants on the basis of digital traces of their migration history and are therefore a major, 
and growing, contribution to the efforts of those member states developing surveillance 
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systems operating (especially) under the second logic of exclusion. The new digital borders of 
the EU are in a very real sense legal external borders that are patrolled at the (sub) national 
level.  
 
Chapter six is the concluding chapter of this dissertation that will conclude and reflect on the 
findings of the research and will answer the research questions. 
 
1.5.2 A note on the (statistical) data  
Like most dissertations this study builds on the work of numerous scholars that have 
researched various aspects of (irregular) migration, government policy and surveillance. 
However, and again like most dissertations, this study could not be pieced together on the 
basis of existing scientific studies, so sources also include ‘grey’ literature, studies conducted 
by NGO’s and studies commissioned by government agencies and ministries. In the empirical 
chapters the various ‘types’ of sources are clearly indicated in the text and references. 
Considering that policy development is the prime interest of this study the information and 
data provided by the Dutch and German government themselves often comes into play where 
the scientific literature cannot offer a “peer-reviewed” source. Therefore, in terms of 
(statistical) data this study relies for a large part on the data that government agencies make 
available to the public. That means that the statistics used should be handled with care and a 
good degree of ‘healthy suspicion’. Care and suspicion are warranted because government 
statistics always (also) serve political priorities and are meant to justify political programs 
and the policy alternatives that were chosen. However, considering the general accountability 
of the Dutch and German bureaucracies there is also no need to view government statistics in 
the light of Winston Churchill’s dictum that he “only believes the statistics that he forged 
himself”. In addition to a healthy suspicion to the official statistics, it has to be realized that 
this study tries to ascertain policy developments in internal migration control, which has a 
target population of ‘uncountable’ irregular migrants. Given the government supplied data 
and the elusive target population of the policies analyzed, allowance has to be made for some 
degree of shadow dancing. Conclusions in this study will therefore not reach the level of 
certainties (an odd scientific claim to begin with) or claim to have settled matters once and 
for all. The material allows for the analysis of trends, shifts in policy thinking and the 
implementation thereof. It can comment on the direction the ship of state is moving in, but 
not ultimately on the ‘effectiveness’ of policies. The data simply come with (too many) 
restrictions. So, it is not just governments that have to make ends meet. When it comes to 
sources and data researchers also have to make choices under the restriction of the 
availability of information. However, in light of the central theme of this book, we should 
perhaps also be glad with some limitations of the research material. A brave new world that 
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has government data on all aspects of social life is not necessarily a society in which free 
research thrives.   
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2 THE STATE, SURVEILLANCE AND IRREGULAR MIGRANTS: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
 
2.1 Introduction 
“The border is everywhere”, wrote David Lyon in 2005. We are accustomed to think of the 
border in terms of territorial lines dividing the world into countries. But these traditional 
territorial lines originate in politico-legal international agreements (often codifying the 
outcomes of war and civil strife), they have also been translated into legal documentary 
requirements, which, in turn have been translated into prerequisites for rights, obligations 
and entitlements for those ‘belonging’ to a specific side of those ‘territorial’ lines. In other 
words, the border has been translated into a myriad of smaller belongings and memberships 
that in everyday life determine rights and limitations. And if the border is everywhere, than 
logic dictates that it can also crossed – legally and illegally - everywhere.  
 
Over the years many authors have debated the changing nature of the border and its 
significance for migration control. In paragraph 2.2 these debates are analysed along the 
lines of a number of often used metaphors. The metaphor of the Fortress Europe, coined by 
those who oppose it, draws attention to the developments in border and migration policies of 
the EU and its member states to guard Europe against unwanted immigrants. The metaphor 
of the panopticon has been used to describe the shift to internal control on irregular migrants 
and to stress the importance of surveillance. The debate now seems to be in a post-panoptic 
phase, in which the ‘surveillance state’ is a central theme. Paragraph 2.3 analyses the 
development of the surveillance state and its growing link with the development of internal 
migration control on irregular migrants. Paragraph 2.4 describes the limits of the state 
surveillance. Some limitations are part of the realm of the state itself – such as legal 
restrictions – while others are the result of strategic behaviour of irregular migrants and 
illegitimate organizations that frustrate the state’s efforts, sometimes with minimal 
resources. Paragraph 2.5 sums up the central expectations that result from this theoretical 
chapter for the analysis of the empirical material in the chapters that follow.  
 
2.2 The changing nature of European borders: a story in metaphors 
Many have observed that Western states in recent decades have not been able to stop 
unwanted immigration in spite of the outspoken political wish to do just that. The 
widespread declaration of ‘zero-immigration’ policies by West-European governments, after 
the termination of the guest worker programmes, went hand in hand with rising numbers of 
immigrants through the channels of asylum, family reunification and family formation. The 
problems that these channels of legal entry posed for these ‘reluctant countries of 
immigration’ were supplemented with the rise of illegal immigration and other methods 
resulting in illegal residence, such as overstaying on legal tourist visa (Cornelius et al. 2004). 
The fact that the liberal states of the West have (seemingly) been largely unsuccessful in 
stopping unwanted immigration has spurred a public and academic debate on the question 
whether or not states have ‘lost control’ on immigration (see for example Sassen 1996; Soysal 
1994; Jacobson 1996; Joppke 1998, 1999; Freeman 1998; Lahav & Guiraudon 2000; 
Guiraudon 2001; Cornelius et al. 2004). Some saw the era of the nation state and ‘hard’ 
national borders drawing to a close as a result of globalisation. This pressure on the nation 
state results either from economic globalisation (a free flow of goods and capital will be 
followed by at least some degree of free movement of people) or from an emerging global 
legal culture of human rights that awards rights to individuals irrespective of state-
membership. Others questioned the notion of lost control, pointing to the increased capacity 
and resources being directed at the issue of immigration and immigration control. From a 
more historical perspective it was put forward that the absolute physical control of frontiers 
by states was always a myth and will remain so (Anderson & Bigo 2002; Andreas 2000).  
 
Though the debate is by no means closed, there does seem to be wide agreement on the 
notion that immigration and immigration politics have shifted from the realms of ‘low’ 
politics to that of ‘high’ politics. Definitions of security and security threats in relation to 
borders have significantly shifted. Borders have become less about fighting wars, and more 
about fighting crime and new security threats such as terrorism and illegal immigration 
(Andreas 2000, Bigo 2000). Immigration control has reached the top of the political agenda 
and the public unease in Western Europe fuels the resolve of politicians to dedicate more 
manpower and resources to the agencies involved. Germany and the Netherlands, having 
been at the forefront of ‘policy innovations’ in both national and European migration control, 
are a case in point. Meanwhile the border itself is changing. The border as a concept and the 
practical organisation of the border are transforming in response to the many – and 
sometimes – conflicting challenges of economic globalization, international migration and 
Europeanization. In Europe, the development of the border has often been captured in 
metaphors, starting with the vivid image of a Fortress Europe that was coined by those who 
opposed the ‘closing of Europe’. Needless to say, one metaphor for all of the European Union 
clouds relevant differences between its member states, such as the north-south divide that is 
especially relevant in matters of immigration. Nonetheless, metaphors can take us briefly 
through the development and the changing nature and location of the border and lead us to 
the central role that surveillance plays in managing (unwanted) migration nowadays. These 
metaphors are of course also ‘programmatic’. They point to the essence of the ‘policy 
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paradigm’ that is in operation at a particular time and haunts the minds of politicians and 
policy makers. As such, they might be seen as a ‘policy frame’. Rein and Schön (1993: 146) 
described framing as “(…) a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making sense of a 
complex reality to provide guide posts for knowing, analyzing, persuading and acting”. 
Specific frames and metaphors highlight specific parts of the policy problems at hand and 
thus produce fast tracks to certain policy solutions. Reversely, they undervalue and lead away 
from other options, as the following metaphoric ‘history’ of European migration control 
illustrates.  
 
2.2.1 Fortress Europe 
The metaphor of a Fortress Europe has often been used to describe the development of 
immigration and border policies at the level of member states and subsequently of the EU 
itself. This rather grim metaphor draws attention to the fact that borders and immigration 
policy have become a ‘line of defence’ against immigrants who are perceived to be ‘laying 
siege’ to the fortress. Since the late 1980s national policies for immigration and asylum have 
developed along the rationale of denying or at the very least limiting access for most 
immigrants. The invitation policies and guest worker programmes were over and 
immigration should have grinded to a halt. When it didn’t, public and political opinion of 
immigration and immigrants began to change. Against a background of rising 
unemployment, restructuring of welfare states and a continuous high level of immigration, 
public opinion and mainstream politics began to perceive immigrants by and large as 
uninvited and unwanted. From the mid-1980s and all through the 1990s asylum migration 
dominated public sentiment and immigration policy in Europe. Especially Northern EU 
member states had enormous (administrative) difficulties coping with the large numbers of 
refugees. Germany even functioned as Europe’s ‘magnet’ with the number of asylum 
applications peaking at the staggering number of 418.191 applications in 1992 (Broeders 
2004). The image of asylum seekers gradually changed from politically persecuted and help 
deserving individuals to ‘floods of bogus-asylum seekers’, from which a few ‘deserving 
genuine’ refugees could be filtered – at great costs. In the late 1990s illegal immigrants 
became a new prime category of unwanted immigrants. As the number of illegal immigrants 
rose, the ‘fight’ against illegal immigration was also stepped up. In the process, immigrants 
coming to Western Europe for economic reasons, such as ‘bogus asylum seekers’ and 
irregular migrants, became categorized as ‘enemies of the state’ (Engbersen 1996; Schinkel 
2005).  
 
The development of immigration policy at the level of the EU followed suit. As the issue of 
borders is intimately tied up with national sovereignty, the member states were very reluctant 
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to yield control to the institutions of the EU in matters of immigration and border control. 
‘Common policies’ were developed in the intergovernmental third pillar of the EU and some 
major initiatives, such as the Schengen agreements, were negotiated outside the framework 
of the EU altogether. The political sensitivity of immigration and asylum in Europe was one 
of the reasons that development of EU-policies in this area – Justice and Home Affairs – 
became firmly embedded in a discourse of safety and security (Kostakoupoulou 1998, Peers 
2000, Mitsilegas, Monar & Rees 2003). National sensitivities about sovereignty and secrecy 
did not however add up to disagreement about finding new ways to close the borders, 
improve control and harmonize visa policy. The latter being essential for controlling access to 
an internally borderless Schengen zone. The construction of the fortress took off in earnest 
during the 1990s. Physically, the dropping of the internal borders between the Schengen 
member states led to the reinforcement of the new joint external borders. Gates, concrete, 
fences and watchtowers are the most visible icons of the fortress. Some parts of the border 
and certain notorious backdoor entry points to the EU, such as the Spanish enclaves Ceuta en 
Melilla on the coast of Morocco, have been turned into fortresses in a most literal sense 
(Broeders 2002) and now look like military strongholds. This is not just a European 
phenomenon. Parts of the border between the United States and Mexico have undergone a 
similar transformation under militaristic slogans such as Operation Gatekeeper, Operation 
Hold-the-Line and Operation Hard Line (Andreas 2000). However, both the European 
border and the US-Mexican border are simply too long to control. Let alone seal off. Germany 
for example shared an external Schengen border with Poland (454 km) and with the Czech 
Republic (810 km) that even the generously staffed Bundesgrenzschutz could not patrol 
effectively and/or continuously (Asbeek Brusse & Griffiths 2004). Since December 21st 2007, 
Germany’s neighbours to the east are full members of Schengen, meaning that the burden of 
external control shifted to them with a new and even longer external Schengen borders in the 
east. Due to the long borders the Fortress Europe is not all steel and concrete. In the modern 
age immigration control has widened. Border control is ‘moving away from the border and 
outside the state’ (Lahav & Guireaudon 2000), or is becoming ‘remote control’ (Zolberg 
2002) or is moving ‘upwards, downwards and outwards’ (Guireaudon 2001). Classical border 
control, characterised by gates and guards, is changing as Anderson & Bigo (2002: 19) 
sketch: 
 
The control of movement of persons is changing - the Member State borders are less and less 
important. The control of movement begins in the country of origin, at the consulate for people 
coming from most countries in the world, it continues at the point of departure with travel 
agents and airlines, subject to carrier liability, exercising controls on travellers’ documentation 
and, for surface travellers at the land borders of the EU neighbouring countries who will not 
admit them if they suspect they intend to attempt to enter the EU without proper documents. 
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People arrive at the EU borders in large numbers, but many have already been deterred or 
prevented from reaching them. At the external EU border, if undocumented or suspect persons 
arrive by air, they will be held in an international zone of airports and entry to the EU is very 
difficult. By contrast, the external land borders of the EU are relatively easy to cross. The 
requirements of the market economy and the necessity of rapid circulation of goods explain 
why the government does not go too far “sealing” off the borders in a way that would prevent 
undocumented immigration.  
 
In other words, territorial borders are, in spite of huge investments, still permeable borders. 
One reason for that is that borders have a double function. The smooth functioning of the 
modern economy requires an easy passage for some people and goods. Businessmen and 
cargo should pass the border with a minimum of delay. On the flip side, the border is meant 
to filter out contraband, terrorists and irregular migrants. Border officials thus face the 
challenge to restrict illegal border crossings while facilitating and encouraging the rising 
volume of legal crossings. They have to filter out the ‘undesirable’ from the ‘desirable’ 
crossings (Andreas 2003) and they have to be quick about it. In his work on globalisation 
Bauman (1998) saw a new border developing between the first world and (a new) second 
world. This new border divides the global population into ‘tourists and vagabonds’ and into 
‘globals and locals’. In other words, international mobility may be part and parcel of what we 
call globalisation but it is the privilege of the few. Guiraudon & Joppke (2001) call this the 
paradoxical union of ‘open’ economies and ‘closed’ national states in the age of globalisation. 
Another reason for the permeability of the border is a matter of capacity. There is simply too 
much border in relation to the capacity the state can muster to guard it. The fact that a totally 
‘sealed’ border is neither possible, nor (economically) desirable has led to a new shift in 
policy to counter irregular migration.  
 
2.2.2 Panopticon Europe 
In recent years policies to counter irregular migration have increasingly turned inwards. 
Border controls remain important but in light of their ‘structural flaws’ have to be 
supplemented with policies of discouragement of those unwanted aliens that pass the border. 
The goal of discouraging irregular migrants has led to a shift towards internal migration 
control, which comprises a wide array of policy measures such as employer sanctions, 
amnesties, exclusion from public services and surveillance by the police (Van der Leun 2003, 
Cornelius et al. 2004). Immigration policy is usually equated with the territorial dimension of 
the state, but internal migration control reminds us that states are at once territorial and 
membership associations. When it comes to internal migration control, these two 
interrelated dimensions pose different challenges for the state, as Torpey (2000: 33) 
describes:  
 33 
 The first dimension, territorial access, chiefly raises questions about the capacity of states to 
identify citizens, distinguish them from non-citizens, and regulate their movement in keeping 
with policy objectives. The second dimension, establishment, concerns the extent to which 
states may be able to exclude noncitizens from opportunities for work, social services, or 
simply unperturbed existence once they have already entered the territory.  
 
In the future, internal borders may become even more important than state borders, than is 
already the case. Engbersen (2001: 242) suggests that the Fortress Europe may be turning 
into a panopticon Europe “in which not the guarding of physical borders is central, but far 
more the guarding of public institutions and labour markets by means of advanced 
identification and control systems. Panopticon Europe guards the ‘system border’ of rich 
welfare states”. The Dutch Linking Act that entered into force in 1998 is perhaps the 
quintessential example of panoptic shielding of the welfare state. This act makes the 
entitlement of immigrants to a whole range of public and semi-public provisions such as 
social benefits, health care, housing and education systematically conditional on having a 
regular residence status (Bernini & Engbersen 1996; Van der Leun 2003: 115).  
 
The metaphor of the panopticon comes from the work of Foucault (1995, org. 1977), who in 
turn borrowed the term from Bentham’s design for a prison. Bentham’s panoptic prison 
design, in which individual prisoners could be seen at all times by a centrally located guard 
who was invisible to them, has become a dramatic symbol for the modern society in which 
surveillance plays such an important role. The panopticon has become a central metaphor in 
the literature on surveillance, which deals with all sorts of gathering of personal information 
for analysis and the exertion of control. When it comes to surveillance by the state the 
gathering of information on citizens and their behavior is seen as a constitutive element of 
the power of the state over its subjects. Foucault’s emphasis on the intimate connection 
between power and knowledge, and on the crucial importance of individual surveillance in 
modern administrative systems has proven enormously suggestive (Torpey 1998: 248, see 
also Dandeker 1990). According to Foucault’s theory the constant surveillance and visibility 
in the panoptic prison are meant to do more than just control the inmates. The ultimate aim 
is to discipline the individual under surveillance. The idea is that the prisoners under the 
perpetual eye will experience a process of disciplining in which they lose the opportunity, 
capacity and will to deviate: 
 
“Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious 
and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to 
arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is 
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discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its 
actual exercise unnecessary…” (Foucault 1995, org. 1977: 201).  
 
In other words, the operation of power should become cheaper, easier and more effective as 
the inmates ‘internalize the gaze’ of power (Gilliom 2001: 130). The exclusion of irregular 
migrants through panopticism will be less precise as it is bound to the much more ‘fleeting’ 
institutions of the welfare state, instead of spatially confined institutions such as the prison 
and the school. The aim is to sift out anyone who lacks the proper documentation. Being 
undocumented bars access to public institutions and services and the underlying policy 
assumption is that this exclusion will discourage irregular migrants from lengthening their 
stay.   
 
Many researchers have taken the panopticon metaphor out of the realm of the prison and 
used it to describe other policies in which the state tries to control and influence (deviant) 
social behavior. The modern welfare state, and the control on its beneficiaries, has been 
compared to a panopticon (see for example Gilliom 2003), as has the introduction of cameras 
in public places for the purpose of public surveillance (see for example Yar 2003). In all cases 
information is gathered with the intention to improve control. Information serves as a power 
base for the state. In the modern state information and communication technology plays an 
important role in widening the possibilities to document, codify and store information on the 
activities of subjects and citizens.  
 
2.2.3 Migration control in a ‘state of surveillance’ 
In the recent academic literature on surveillance there is a debate on the loosening of bonds 
between the panoptic metaphor and the study of surveillance. Within the broader field of 
surveillance studies the panoptic metaphor has been questioned on many accounts (see for 
example Boyne 2000, Haggerty & Ericson 2000, Yar 2003, Lyon 2007). In relation to the 
question of internal migration control on irregular migrants the metaphor comes under 
strain on three specific counts: (1) the objects of surveillance are mobile and not bound to 
classical panoptic institutions, (2) surveillance is used for social sorting, rather than 
controlling the ‘socially sorted’ and (3) the aim of surveillance is exclusion rather than 
correction.  
 
Firstly, as Bauman (1998) indicated, international mobility is one of the key defining 
characteristics of globalization. For the elite it is a privilege, bordering on an obligation. The 
‘vagabond’ on the other hand, hopes to achieve his international mobility despite of the 
policies that the richer countries implement to prevent it. The element of mobility doesn’t sit 
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well with the institutional emphasis in Foucault’s panopticon. Instead of closed institutions 
such prisons, factories, schools and hospitals in which people are ‘kept’ under a watchful eye, 
surveillance is now aimed at moving populations. This requires a control on populations 
rather than on territories or populations in a fixed location. Territorial and institutional 
borders will have to be supplemented with a more ‘liquid’ border that is able to trace and 
survey the immigrant population. The power derived from panoptic surveillance has become 
increasingly extraterritorial and is no longer necessarily fixed to a place (Bauman 2000, 
Deleuze 2002, Bigo & Guild 2005). This does not mean that the institutional context has 
become irrelevant for the surveillance on unwanted immigrants. Far from it. Considering the 
fact that undocumented immigrants try to hide and submerge in west European societies, it 
is institutions such as the labour market, social security and health care institutions where 
they emerge and may (again) become visible to the state. Mostly, irregular migrants come 
into contact with these institutions on a temporary basis as contact with official institutions 
and public officials is preferably shunned. Their ‘close encounters with the welfare state’ (Van 
der Leun 2003: 115) differ from the fixed localities and fixed populations of the panopticon. 
So the locus of control has become less predictable and has to follow the movements of the 
population under surveillance.   
 
Secondly, surveillance of populations is primarily aimed at social sorting, defined by Lyon 
(2004: 142) as the classification of populations as a precursor to differential treatment. The 
population is therefore not a priori known and classified, as is the case in a prison or school. 
A prison or a school, one might say, starts with a sorted population of prisoners and students. 
Didier Bigo introduced the alternative metaphor of the “Ban opticon” noting that “ (…) the 
social practices of surveillance and control sort out, filter and serialize who needs to be 
controlled and who is free from that control, because he is ‘normalized’. It is more a Ban than 
a Pan opiticon” (Bigo & Guild 2005: 3; Bigo 2004). In other words, surveillance aims to 
divide the mainstream of the mobile population into separate subpopulations, which are to 
be treated differently. The Dutch and German asylum procedures are a prime examples of the 
‘art of subdivision’. These procedures have made various subdivisions within the broad 
category of eligible refugees, meaning those applicants who cannot be sent away due to 
humanitarian reasons. Most of those who are not refused protection are channelled towards 
some form of (temporary) auxiliary status with less legal rights than the UN refugee status. 
This means that most off them lack the strong rights of the refugee status, leaving the option 
of return at a later point in time open. Scanning and selecting certain groups from within the 
masses is a different function than the panoptic control of a selected and classified group. 
Gary Marx (2005: 13) points out that “many forms of surveillance can be usefully viewed as 
techniques of boundary maintenance. Surveillance serves to sustain borders through defining 
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the grounds for exclusion and inclusion - whether to physical places, opportunities or moral 
categories”.  
 
Thirdly, Panoptic surveillance in Europe on undocumented (or more generally unwanted) 
migrants has made exclusion an explicit policy objective. The system under construction is 
meant to gain knowledge of the actions and movements of irregular migrants, but not with 
the ultimate aim of structuring and moulding their behavior in line with socially accepted 
standards - defined by the state - as the Panopticon does. The aim is not to get them in line, 
but to get them out. The element of correction, of the ‘internalization of the gaze’, is not a 
central element of the panopticon that the member states of the EU are constructing4. 
Engbersen (2001), borrowing from Bauman’s analysis of modern American prisons, claims 
that the aim is not correction, but exclusion. “Panopticon Europe is not a ‘factory of 
correction’. Its aim is not disciplining and correcting undesirable migrants. Panopticon 
Europe is designed as a ‘factory of exclusion and of people habituated to their status of the 
excluded’ (Engbersen 2001: 242). In other words, the state gathers information on the doings 
and whereabouts of illegal immigrants with the explicit aim to exclude them from both its 
territorial and membership associations. ‘Post-panopticism’ then brings us to the realm of 
the surveillance state. The interaction between the advent of the surveillance state and the 
internal migration control on (irregular) migrants will be discussed in paragraph 2.3. 
 
2.2.4 Metaphors on power and the power of metaphors  
Even though metaphors are useful analytical concepts they are not without flaws or 
drawbacks. They structure our view of the world by highlighting certain elements of a 
phenomenon and omitting what can be ‘left out’ of the picture. The images they invoke are 
meant to convince but should also encourage reflection. They should be an invitation to 
reflect on the core characteristics of the phenomenon that is captured by the metaphor. 
However, they also run the risk of becoming clichés: weak metaphors that no longer invoke 
reflection but rather reflexes (Witteveen 2000: 43). Or phrased even stronger: “clichés can be 
easily consumed because they do not require cognitive reflection” (Zijderveld 1979: 12). 
However, the fact that they no longer invoke reflection does not mean that clichés do not 
have a social function. They are important in structuring social behavior but, as Zijderveld 
(1979) puts it, their meaning has been superseded by function. Powerful images such as the 
fortress and the panopticon have both advantages and drawbacks for the study of internal 
control on irregular migration. They should not be allowed to turn into clichés, that no longer 
                                                        
4  The ‘pedagogic’ element of the panopticon is not so much correction as it is prevention. The construction of 
the panopticon, just as that of the fortress is meant to discourage would-be immigrants and through 
discouragement prevent their arrival.  
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require reflection. These metaphors capture the nature and character of political and policy 
developments in a broad sense and stress those elements that help us to understand the 
essence of the type of surveillance under scrutiny. The Fortress Europe and the panoptic 
metaphor draw our attention to the power of the state and the enormous capacity it has built 
up in the ‘fight against illegal immigration’. It highlights the actions, choices and 
developments within the power container of the state. The concept of the ‘surveillance state’ 
furthermore channels our attention to technology and technological innovations. It highlights 
innovation in surveillance techniques, such as the current debate on biometrics, and its use 
for the government’s control on (mobile) populations. The choices and policies of the state 
are the central focus of this book and much of the ‘metaphorically inspired’ literature helps to 
highlight the relevant trends and leave side issues at the side. Paragraph 2.3 therefore focuses 
on ‘the’ state and the state perspective. 
 
But metaphors are obviously ideal types. Therein lies a problem, as social scientists often 
have to note that the devil is in the detail. Bennet (2005: 133) having conducted a detailed 
inquiry into what actually happens – in terms of surveillance - when you buy an airline ticket, 
points to the risks of relying too much on metaphors: 
 
Surveillance is, therefore, highly contingent. If social scientists are to get beyond totalizing 
metaphors and broad abstractions, it is absolutely necessary to understand these 
contingencies. Social and individual risk is governed by a complicated set of organizational, 
cultural, technological, political and legal factors. The crucial questions are therefore 
distributional ones: why do some people get more ‘surveillance’ than others? 
 
This points to realities both inside and outside of the power container of the state that are at 
odds with metaphoric clarity and lack of ambiguity. Power always meets resistance. 
Sometimes the state is openly challenged; sometimes opposition is covert and small scale. 
Sometimes resistance is a matter of the subjects of surveillance, while in other cases it is 
within the state itself that resistance or obstruction takes place. Too much emphasis on state 
power therefore entails the risk of blocking out counter movements that are relevant to the 
analysis of state surveillance on irregular migrants. Even though this study concerns itself 
with the developments of the state’s capacities and the choices it makes in the internal 
control on irregular migrants, it is important to note and where possible evaluate these 
countermoves and strategies. Paragraph 2.4 therefore deals with the literature that maps the 
limitations of state power and its control on irregular migration.   
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2.3 The surveillance state and internal migration control  
The history of surveillance is closely entwined with the history of the modern bureaucratic 
state. In fact, it is hard to imagine the first without the second. Bureaucracy depends on 
registration and classification to implement policies varying from collecting taxes, 
distributing benefits and allowances to controlling and policing the population. This 
paragraph will therefore start with a brief historical account of the connection between the 
rise of the modern bureaucracy and the rise of surveillance as an instrument of state power 
(2.3.1). Early on in the process of state formation, surveillance has been directed to the 
question of international mobility. Passports were an early form of subdividing populations 
into those who could legally pass the border and those who could not. The state drew 
territorial and legal borders by means of registration and documentation, thus classifying 
those who travelled without documents as ‘illegals’ or trespassers’. Paragraph 2.3.2 will deal 
with the link between surveillance and international mobility. The computer age has altered 
the face of the modern bureaucratic state on many fronts, but has been a revolution for the 
information intensity of modern surveillance. Surveillance is rapidly being computerised, 
networked and internationalised and is strengthening its focus on (irregular) international 
mobility (paragraph 2.3.3.). Though it is tempting to equate surveillance with technology this 
paragraph should make clear that surveillance can and often is both ‘face to face and/or 
technologically mediated’, even though in ‘today’s world the latter is growing fast’ (Lyon 
2007: 1).  
 
2.3.1 The rise of bureaucratic power and surveillance  
Accumulating information on citizens and inhabitants has been described as a central aspect 
of state formation. The historical rise of centralised nation states is closely entwined with the 
gathering of information on the population on a large scale. James Scott (1998) describes this 
process as one in which the state makes its people ‘legible’ by gathering information on its 
subjects in the various roles they play in society. This legibility served to increase the state’s 
ability to govern and control its population. Caplan & Torpey (2001: 1) in similar vein stress 
the role of ‘documenting individual identity’ in the rise of modern government: “Establishing 
the identity of individual people – as workers, taxpayers, conscripts, travellers, criminal 
suspects – is increasingly recognized as fundamental to the many operations of the state”. In 
order to enhance its grip on society, the state increased the accumulation of information on 
its inhabitants through registration and documentation. Information, legibility and 
documenting identities can of course be applied to various state tasks. It is vital for both the 
control of the population (with totalitarian control as its extreme form) but also for 
emancipatory goals and redistribution of scarce resources in light of the operations of the 
welfare state. Surveillance always moves somewhere on a continuum between care and 
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control (Lyon 2007: 3). Both the welfare state and the control state require elaborate 
bureaucracies to run their operations. 
 
The rise of the bureaucratic state went hand in hand with increasing possibilities, and 
desires, to control the population through information. Information and bureaucracy can 
almost be seen as two sides of the same coin. Authors such as Weber, Foucault and Giddens 
analysed bureaucracy as a highly rationalized mode of information gathering and 
administrative control. They discussed the administrative logic of modernity in terms of the 
growth of ‘surveillance’, understood as an expansion of the supervisory and information 
gathering capacities of the organizations of modern society and especially of the modern state 
and business enterprise (Dandeker 1990: 2). Surveillance in these views is one of the prime 
instruments at the disposal of the state to monitor and control its population and society. 
Often this line of reasoning has focused on the nightmarish extremes of state power and 
totalitarianism. Both fiction- Orwell’s all-seeing Big Brother - and history - the highly 
organised bureaucratic power of the German Third Reich - have provided vivid images of the 
power of surveillance when it is not morally or legally restrained. The intimate connection 
between bureaucracy and surveillance cannot be explained by just using images of a power-
hungry government seeking means to control and subject its population. Bureaucratic 
surveillance is two-faced: it can be seen from both the perspective of social control or from 
that of social participation. Lyon (1994: 31) argues that “The administrative machinery 
constructed during the nineteenth century can be understood both as a negative 
phenomenon – Weber’s ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratic rationality or Foucault’s ‘disciplinary 
society’ - or, more positively, as a means of ensuring that equal treatment is meted out to all 
citizens”. Both functions depend on the surveillance capacity of the state. It can be argued 
that the control function of surveillance came first in a historical sense. After all, registration 
and administration were originally designed to award duties and responsibilities to citizens, 
such as taxation and conscription (Scott 1998). As European states gradually developed into 
welfare states the duties of the citizens towards the state were supplemented with all sorts of 
rights and redistributions (see for an historical account De Swaan 1993). Gary Marx notes 
that the state’s reasons for collecting and using identification have broadened significantly 
over time. “In the twentieth century its traditional claimed needs to identify for reasons of 
internal security, the draft, to protect borders, and for taxation, were supplemented by 
regulatory needs and the desire to do good (as defined by those with power) via the welfare 
state” (Marx 2001: 326). This is where the other face of surveillance, the face of social 
redistribution and equal treatment of citizens, comes to the fore.  
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The function of internal surveillance and control is increasingly to separate the ‘ins’ from the 
‘outs’. Solidarity and redistribution are by definition limited to a clearly demarcated group. 
Especially in rich welfare states there is a paradox of solidarity and exclusion: maintenance of 
national, institutionalised forms of solidarity for the benefit of native citizens and denizens 
(legally residing aliens) requires a rigorous exclusion of outsiders from the welfare state’s 
social entitlements (Teulings 1995; Entzinger & Van der Meer 2004, Engbersen 2004). 
Identification and surveillance of the population is therefore also an instrument to determine 
eligibility. Both Germany and the Netherlands fit neatly into this representation of 
bureaucratic development. They are both elaborate welfare states with a high level of social 
protection, which requires a keen eye for matters of eligibility. Most sectors of public and 
semi-public life are highly regulated and subject to registration and documentary 
requirements by a professional and well staffed bureaucracy. However, the actual 
implementation of policy is executed in the offices and practices of the ‘street level 
bureaucracy’, where there usually is room for some (formal and informal5) discretion in 
decisions over benefits and sanctions (see Van der Leun 2003; Cyrus & Vogel 2003).  
 
2.3.2 Surveillance and the control on ‘legitimate movement’ 
In an age of globalization separating the ‘ins’ and the ‘outs’ has also become a matter of 
migration and immigration policy. Migration policy itself is a tool to divide the population of 
the ‘globally mobile’ into a part that is considered ‘legal’ and a part considered ‘illegal’. John 
Torpey (1998, 2000) argued that modern states, and the formation of the international 
system of nation states in which they are embedded, have monopolized the ‘legitimate means 
of movement’. He saw a development similar to Weber’s notion of ‘monopolization of the 
legitimate use of physical force’, in which the state took the legitimate use of violence out of 
the private sphere. Likewise, the state has taken the right to move across land and borders 
out of the private sphere: “The result of this process has been to deprive people of the 
freedom to move across certain spaces and to render them dependent on the state and the 
state system for the authorization to do so – an authority widely held in private hands 
theretofore” (Torpey 1998: 239). This monopolization was to a large extent executed through 
the introduction of the passport. The passport connected an individual with a written identity 
that can only be issued by the state and this document became the prerequisite for moving 
across the border. Identification, and thus identity, became formalized and documented. The 
issue of enforcement was of even greater importance. Identifying and documenting new 
subdivisions in society meant very little, if the state could not enforce its policies and regulate 
                                                        
5  Cyrus and Vogel (2003: 226) define formal discretion as “the scope of choices foreseen by law and 
administrative regulations” and informal discretion as “the use of choices that are not explicitly allowed by 
law or are even forbidden”. 
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the movement of its subjects. “The successful monopolization of the legitimate means of 
movement had to await the creation of elaborate bureaucracies and technologies that only 
gradually came into existence, a trend that intensified dramatically toward the end of 
nineteenth century” (Torpey 2000: 35). Surveillance and (international) mobility thus 
became closely entwined. As Boyne (2000: 287) puts it: “The prime function of surveillance 
in the contemporary era is border control. We do not care who is out there or what they are 
doing. We want to see only those who are entitled to enter”. Yet, this short quote outlines the 
problematic coherence between irregular migration, surveillance and exclusion in a nutshell. 
The fact that you only want to see those who are entitled to enter means that you have to care 
who is out there and what they are doing. Once irregular migrants have crossed the border it 
takes information and documentation on who they are and what they are doing to be able to 
effectively exclude them. That goes especially for the successful implementation of expulsion 
policies. The practical organization of exclusion is a labour- and information-intensive 
process. Torpey has argued that the modern state’s capacity to intervene in social processes 
depends on its ability to embrace society. As states grow larger and more administratively 
adept they can only penetrate society effectively if they embrace society first. “Individuals 
who remain beyond the embrace of the state necessarily represent a limit on its penetration” 
(Torpey 1998: 244). Irregular migrants are of course both likely – they are after all ‘irregular’ 
because they do not fit into any legal administrative category - and eager to stay beyond the 
embrace of the state. Internal migration control is aimed at embracing them and the 
institutions and circles in which they move in order to exclude them. 
 
Information and identification are vital for the control of populations and because of a 
general lack of registration this goes double for the irregular population. The keywords for 
the internal control on irregular migrants are surveillance and identification. In a modern 
(welfare) state exclusion is dependent on documentation (or registration) of identity and 
legal status. Marx (2001) describes seven types of ‘identity knowledge’. Of these, three types 
are especially important for the goal of internal control on irregular migrants. The first is 
‘legal name’, identification requires that a person can be linked to a unique legal name. In 
short: who are you? Authorities have to invest a lot of time in this basic question of identity. 
Linking an irregular migrant to a legal identity is a prerequisite for further action such as 
expulsion. The second type of identity knowledge is ‘locatability’. In short this refers to the 
question: where are you? This involves the “ability to locate and take various forms of action, 
such as blocking, granting access, delivering or picking up, charging, penalizing, rewarding or 
apprehending” (Marx 2001: 313). Locatability is one of the main links between capacity and 
enforcement. If the state does not know where to go, policy will remain a dead letter. In the 
case of ‘liquid’ populations (compare Bauman 2000) moving through society by stealth – 
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such as irregular migrants – borders will have to follow and seek out the places where they 
interact with the institutional world. Moreover, many irregular migrants will not wait for the 
immigration authorities to show up at the door when they have been given notice to leave the 
country, but go deeper underground. So from the state’s perspective the use of detention as a 
preparation for expulsion is another aspect of locatability. The third type is described as 
‘symbols of eligibility/non-eligibility’. This concerns the manner in which an identity is 
coupled with a set of rights. This can be done in the form of documentation (passport, social 
security card) or in the form of registration (legal status, eligibility etc).  
 
2.3.3 Surveillance and irregular migrants: two separate logics of exclusion 
The link between the exclusion of illegal immigrants and policies of surveillance can follow 
two separate, and essentially contradictory, logics. The first may be captured under the 
notion of ‘exclusion from documentation’ and the second under the notion of ‘exclusion 
through – or by means of – documentation and registration’. Policies operating under the 
first logic exclude irregular migrants from documentation and registration in order to exclude 
them, while policies operating the second logic aim to register and document the individual 
irregular migrant himself in order to exclude him in the ultimate sense of expulsion.  
 
Exclusion from documentation and registration 
First, surveillance may be deployed to exclude illegal immigrants from key institutions of 
society, such as the labour market and the housing market and even from informal networks 
of fellow countrymen and family. This is the panopticon Europe as described by Engbersen 
(2001) in which the state raises a protective wall of legal and documentary requirements 
around the key institutions of the welfare state and ‘patrols’ it with advanced identification 
and control systems. The first logic of exclusion reads as follows: Irregular migrants are 
(formally) excluded from legal documentation and registration, and are thus excluded from 
the institutions themselves while it is exactly these documents and registrations that allow 
access to the institutions. One might say that the state’s embrace in this perspective is aimed 
at the institutions and networks illegal immigrants use and need for their daily lives. It is a 
strategy of exclusion through the delegitimization and criminalization of all those who may 
be employing, housing and aiding illegal immigrants. Seen from this perspective the 
panopticon does contain some elements of correction and discipline as it aims to discipline 
first of all public and semi-public institutions and secondly the social networks and 
institutional surroundings of irregular migrants. These strategies are prominent in both the 
Netherlands and Germany where registration is routinely used to exclude irregular migrants 
from (semi-) public institutions and the labour market. Targeting the ring of ‘social’ networks 
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and institutions, such as the crackdown on legal and not-so-legal temp agencies in the 
Netherlands, is a more recent phenomenon.  
 
Exclusion through documentation and registration 
In the second type of logic, the state aims to embrace illegal immigrants themselves. The state 
follows the strategy of developing detection and identification tools aimed at exclusion. 
Embrace of illegal aliens is necessary for detection, but especially for expulsion, as states have 
gradually found out that ‘unidentifiable immigrants are constitutionally rather invulnerable 
to expulsion’ (Van der Leun 2003: 108). The expulsion of illegal aliens can only function 
when identity, nationality and (preferably) migration history can be established. If not, 
extradition is likely to be resisted from within (lawyers and judges) and from abroad 
(countries of transit and origin) in addition to personal resistance from illegal aliens 
themselves. It is therefore vital for the state to be able to connect illegal aliens with their ‘true’ 
identities. The second logic of exclusion then reads as follows: Documentation and 
registration is aimed at the irregular migrant himself, in his capacity as an irregular migrant. 
Documentation and registration have to establish (a) the illegal status of the migrant and (b) 
establish and (re) connect the irregular migrant with his legal identity. In other words, 
registration is used to identify or even re-identify irregular migrants (see Broeders 2007). 
This is in turn needed in order to facilitate exclusion in the ultimate sense: expulsion from 
the state. This strategy is dominant in the advanced welfare states of Northern Europe 
(Engbersen 2003; Levinson 2005, Van Kalmthout et al. 2007). Since the 1990s Germany and 
the Netherlands have for example been increasing their detention capacity for irregular 
migrants and rejected asylum seekers with the aim of facilitating expulsion (Jesuit Refugee 
Service 2005, Welch and Schuster 2005). Both countries have also been investing heavily in 
database systems that are able to register, track and identify the resident migrant population 
and are leading advocates of organising and equipping data exchange at the European level in 
matters of migration management (see for example Aus 2003, 2006, Broeders 2007). In 
southern Europe, the Italian, Spanish and Greek governments have in recent years 
particularly pursued a strategy of selective inclusion, which also requires documenting and 
registering irregular migrants6.This latter strategy, though important, is however outside of 
the focus of this study. 
 
                                                        
6  These countries have followed a strategy of selective inclusion of specific categories of illegal migrants 
through regularization programmes. An increasing number of European countries have adopted such 
regularization programmes over the past decade. Such programmes bring undocumented persons out of the 
shadows and provide information to governments on their numbers and characteristics. It also transforms 
them into regular denizens with corresponding rights and duties (e.g. to become a taxpayer). 
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2.3.4 Surveillance in the digital age: tracking and identifying mobile populations  
The introduction of the computer to the modern bureaucracy has no doubt been a 
quantitative and a qualitative leap for its capacity. Gilliom (2001: 129) simply states that “the 
turn to the computerization of surveillance and administration represents a revolutionary 
shift in administrative power of the state system”. Filing cabinets and card indexes have been, 
or are being, transformed into searchable digital databases. Information and communication 
technology has made it possible to link various databases and to create networks between 
them. Communication technology has also detached registrations and administrations from 
fixed places and locations because they are often remotely searchable. This interconnectivity 
and accessibility of information makes cross-referencing potentially a matter of seconds. 
Computerisation, interconnectivity and remote accessibility are an enormous boost for the 
state’s ability to execute the first logic of exclusion from documentation and registration. The 
verification of non-registration or the checking of suspect documents becomes easier and 
faster. From a purely technological perspective the limit may indeed be approaching the sky.   
 
Whether or not the governments connect and combine different bodies of information will 
increasingly become a matter of legal constraints, as the technological constraints are losing 
their relevance quickly. Computers and modern surveillance techniques are spreading rapidly 
in modern society. Moreover, it is not just governments that are stepping up their 
surveillance activities. Big brother is joined by big business. Corporate actors are interested 
in all sorts of information on citizens (often in their role of consumers) and some forms of 
surveillance are in the hands of private parties, such as video surveillance in stores and other 
semi-public spaces. Haggerty & Ericson (2000: 609) see the development of a ‘surveillant 
assemblage’, in which surveillance becomes an inescapable feature of modern society. They 
paint a somewhat fatalistic and dramatic picture, in which there is no escape from the coming 
future:   
 
In the face of multiple connections across myriad technologies and practices, struggles against 
particular manifestations of surveillance, as important as they might be, are akin to efforts to 
keep the ocean’s tide back with a broom – a frantic focus on a particular unpalatable 
technology or practice while the general tide of surveillance washes over us all. 
 
This ‘surveillant assemblage’, spreads much wider than the systems of knowledge production 
of the state itself and should not just be viewed as a top-down system in which the few 
monitor the many. The availability of surveillance systems and the rapid spread of their use 
have ‘democratised’ the chances of becoming the object of surveillance. Haggerty & Ericson 
(2000: 614) use the metaphor of rhizomatic expansion for this development. Rhizomes are 
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plants, which grow in surface extensions through interconnected vertical root systems. Or put 
simpler: they grow like weeds. The rhizome metaphor accentuates two characteristics of the 
surveillant assemblage: its phenomenal growth through expanding uses, and its levelling 
effects on hierarchies. Though the phrase is usually reserved for paranoia, it can almost be 
said that surveillance is everywhere. For Haggerty & Ericson (2000: 619) this development 
marks “the progressive ‘disappearance of disappearance’ – a process whereby it is 
increasingly difficult for individuals to maintain their anonymity, or to escape the monitoring 
of social institutions”. For irregular migrants the ‘disappearance of disappearance’ would be 
truly bad news.   
 
Digital surveillance has thus become an integral part of everyday life. Whereas in earlier days 
there was a limited number of records on an individual –usually locally stored printed 
documents – the digital tracks of modern man are everywhere. Most of it is generated with 
citizens’ consent or under conditions of their indifference. Lyon (2003: 152) rightfully 
reminds us that “Compliance with surveillance is commonplace. Most of the time, and for 
many reasons, people go along with surveillance”. The result is a circulation of (various) 
representations of an individual in databases, that Gary Marx calls digital shadows. “(…) now, 
with so many new ways of collecting personal data and the growth of data banks, we see the 
rise of a shadow self based on images in distant, often networked computers” (Marx 2005: 
23). Haggerty & Ericson (2000: 613) point to roughly the same phenomenon when they 
speak of ‘data doubles’ that “(…) circulate in a host of different centres of calculation and 
serve as markers for access to resources, services and power in ways which are often 
unknown to its referent”. The growth of surveillance and the digital storage of data on 
individuals is paralleled by a growing interconnectedness between systems of surveillance. 
Here we enter the realm of the second logic of exclusion, the exclusion through 
documentation and registration. When applied to the case of irregular migrants this would 
entail all efforts to ‘embrace’ and register them – i.e. create data doubles – in order to re-
identify them at a later stage when they come into contact with state officials. The fast 
developments in computer technology and the diminishing costs connected with computer 
registration make policies of ‘encompassing registration’ in order to control a relatively small 
population increasingly a viable option.  
 
So in the case of irregular migration the state is increasingly turning to modern surveillance 
techniques to achieve the double goal of identification and exclusion. Digitalised databases 
and biometric identifiers, two relatively new innovations, are being combined and seem to 
become the ‘technique of choice’ for governments that want to restrict and control irregular 
migration. Databases are used for pre-emptive surveillance that aims to anticipate likely 
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unwanted behaviour by means off classification and profiling (Salter 2005: 43) and for the 
(re-)identification of terrorists, criminals and, increasingly, irregular migrants . In border 
policy there is a long-standing practice pre-emption in for example visa policy. The citizens of 
some countries need to apply for visa and some countries are even blacklisted. Databases 
facilitate this mechanism and may also make it easier to blacklist groups of people or even 
known individuals. As migration policies rely heavily on legal documentation and 
identification – not in the least when trying to expel irregular migrants – it is vital for the 
state to connect the dots between an irregular migrant and his or her legal identity. Or, as 
Salter eloquently puts it “Linking the mobile body to stable or reliable information is a crucial 
technique of risk management” (Salter 2005: 47).  
 
The steadily growing reliance on databases and profiling also affects the development of 
bureaucracy itself. Aas (2004) has argued that the reliance on databases leads bureaucracies 
in the direction of more formalized decision making procedures in which the formats and 
electronic forms themselves increasingly determine how professionals should think and act. 
Individual cases are processed according to procedure and the ultimate decision is embedded 
in the algorithms and decision trees of the software. Once all the required boxes have been 
filled in the computer ‘dictates’ the appropriate action to be taken. The individual subject is 
increasingly standardized and de-contextualised, while the individual bureaucrat is losing 
elements of its discretionary space. Bovens & Zouridis (2002: 180) have described the 
introduction and use of ICT in some sectors of the bureaucracy as the onset of a development 
in which ‘street level bureaucracy’ (cf. Lipsky 1980) develops into ‘system level bureaucracy’. 
In this transformation the role of ICT is no longer supportive but decisive and its function for 
the bureaucratic organisation moves from ‘data registration’ to ‘execution, control and 
external communication’. Even though their analysis is based on and is only applicable to 
what they call ‘decision making factories’, such as the Dutch organisation that handles the 
Student Grants and Loans, the logic of this development - that it limits the human factor in 
both bureaucrat (by limiting his discretion) and the subject (by codifying him) - is more than 
relevant for the case at hand. The more dependent the migration policy process becomes on 
the digital decision making and databases, the more the interaction between the (irregular) 
migrant and immigration official will be characterized by this ‘double depersonalization’ 
(Broeders 2009b).  
 
Given the fact that ‘identities’ are now centre stage in matters of migration and deportation, 
states are searching for the undisputable link between person and identity. In doing so, they 
have brought the body into the equation. The buzzword in matters of surveillance and 
migration is ‘biometrics’, i.e. the use of data extracted from the body, such as an iris scan, 
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digital facial image or a fingerprint. Biometrics primarily serve the purpose of the verification 
of identities, on the assumption that truly unique identifiers are found on the body (Lyon 
2003: 68, Van der Ploeg 2005, Lodge 2007). With the widespread use of biometric 
technologies the body has become a password authenticating people and authorizing (or 
disqualifying) their behaviour accordingly. On some airports there are now fast-track 
procedures for frequent flyers on the basis of an iris scan. Gaining access to offices and 
government buildings is sometimes dependent on a fingerprint scan. In most other cases it is 
usually bad news if a fingerprint is matched against previously stored prints. A print that is 
matched against the records of the police or the immigration authorities will often result in 
an arrest, a refusal for entry or in an expulsion procedure. Muller (2004) calls this the 
transformation of citizenship into ‘identity management’.  
 
Identity management also highlights the link between biometrics and the expanding system 
of databases that supports it. The use of biometrics is an important part in the development 
of what Mark Salter calls ‘hyper-documentation’ by which he means that “each piece of data 
is linked to other data, and ultimately to a risk profile: body-biometrics-file-profile” (Salter 
2005: 47). Biometrics are – at the very least in the eyes of the governments and government 
agencies that are promoting them – very useful for the tracking and sorting of 
(internationally) mobile populations. Especially in the post 9-11 era the political support for 
the use of biometrics in matters of security and migration has been virtually unwavering (see 
for example Lyon 2003; Muller 2005, Balzacq 2008). Politicians are introducing or 
contemplating the use of biometrics in passports, ID-cards, visa and all sorts of databases 
related to immigration policy and (national) security. Both immigration and national security 
issues such as terrorism are global phenomena and groups of states have strong incentives to 
work together where it is mutually advantageous (see also Broeders 2008). According to 
Lyon (2004: 139) the ‘infrastructural basis of contemporary surveillance’ makes it a 
(potentially) international phenomenon. Transnational crime, international terrorism and 
international migration have pushed the search for effective policies and remedies beyond 
national borders. The government regulation of the ‘legitimate means of movement’ has 
taken on a grander scale than just the national state. A relatively new phenomenon is that 
states are starting to cooperate, share information and in some cases are even setting up joint 
surveillance systems. In the field of immigration policy, the member states of the EU have 
been working on an interconnected surveillance system of their own for quite some time. It 
started with the Schengen Information System (SIS), that lists persons – primarily irregular 
migrants – and missing objects such as identity documents. It is now supplemented with 
Eurodac database, that registers asylum applicants including their fingerprints and will be 
expanded with the Visa Information System (VIS), that will register fingerprints and the 
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application details of anyone who requests a visa of the EU. These are vast databases that can 
be accessed throughout the European Union and even outside of it in consular offices in the 
case of the (not yet operational) Visa Information System. When these systems are used in 
the context of the ‘fight against illegal migration’ and the internal control on irregular 
migrants they are vital tools for the exclusion through registration, as their principal function 
is to re-identify irregular migrants (Broeders 2007). It has been especially member states 
such as Germany and the Netherlands that have been pushing for the rolling out of this 
network of databases in the context of the Schengen and wider EU fora.  
 
2.4 The limits of state surveillance 
Much research has been devoted to the question why immigration policy has not been able to 
control immigration. Why is the liberal state, despite political determination and vast 
resources, ‘losing control’ of immigration? Why is there a “significant and persistent gap 
between official immigration policies and actual policy outcomes” (Cornelius et al. 2004: 4)? 
This ‘policy gap hypothesis’ is in the view of Cornelius, Martin & Hollifield, who coined the 
phrase in the first edition of their book Controlling immigration. A global perspective, not 
even a real hypothesis. They stress that it is perhaps misleading to refer to the gap hypothesis 
as a true hypothesis since it is an empirical fact that few labour-importing countries have 
immigration control policies that are perfectly implemented or do not result in unintended 
consequences. In other words: policy gaps are a given. The new identification, information 
and control mechanisms that the state is setting up, will also have their flaws and will most 
likely produce new policy gaps.  
 
The policy gap however, does have a specific anatomy. Research has shown there are various 
sources of this policy gap and that their relative importance varies from country to country. 
For example, client politics and the active and professional lobbying of politicians are an 
integral part of the American political system. Given the presence of large, and sometimes 
politically influential, groups of immigrants there is a substantive lobby and popular 
movements on behalf of (illegal) immigrants that influences policy even against popular 
sentiments of limiting immigration (Freeman 1998). As most European countries lack a 
tradition of political lobbying ‘American style’ there is much less organised pressure on 
governments in this style. Other ‘sources’ of the gap fit the profile of northern member states 
of the EU, such as the Netherlands and Germany, better. In this paragraph the sources of the 
policy gap are organised in two clusters.  
 
One cluster centres on sources of the policy gap within the state (par. 2.4.1.). Different levels 
of government and different branches of the government produce restraints on the intentions 
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and actions of the executive branch of government. But even within the realm of the 
executive different (political) logics may be at work simultaneously, thus producing policy 
gaps. Gaps may be the result of conflicting political considerations at the national and the 
local level and may also result from legal constraints or from practical and technological 
limitations. The second cluster centres on the irregular migrant and his institutional and 
social surroundings. Irregular migrants produce restraints on policy either through the use of 
social networks and legal, semi-legal and informal institutions (par. 2.4.2) or through their 
own individual actions (par. 2.4.3). Individual actions sometimes carry more weight than 
might be expected given the relatively weak position of irregular migrants. The restraints 
found in the sphere of the irregular migrants and his (institutional) surroundings can be 
captured under the notion of ‘foggy social structures’: social structures that emerge from 
efforts by individuals and organizations to avoid the production of knowledge about their 
activities by making them either unobservable or indeterminable; or, put another way, the 
practical production of fog (Bommes & Kolb 2003: 5 of 133). Both the Dutch and German 
state and society offer many examples of internal restraints on the state (emanating from 
local government, state agencies and the judicial branch of government for example) as well 
as examples of institutional ‘innovations’ on behalf of irregular migrants – though by no 
means benevolent institutions per se - and possibilities for individual strategic behaviour. 
 
2.4.1 The state and ‘self restraint’ 
Policy gaps may be the result of political choices. Sometimes officially declared immigration 
policy is quite different from the ‘real’ intention of policymakers (Cornelius et al. 2004, 
Castles 2004, Cornelius 2005). Some policies remain unimplemented intentionally because 
‘turning a blind eye’ is the politically and/or economically more sensible option. For the 
United States Cornelius (2005) has shown the huge gap between the rhetoric and funding of 
the patrolling of the US-Mexican border and the virtual non-existence of internal controls on 
the labour market (i.e. control on employers). But this also holds true for the Southern 
member states of the EU. Castles (2004: 223) even claims that the resulting paradox is in fact 
the real, yet undeclared, object of state policy. In his view irregularization can be seen as “(…) 
an attempt to create a transnational working class, stratified not only by skill and ethnicity, 
but also by legal status”. It may also mean that certain policies are for a large part intended to 
give the impression that the government is handling the problem, while it is fully aware that 
it is not. In Germany and the Netherlands this may well take the form of a gap between 
political rhetoric and a lack of political priority for policy implementation. Another version 
may result from investing heavily in very visible ‘solutions’ in the full knowledge that the 
investment amounts to the proverbial drop in the ocean, and not much more. For the USA, 
Andreas (2000) described the enormous investments in the guarding of the US-Mexican 
 50 
border in terms of an ‘escalation of policy’. In his view this escalation of border control had to 
be seen as a response to the powerful narrative of the loss-of-control theme. The escalation 
did sort effect in actual border control, but its main purpose was symbolic and clearly aimed 
at the domestic public. “Yet policing methods that are suboptimal from the perspective of a 
means-ends calculus of deterrence can be optimal from the political perspective of 
constructing an image of state authority and communicating moral resolve” (Andreas 
2000:9). Phrased slightly more provocative it simply means that stupid policies can 
sometimes make smart politics.  
 
Sometimes, political rhetoric is harsher than the official policy practice for reasons of self-
interest. Though it is certainly not something that governments often publicly admit to, but 
irregular migrants are as a rule not excluded from urgent medical care. In the Netherlands, 
the entry into force of the Linkage Act was accompanied with the installation of a ‘Linkage 
fund’. Medical professionals can draw from this government fund when they treat uninsured 
irregular migrants. In part this fund is the result of obligations under international law, but a 
secondary reason is the protection of wider society against the spread of disease and 
epidemics. Historically, exclusion of the ‘unwanted’ has been limited by a mixture of 
humanitarian considerations and considerations of fear and safety. De Swaan (1989) has 
shown that the evolution of welfare and healthcare was to a large extent built on the self-
interests of the elite who feared that the disease and poverty of the unfortunate might turn 
against them. A similar train of thought underlies some of the limits on the exclusion of 
irregular migrants nowadays.     
 
In the USA, and other classical immigration-countries, policies have been watered down or 
hardly implemented under the influence of pressure groups such as employers and other pro-
immigration lobbies (see for example Cornelius 2005). In Europe, domestic restraints usually 
take another form. Potentially effective but draconian control measures are likely to be 
challenged and even overturned by courts that brand such measures unconstitutional or in 
violation of rights that cannot be withheld from (irregular) migrants. High Courts such as the 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht and the Dutch Hoge Raad performed this role in earlier 
stages of the development of immigration policy. Courts intervened in the development of 
government policies and policy proposals on issues such as illegal expulsions and 
withholding certain rights and entitlements from long-term immigrants. For example, in two 
famous cases in 1973 and 1978 the German Bundesverfassungsgericht first curtailed the 
executive’s nearly unlimited discretion to expel aliens and then codified the notion that the 
rights of legal immigrants should grow incrementally over time and should ultimately 
approach the rights of the citizen (Joppke 1999b; Broeders 2001: 62-63). Joppke (1998) calls 
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this the “self-limited sovereignty that explains why liberal states accept unwanted 
immigrants”. This national ‘channelling’ of international legal norms and human rights, has a 
more prominent effect on policy development than international pressure or international 
law itself.  
 
Other gaps may be the result of a lack of capacity at the level of the implementation or may 
result from differences of opinion between different agencies or levels of government. “If 
local authorities do not share the same policy objectives and interests of the national 
government (or they are not given sufficient resources) they may become lax in enforcement 
or simply not comply” (Cornelius et al. 2004: 15). Sometimes gaps may occur at the local 
level because of political differences between national and local authorities. More often 
however, it is the local level of government that is confronted with the results of national 
policies and has to deal with issues of social order, public health and safety as they emerge in 
local practice (see for example Van der Leun 2003). Strict exclusion policies are then watered 
down at the local level by municipalities and private and semi-private organisations, though 
their means are limited and they can often only give temporary relief (see for some Dutch 
examples Rusinovic et al. 2002). The local level of government often faces the challenge of 
drawing a socially acceptable border between inclusion and exclusion, which sometimes 
results in defying national laws and policies or even taking legal action against the national 
state.  
 
The prominence of information and information technology is usually an asset for the state, 
but it can also be a restraint on policy. The centrality of what Bommes & Kolb (2003: 5 of 
133) call ‘knowledge production’ also leads to vulnerabilities. Knowledge production may be 
vital to exert control in a modern society. “Yet societies and their states operate on the basis 
of insecurity, concerns about gaps in knowledge, doubt about the reliability and validity of 
various forms of constructed knowledge and the incompatibilities of a range of forms of 
knowledge”. Scott (1998) turns this line of reasoning up a notch. He argues that modern 
states must produce knowledge and information in order to execute their various policies. 
The process of knowledge production, however, requires simplification of a complex social 
reality. Reality has to be rewritten in order to make social reality ‘fit’ into the categories and 
terms in which the policies are formulated. This is basically the flip side of the development 
from ‘street level bureaucracy’ to ‘system level bureaucracy’ as described in paragraph 2.3.3. 
Shifting control from the bureaucrat towards the bureaucratic database limits the human 
factor in bureaucratic operation. Sometimes this may be an advantage for bureaucratic 
procedures as it increases equal treatment. However, a greater dependence of (the logic) of 
databases may also increase blind spots in the panoptic gaze. Databases are after all never 
 52 
‘street smart’ and do not posses the professional and tacit knowledge of an experienced 
professional.   
 
2.4.2 Restraints on the state: public protest, social capital and ‘bastard institutions’ 
Just as illegal aliens are ‘illegal’ because they do not fit into any legal category, they are also a 
group because they are labelled as such by policy. They are not a group by choice and are 
seldom truly organised, especially in Europe. Moreover, public protest is unlikely to sort 
much effect as the general public attitude towards immigration in Western Europe is hardly 
favourable. Especially illegal aliens, who lack all but the most basis set of rights, do not seem 
to have many or very vocal defenders. In the past groups such as the Witte Illegals Movement 
(Witte Illegalen) in the Netherlands, the still very active German Jesuit Refugee Service, and 
the churches did target public opinion to improve their legal and social situation. Nowadays 
it seems that resistance against policy has been ‘replaced’ with assistance to irregular 
migrants. Various groups and organisations play a role in helping irregular immigrants 
getting by on a day-to-day basis, thus weaving a sort of social safety net, albeit with limited 
capacity (Rusinovic et al. 2002). Public opinion and civil rights groups are even further in the 
background when it comes to the growing surveillance of irregular immigrants. The 
application of new information technology in the fight against illegal immigration is relatively 
unknown to the general public, and is unlikely to muster much popular resistance. Even 
when it concerns citizens and legal inhabitants themselves the use of modern surveillance 
systems hardly stirs up popular unrest. Gilliom’s (2001: 124) observation for the USA that 
“Our nation is adopting widespread policies of surveillance and control with a barely stifled 
yawn or even muted applause”, seems to apply to Western Europe as well. 
 
In order to remain out of sight, irregular migrants steer clear of formal institutions that 
increasingly require registration and official documentation. Just as many irregular migrants 
depend on the shadow economy for work they increasingly rely on informal ‘shadow’ markets 
in the spheres of work, housing, relations and documents. These informal markets can be 
classified as bastard institutions (Hughes 1994) or parallel institutions (Mahler 1995). They 
are illegitimate institutions in which we can see the same social processes going on that are to 
be found in the legitimate institutions (Hughes 1994: 193-194). These bastard institutions are 
developed by irregular migrants, regular migrants and native citizens, in response to the 
demand that is created by restrictive legislation and the large demand for cheap labour force, 
illegal housing, (false) documents, partners, et cetera. Bastard institutions are essential for 
the travel and residence opportunities of irregular migrants and very hard for the central 
state to gain control over: state instruments of surveillance and identification have difficulty 
penetrating them. As such, they are typical examples of ‘foggy structures’.  
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 In addition to bastard institutions that enable them to escape from formal patterns of 
registration, irregular migrants make strategic use of informal migration networks. These 
also help them to avoid detection by the state. The transnational social capital of irregular 
migrants makes it possible for them to follow in the footsteps of compatriots legally residing 
in Europe and remain in the shadow of ethnic communities (Engbersen 2001). Whereas 
bastard institutions are difficult to control by the state because of their illegitimate character, 
this social capital is hard to control because of its legitimate character. After all, regular 
migrants are allowed to travel freely (and may secretly take someone along in their car) and 
may also have their compatriots come over on tourist visas and then help them to stay in the 
country illegally (Broeders & Engbersen 2007).  
 
2.4.3 Restraints on the state: the importance of not being earnest  
Just like other socially weak groups, the resistance of illegal aliens is unlikely to be open, 
organised and confrontational. A demonstration is hardly a wise strategy if you wish to 
remain unseen. Scott (1985) has shown that the resistance of socially weak groups is usually 
silent and individual. They are a “form of individual self-help; and they typically avoid any 
direct symbolic confrontation with authority or with elite norms” (Scott 1985: 29). Everyday 
forms of resistance are the weapons of the weak that may prove to be very effective in the 
frustration of policy. Simple strategies can sometimes seriously undermine all the might and 
computer power that the modern state has at its disposal. As Gary Marx noted “Humans are 
wonderfully inventive at finding ways to beat control systems and to avoid observation. Most 
surveillance systems have inherent contradictions, ambiguities, gaps, blind spots and 
limitations, whether structural or cultural, and if they do not, they are likely to be connected 
to systems that do” (Marx 2003: 372). Gilliom showed the limitations of surveillance on 
welfare systems of social security. “The surveillance system seeks to gauge truth and 
compliance by using officially reordered sources of income in a data set which is awesome in 
its capacity to measure recorded events anywhere in the nation, but laughable in its blindness 
to unrecorded income, barter and trade” (Gilliom 2001: 132).   
 
Those who do not wish to be seen can either hide or try to obscure the vision of those 
watching by purposefully producing ‘foggy social structures’. Illegal aliens are no fools and 
often anticipate the state’s action or use their knowledge about policies, procedures and 
loopholes to stay out of sight or to frustrate implementation of policy (see for example 
Engbersen 2001, Van der Leun 2003, Sciortino 2004, Broeders & Engbersen 2007). 
Manipulation of their personal identity is one of the major strategies adopted by illegal aliens 
who want to prevent detection by the state. Irregular migrants often do not have the 
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possibility to live and work under their personal identity in the public sphere (and sometimes 
neither in the private sphere) given the risk of apprehension and deportation. Irregular 
migrants therefore develop various strategies to change and mask their personal identity and 
illegal status. There are three main variants (Engbersen 2001). First of all, there is the 
structural or situational adoption of a false identity. A widespread practice is the acquisition 
of false papers or legitimate documents - such as passports, social security numbers and 
medical insurance cards - from legitimate others. Irregular migrants also use a false identity 
as a major strategy to ensure that they can stay in the EU in case the police arrest them. The 
relatively high number of Algerians among apprehended Dutch irregular migrants, for 
example, may be explained by the fact that many Moroccans assume an Algerian identity. As 
the Algerian authorities are generally uncooperative when it comes to implementing 
deportations, it makes them more difficult to deport (Van der Leun 2003). Secondly, they 
obliterate their legal identity – more particular, their nationality – vis-à-vis the authorities. 
Thus, irregular migrants can prevent and obstruct deportation by destroying their 
identification papers (such as their passports). Unidentifiable irregular migrants are the 
‘unmanageable’ cases that the immigration authorities have difficulty coping with and they 
are seldom deported. Thirdly, they conceal their irregular status from others, such as 
employers, public officials and members of their own ethnic community. They do so out of 
fear for repercussions but also because knowledge of their status may lead to an inferior 
position in their own community. These identity strategies highlight the importance of lying 
for irregular immigrants. When there is no documented proof of identity, the agents of the 
state are powerless without the information provided by the individual.  
 
2.4.4 Restraints on the state in Germany and the Netherlands 
There are, in short, many possible restraints on the politics and policies of the state. That 
being said, it should be pointed out here that the empirical core of this research project 
concerns itself with the intentions, politics, policies and instruments that the Dutch and 
German state bring into play for the internal migration control on irregular migrants. Though 
I am well aware of the restraints that result from the various sources described above, they 
are not a central part of the analysis made in the following chapters. Policy gaps coming from 
these sources will obviously appear and reappear throughout the analysis, but the focus is on 
the state and development of state policies and not on the irregular migrant and his social 
and institutional environment. For both the German and the Dutch case there have been 
research projects that do take the position of the irregular migrant as the starting point and 
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focus for empirical research7. Nonetheless, some of the restraints are more relevant than 
others in this study, especially if one differentiates between the policy sectors that will be 
analysed. Not every source of policy gaps will be of (major) importance in the policy domains 
of the following chapters. Each policy domain ‘favours’ a certain type – or types - of restraint 
on the state as a result of the institutional setting and relative power positions within that 
setting. For example, access to the labour market, which is a major lifeline for irregular 
migrants, is bound to produce policy gaps as a result of strategic and risk-calculating 
behaviour of individuals and of intermediary, often informal, institutions. Market forces do 
not necessarily stop at legal requirements and boundaries, especially when the balance 
between risk and profits tips in favour of the latter. Internal surveillance by the police will 
most likely find its policy gaps within the realm of the state itself. The line between (national) 
political priorities and the priorities of police officers on the beat is a long one, along which 
priorities may be watered down for various reasons. Detention and expulsion will most likely 
meet resistance from the individual migrant who has a lot to gain from non-cooperation and 
shielding off his legal identity.     
 
However, the development of internal migration control and the drive towards applying more 
and more technical means to detect, identify and exclude irregular migrants, is at least partly 
driven by the fact that in time policy instruments are often evaded and even rendered useless 
by the counteractions and evasions that irregular migrants and (informal) institutions come 
up with. Policy innovations provoke counter innovations that aim to neutralize policy effects 
and this may ultimately result in a stalemate. In other words, there is an important element 
of action and reaction in the interaction between the state and the irregular migrant, though 
this would be hard to measure given the lack of hard facts and figures on the developments 
within the population of irregular migrants. The differences in power positions are also 
striking. Even though irregular migrants and ‘their’ institutions are far from powerless, they 
remain the ‘little people’ that have to rely on the weapons of the weak. Caplan & Torpey 
(2001: 7) see it thus: “In short, states and their subjects/citizens routinely play cat-and-
mouse with individual identification requirements. Yet even if, as these examples suggest, the 
game is never entirely decided in advance, it still seems realistic to concede that so far the cat 
has held the better cards”. On the other hand, some of the examples above suggest that 
modest means, such as a simple lie, are sometimes extremely effective.  
 
                                                        
7  For the Netherlands the “hidden city’ research project is especially noteworthy. This project on irregular 
migrants in the city of Rotterdam resulted in a number of (Dutch) publications, such as Burgers & Engbersen 
(1999); Engbersen, Van der Leun, Staring & Kehla (1999); Staring (2001) and Van der Leun (2003). In 
Germany a number of researchers, both University and NGO-based, have undertaken research projects 
focussing on the position and living conditions of irregular migrants in Germany or specific German cities. 
Examples are Anderson (2003) on Munich, Alt (2003) on Munich and Leipzig and Stobbe (2004). 
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2.5 A new regime of internal migration control? 
This book is primarily about states, not about irregular migrants. More precisely, it is about 
the question whether there is a development in state policies towards irregular migrants in 
certain countries of the European Union in which policies of societal exclusion (the first 
logic) are supplemented with policies of exclusion focused on identification and expulsion 
(the second logic). In that sense, it’s main focus is not even on the two case studies, Germany 
and the Netherlands. The development itself is the prime focus of research. Germany and the 
Netherlands are the empirical cases that are studied to seek an answer to the question 
whether this development is taking place and if so, to what extent and in what form. This 
hypothesized development of state behaviour vis-à-vis irregular migrants consists of a 
number of core elements. 
 
- Internal migration policy on irregular migrants is intensifying in countries where 
their presence is considered a (political) problem  
- Internal migration policy on irregular migrants is dominated by the policy goal of 
exclusion  
- This exclusion follows two separate logics:  
(a) exclusion from (formal) institutions, in which the irregular migrant’s access 
to registration and documentation is barred and is therefore excluded from the 
institutions. Recognizing irregular migrants as ‘not belonging’ is sufficient in 
this more traditional logic of internal migration control.  
(b) exclusion in the sense of expulsion, in which case exclusion requires an 
extensive documentation, registration and identification of the irregular 
migrant himself. In this logic identification is indispensible for effective 
exclusion (paradoxically this exclusion often initially requires a radical 
embrace of irregular migrants). 
- Exclusion is increasingly executed through a system of digitalized bureaucratic 
registration and surveillance. A technical and computerized approach will become 
increasingly dominant. Internal migration control is a matter of the surveillance state  
- The almost oppositional demands the two logics of exclusion make on the 
organization of bureaucratic documentation and registration, make a shift towards 
the (supplementary) use of the second logic also a shift in the organization of the 
instruments and procedures of migration control to enable the identification and 
tracking of irregular migrants instead of just shielding off institutions  
- Identification and the breaking down of irregular migrant anonymity – and all the 
organization and systems needed for that –increasingly becomes a central notion in 
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the development of the internal migration control on irregular migrants at both the 
national and the EU level.  
 
Empirically, Germany and the Netherlands are taken together on the explicit assumption that 
they are comparable cases when it comes to this expected development in internal migration 
control. The interest is in the development of state surveillance on irregular migrants, not in 
comparing the two cases per se. Obvious differences between the two countries – the unique 
federal structure of relatively independent Länder versus the more centralised but layered 
structure of Dutch government is a classic example – also influence state behaviour and will 
of course be taken into account where it is inevitable and appropriate. But the choice is for a 
focus on the similarities in relation to the issue of internal migration control. The three 
empirical chapters that follow are chosen with a view to detecting the expected changes in the 
internal migration control on irregular migrants. Guarding access to the labour market 
(chapter 3) is probably the most classic site for internal migration control following especially 
the first logic of societal and institutional exclusion. In the heavily regulated Dutch and 
German labour markets public and semi-public authorities routinely conduct checks of 
registrations and documents that shield off the labour market to those without papers. 
Question here is if labour market policies and the authorities implementing them are also 
turning towards the second logic of identification and exclusion, especially considering the 
demands that entails for a very different use and organization of registration and 
documentation systems. In chapter 4 on ‘police surveillance, detention and expulsion’ the 
second logic is much more dominant, even though competing claims on the police are to be 
expected. The question here is how this chain of government agencies that is charged with 
the organization of the expulsion process, fares with the implementation of the second logic 
of exclusion. Is there a significant intensification in policies, budgets and staffing to increase 
the number of identifications and expulsions and what obstacles does it encounter? The third 
empirical chapter takes the issue of the domestic control on irregular migrants to the level of 
the EU. In a ‘borderless’ Europe instruments have to be found to create and patrol new 
borders that will enable its member states to separate the ins from the outs. The EU member 
states will primarily look to the European level to find new solutions that will strengthen and 
instrumentalize the second logic of exclusion. After all, expulsion in an unified Europe is 
ideally expulsion from the EU, or at least from the Schengen area. The potential traces of 
migrant identities all over Europe in the files and databases of its member states, are a 
tempting and valuable source of information for those member states that seek to construct 
effective expulsion policies. Organizing those into a new European digital border may be the 
ultimate instrument to break down the anonymity of irregular migrants.  
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3 GUARDING THE ACCESS TO THE LABOUR MARKET 
 
3.1 Setting the scene: political mindsets and policy frameworks  
In august 1849 the first Dutch aliens act entered into force. This was a fairly liberal law that 
stipulated that all aliens were welcome in the Netherlands except political troublemakers and 
vagrants. The main worry of the authorities was political agitation and migrants becoming a 
burden on the (costly) poor relief system. According to Lucassen (2001: 246) the spirit of the 
law was that “Trustworthy and industrious immigrants were not to be hindered, even when 
they did not have a passport or if they had no means of identification at all. Only dangerous 
and (above all) poor aliens had to be kept out or expelled”. Two things are interesting about 
this 1849 law from a contemporary point of view. In the first place, labour migration was 
perceived to be totally unproblematic. In the second place, documentation and identification 
were already playing an important part in the internal control on aliens, especially with a 
view to expulsion. Lucassen (2001) points out that the authorities stimulated various forms 
of identification. Migrants also welcomed them, because documentation served as an 
‘insurance policy’ against official harassment by the authorities. The authorities in turn 
needed documentation to ascertain to which country a destitute migrant should be expelled 
and it “greatly increased the chances that the authorities of that state would accept such a 
person” (Lucassen 2001: 247-8). Germany drafted its first Aliens law in the same period, but 
made a turn towards restrictions for labour migrants much earlier. Especially after the 1870s 
the authorities began to worry about undocumented poor labour migrants. According to 
Lucassen this is probably explained by the fact that the German state assumed responsibility 
for the poor relief much earlier than the Dutch. But imperial Germany was also early to 
organize the recruitment of foreigners for employment in agriculture. “Eventually, bilateral 
accords were signed to regulate seasonal agricultural employment. Some foreign workers, 
however, violated the terms of their entry. Deportation was the punishment. Yet employers 
who hired the unauthorized foreigners were also culpable. By the interwar period, when 
international migration in Europe generally ebbed, German labour law included sanctions for 
unauthorized employment of aliens” (Miller 2001: 321).  
 
In other words, the concepts of migrant labour, legal access to labour (thus making irregular 
labour participation a distinct possibility), documentation and identification of labour 
migrants and the penalization of employers have long roots in European history. At the same 
time, there is also a history of liberal laws, selective enforcement of labour laws and controls 
and a pragmatic approach to labour migrants that hinged primarily on the prevention of a 
migrants becoming a burden on the institutions of the poor relief. In the post-war period a 
number of these instruments and arguments, and especially the shifts between them, come to 
the fore again. During the time of the recruitment policies of guest workers, from the late 
1950s until the mid-1970s, irregular migration was not much of an issue in Germany and the 
Netherlands. In these post-war years of economic expansion immigration was first and 
foremost a matter of labour market needs and in some countries – such as France - of 
demographic considerations to replenish war losses (Money 1999). Migration was almost 
exclusively seen as a matter of economic policy (Boswell 2003: 10-11). On the fringes of the 
official recruitment channels there was also a flow of irregular migration. Some labour 
migrants simply skipped the formal channels and procedures of the labour recruitment 
agreements and migrated on their own accord. They looked for work, usually found it and 
then presented themselves to the authorities requesting formalisation of their status as a 
guest worker. The political and public perception of this phenomenon in the Netherlands was 
generally favourable; they were called ‘spontaneous labour migrants’ and were often regarded 
as adventurers in the positive sense (see Engbersen 1997). In Germany, this phenomenon 
was also widespread and was generally accepted, although not looked upon favourably per se 
(Sinn et al. 2005).   
 
3.1.1 The political (re)birth of the illegal alien in Germany and the Netherlands 
The economic recession that was echoed in by the oil crisis in the early 1970s turned the 
tables on both regular and irregular labour migration. Labour recruitment was terminated 
and in political eyes the image of the irregular labour migrants underwent a paradigmatic 
transformation from ‘spontaneous labour migrant’ into the ‘irregular migrant’. The first 
measures to curb (irregular) labour migration were taken in the 1970’s in the field of 
employer sanctions. The primary aim then was to ‘demagnetize’ the labour market (Martin 
2004). In other words, sanctions and policy were directed first and foremost at domestic 
employers while the irregular migrant himself was less ‘in the picture’.  
 
According to Engbersen & Burgers (2000) this first phase in the development of a policy 
approach on irregular migrants is characterised by both a general lack of policy as well as 
public debate in the Netherlands and is followed by two phases. The second phase runs 
roughly to 1991 and is characterised by an increasingly strict regulation of entry through 
immigration law and policy and a simultaneous lax approach towards irregular residence and 
irregular work. These are the days when many government policies in the Netherlands were 
characterised by the principle of ‘gedogen’ or ‘toleration’, meaning that the implementation 
of policy, notwithstanding formal legal frameworks, is intentionally weak or reserved 
(Buruma 2007). Irregular migrants, once established, are able to find work even in the 
formal labour market. They can still obtain Social-Fiscal numbers (so called sofi-numbers), 
which allow them to hold tax paid jobs. The enforcement regime on irregular labour is lax 
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and in a number of sectors such as agri- and horticulture, where in spite of the high 
unemployment figures employers find it difficult to fill the vacancies, the authorities often 
turned a blind eye. In the early 1990s this policy approach changes. This third phase ‘starts’ 
with the publication of the report of the Commission Zeevalking in 1989. This report advised 
the government to construct a coherent policy of internal migration control and stressed the 
importance of cooperation between separate state departments and authorities and the need 
for an effective expulsion policy. The 1990s saw the development of a policy on irregular 
migrants, consisting of a number of legislative measures and administrative operations (Van 
der Leun 2003: 17-18; Pluymen & Minderhoud 2002). One of the most recent chords in 
Dutch policy on irregular migrant was the publication of the government’s white paper on 
Irregular Migrants (‘Illegalennota’) in 2004. In the 2004 white paper the labour market has 
been declared one of the major policy priorities. The minister for Aliens Affairs and 
Integration writes that this is needed because “…illegal employment makes it possible for an 
illegally residing alien to finance and perpetuate his existence in the Netherlands” and it must 
also be considered “ …a serious threat to the economic and social order” (Minister voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 22). In contrast to earlier periods much emphasis is 
placed on the implementation of policy and the intensification of labour market controls.  
 
During the days of guest labour recruitment, the German authorities had a ‘loose’ approach 
towards ‘spontaneous’ labour migrants that was similar to the Dutch approach. Schönwalder, 
Vogel & Sciortino (2006: 38) point to recent archive based studies that document that in the 
1960s the formally illegal entry of non-national job seekers was widely accepted and their 
residence and employment were often retrospectively legalized. The oil crisis put a stop to 
this practice and led to the termination of legal labour migration programmes. In the years 
following the recruitment stop German politics focussed its attention on the restriction of 
access to other – increasingly crowded - legal pathways into Germany such as family 
reunification and asylum migration. In Germany, as in the Netherlands, political attention 
for the phenomenon of illegal migration and residence started in earnest in the early 1990s 
(Schönwalder, Vogel & Sciortino 2006, Cyrus & Vogel 2005). Prior to that, from the 1980s 
until the first years of the 1990s, the German Republic had bigger issues at hand. The end of 
the cold war and German reunification – which implied great migratory movements of ethnic 
Aussiedler towards the former West Germany – and the exceptionally large numbers of 
asylum seekers coming to Germany in the late 1980s and early 1990s took up the brunt of the 
political attention. This combination of migration flows constituted what could be called a 
veritable ‘migration crisis’ in German politics, that could only be resolved with a broad and 
intensely debated political ‘asylum compromise’ in 1993 that amended the German Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) in order to curtail the number of asylum applicants (Joppke 1999; Broeders 
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2001; Boswell 2003). In the mid 1990s, when Germany and the Netherlands were both over 
the peak of the ‘asylum crisis’ attention began to shift towards irregular migration. After 1989 
fighting irregular migration in Germany has initially and much more than in the Dutch case, 
been a matter of controlling its long and porous ‘green’ border in the east of Germany (a 
‘hard’ external border of the Schengen group). At a later stage German politics increasingly 
turned its attention to internal migration control on irregular migrants. Especially the Kohl 
government began to draw linkages between unemployment and illegal labour in the run-up 
to the 1998 elections (Boswell 2003: 63-4). In Germany, the internal control on irregular 
migrants is mainly implemented through a system of residence and work permits and 
registrations that was already in place when the political attention shifted towards this issue. 
Hailbronner, Martin & Motamura (1998: 205) stress that Germany already has a highly 
developed system of registration and surveillance in which different agencies can access each 
other’s databases and there is a central register for non-nationals that can be used to detect 
irregular status. Vogel (2001) points out that even in corporatist Germany, with many non- or 
semi-state organizations playing a role in the regulation of the labour market, and in federal 
Germany with its real political difference between the Länder active cooperation seems to be 
the norm (Vogel 2001:343). Cyrus and Vogel (2005: 14) maintain that the more recent legal 
reforms in the field of internal control on irregular migrants have placed more emphasis on 
law enforcement. Irregular migrants and irregular migrant workers are now listed 
prominently on the political agenda. The new coalition of CDU, CSU and SPD declared the 
shadow economy as one of its priorities in their coalition agreement of 2005: “Schwarzarbeit, 
illegale Beschäftigung und Schattenwirtschaft sind keine Kavaliersdelikte, sondern schaden 
unserem Land. (…) Unser Ziel ist es, den gesamten Bereich der Schattenwirtschaft 
zurückzudrängen” (in Vogel 2006: 1). 
 
3.1.2 Aim and structure of the chapter 
Engbersen & Burgers (2000) characterised the development of the political outlook on 
irregular migration in the Netherlands as a transformation from ‘spontaneous guest worker’ 
in the first phase, to a necessary and ‘tolerated’ source of labour in the second phase and 
ultimately into an ‘unwanted illegal alien’ who is to be excluded in the third phase. Germany 
may be said to have followed a similar trail, albeit with a less pronounced second phase of 
toleration. The result is that both countries now share roughly the same political outlook on 
irregular migrant labour: the phenomenon is considered harmful to economy and society and 
irregular migrants are considered unwanted. In short, irregular migrants must be barred 
from the labour market both legally and, more recently and importantly, in practice through 
the implementation of controls. In this chapter I will analyze in what way these countries (try 
to) translate and organize this changed political view of exclusion into practical policies. In 
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paragraph 3.2 I will first look into the political economy of the labour market and (irregular) 
migrant labour from a theoretical point of view. How is the role of the state in matters of 
labour market regulation and surveillance viewed in the relevant theoretical debates? How do 
the parameters of the welfare state on the one hand and the demands of the (capitalist) 
economy on the other affect the state’s options in internal migration control on the labour 
market? Paragraph 3.3 then develops an analytical typology for labour market surveillance in 
the Netherlands and Germany based on the two logics of exclusion that were introduced in 
chapter two. The typology serves as a ‘blueprint’ for the empirical paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5 that 
document the developments in the Netherlands and Germany and illustrates the way these 
countries develop policies and instruments that operate under the two logics of exclusion. 
Paragraph 3.4 describes the logic of ‘exclusion from documentation’ – the more ‘classical’ 
approach to labour market fraud – and paragraph 3.5 describes the policies operating under 
the logic of ‘exclusion through documentation’ - a more novel approach in internal migration 
policy. Conclusions and discussion are presented in paragraph 3.6.   
 
3.2 Political economies of irregular migrant workers 
3.2.1 The double movement of the state 
The relation between the economy and (irregular) immigration is often presented as a 
“simple” matter of supply and demand. In a world without borders, the supply of labour 
would be potentially unlimited. If employers in advanced capitalist economies would have 
unrestricted access to that labour it would radically alter the face and function of national 
labour markets, as we know them today. Economic supply and demand are however 
mitigated by the interventions of governments. Markets emerge and function within social 
and political contexts. The labour market is not just the domain and study object of the 
economic sciences, but also, and perhaps even more so, the domain of the political economy. 
After all, even Adam Smith who introduced the notion of the free market - as the outcome of 
‘individuals pursuing their own gain led by an invisible hand’ - did not mean to suggest that 
there was no role for governments in market economies. Quite the contrary: the ‘free’ market 
needs the state, just as the state needs the market. Karl Polanyi also pointed out the fact that 
state and market need each other if ‘catastrophe’ is to be avoided. In his view the relation 
between state and market should be governed by the concept of ‘embeddedness’, because 
economic actions become destructive when they are ‘disembedded’ meaning that they are not 
governed by social or non-economic authorities (see Schwedberg 2003: 28). The fact that 
markets are embedded in a socio-political system does not necessarily mean that they are 
governed in an effective or ‘just’ way. Their mutual relations vary over time and in different 
contexts, and in the words of Block & Evans (2005: 507): “There can be both positive and 
negative consequences of any specific form of embeddedness”. Historically, the state and 
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capitalist enterprises have often been ‘running mates’. Political and economic goals and 
ambitions often overlap, making ‘government’ and ‘business’ natural allies8. At other times, 
governments and business found themselves in opposite corners, for example when the needs 
of the capitalist economy – cheap labour, long weeks and hours, no unions etc. - clashed with 
responsibilities of the state other than economic growth, such as the prevention of social 
unrest and safeguarding public health. Borrowing again from Polanyi (2001), the position of 
governments may be characterised as a ‘double movement’. Market societies are shaped and 
reshaped by a movement for laissez-faire and expansion of markets on the one hand and 
movements for social protection and the limitation of market forces on the other. In real 
political life these ideal types do not just clash, but they also mix and sometimes even 
reinforce each other (cf. Block & Evans 2005). Governments have had to balance between the 
needs and demands of employers and increasingly those of employees, especially since the 
days that the latter became a political force to be reckoned with.  
 
The history of the welfare state is a history of slowly improving the social and legal status of 
workers vis-à-vis employers. The construction of the welfare state entailed granting rights to 
workers (such as the right to form a Union) and implementing restrictions on the wishes of 
industry, such as introducing a minimum age for factory work, compulsory 6-day workweeks 
etc. The welfare state also entailed a process of decommodification of labour when it 
sheltered workers from market forces through social systems and unemployment benefits 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). Social protection, and thus decommodification, is reserved for full 
citizens and is to a large degree extended to legal aliens (denizens) in modern welfare states. 
Only a legal status gives access to social protection. Thus, irregular migrants still depend 
heavily – but not exclusively - on their ability to work and their possibilities to sell their 
labour as a commodity. The history of the capitalist state is a history of seeking new 
innovations and advantages that would improve the production process and increase profits, 
sometimes aided and sometimes hindered by government. In this history governments come 
to the aid of business in various ways: resisting the rise of trade unions, passing labour- and 
contract laws favourable for business, protecting the interest of national enterprises (by 
diplomatic support or protectionist policies) and by stimulating the ‘supply’ of cheap labour – 
for example through (legal) labour migration. These two histories have laid competing claims 
on the priorities and resources of the government. Nowadays, they still do.  
 
                                                        
8  Using the terms ‘government’ and ‘business’, though useful to make the point clear, makes them both look 
much more monolithic and single-minded than they actually are. A Dutch multinational like Shell has 
different interests and viewpoints that of a small or medium sized firm. Government can also subdivided in 
different layers and institutions that have different and sometimes conflicting interests.  
 64 
3.2.2 Immigrant labour: between market and welfare state  
Immigration is subject of tension when seen through the ‘oppositional’ perspectives of the 
capitalist state and the welfare state. From a capitalist perspective immigration is either a 
source of innovation and competitive advantage (‘importing’ the best and the brightest) or it 
is a source of cheap labour, especially when compared to domestic labour. Either way, 
immigration is sought after because it increases profits. In recent years labour migration and 
recruitment has been reinstated in many European countries at the top end of the - now 
global – labour market. European governments have been competing amongst themselves 
and with the rest of the industrialized world for IT-specialists and other highly trained 
professionals (Boswell 2003). Germany launched a green card initiative for IT specialists in 
2000 and developed a broader policy framework after the widely debated report of the 
Commission Süssmuth (2001). In the Netherlands the government presented its plans to 
attract more international professionals in its 2006 white paper ‘towards a modern migration 
policy’ (Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2006). In an ideal capitalist world 
the state would always facilitate employers’ wishes for migration policies. Above all, that 
means flexibility: hiring immigrant workers in times of labour scarcity and firing immigrant 
workers when the economic tide turns. The guest worker period in Germany and the 
Netherlands is an illustration of the state facilitating both elements of labour migration 
flexibility.   
 
Seen from a welfare state perspective, however, immigration is often considered a threat. 
Cheap immigrant labour will jostle domestic labour, wages will drop and the institutions of 
the welfare state will be overloaded. The welfare state perspective on immigration centres on 
crucial questions of inclusion and exclusion of immigrants. Paradoxically, the protection of 
those within the welfare state requires a radical exclusion of those who are outside the 
welfare state (Teulings 1995; Entzinger & Van der Meer 2004). A certain level of welfare can 
only be sustained if there are limits to the number of people that are eligible for benefits and 
if those who are taxed to provide the funds are not overtaxed. Overtaxation can be both 
understood in a literal, financial sense, and in a symbolic sense, meaning that in order for 
welfare systems to be sustained and seen as legitimate it should not become a matter of ‘us 
versus them’ (Van Oorschot 2006, WRR 2006). Or, as Christian Joppke (1999: 6) put it, 
“because rights are costly they cannot be for everyone”. Cheap immigrant labour raises 
difficult issues about wage differentials and unfair competition with domestic labour. In the 
long run, when guest labour turns into settlement, it raises questions of equal treatment, as 
the aftermath of the guest labour programmes in Europe has shown (Joppke 1999). 
Settlement also raises the complicated issue of immigrant integration, poverty and welfare 
dependence, which has become an increasingly thorny issue in Western Europe. These 
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experiences are the foundation of the Dutch and German defensive stance towards 
immigration in general and their reputation of being ‘reluctant countries of immigration’ (cf. 
Cornelius et al. 2004). Considerations of protecting domestic workers and the welfare state 
are felt even sharper in the case of irregular migrant labour: workers that lack even the 
status of denizens. This defensive stance of the Dutch and German governments is also 
attributed to some of the shared characteristics of the welfare state itself. Within the different 
worlds of ‘welfare capitalism’ in Europe the German and Dutch welfare states are usually 
grouped together under the heading of the so-called continental model (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Ferrera et al. 2000, Ferrera & Hemerijck 2003). They are both rich economies, have 
elaborate en redistributive welfare states and a tightly regulated formal labour market. To put 
it bluntly: both countries are rich and redistributive welfare states and the fact that there is 
much to be redistributed makes the paradox of inclusion and exclusion more substantial, 
both in reality and perhaps especially in terms of (political) perception.   
 
So the state has a double agenda. Obviously, the state encourages economic growth, which 
would imply support for the labour migration agenda of the business community. But there 
are also considerations emanating from the welfare state that favour the exclusion of 
(irregular) migrant workers to keep the system functioning and legitimized. A number of 
theoretical perspectives on the political economy of irregular migration seek to explain the 
presence of irregular migrant workers and the role that the state plays in managing its double 
movement.    
 
3.2.3 Theoretical notes on (irregular) migrant labour in modern welfare states 
When the economies of Western Europe recovered from the devastations of the Second 
World War France entered its trente glorieuses and Germany became a wirtschaftswunder. 
In those days immigration was considered a logical answer to labour market shortages in 
certain sectors of the economy (Joppke 1999; Broeders 2001). Migrants were considered a 
(temporary) means of greasing the wheels of trade and industry. Especially Marxist theorists 
made the case that the labour migrants of the post war era were in fact an industrial ‘reserve 
army’ in the service and at the disposal of a booming capitalist economy (see for an overview 
Samers 2003: 556-558). Because of their temporary stay they had limited rights and a weak 
legal status in the countries where they were working. As such they were an abundant, cheap 
and flexible source of labour. The role of the state in this Marxist perspective is that of an ally 
of industry or, in explicit reference to the Communist Manifesto (Marx & Engels 1990/1888), 
as the ‘executive committee of the bourgeoisie’9. In other words, labour migrants were 
                                                        
9  Literally: “The executive of the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the  
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portrayed as a new and imported, rather than domestic, proletarian workforce to be exploited 
for capitalist gains and the state played its part by supporting and executing the capitalist 
agenda. As many of Europe’s temporary labour migrants chose to stay after the termination 
of the guest worker period and gradually improved their socio-economic position and their 
legal and political status, the comparison with a proletarian workforce loses strength. 
Irregular migrants, lacking any legal status, are now often considered the successors to their 
weak position on the labour market. From this point of view they might be considered the 
new reserve army of workers for the capitalist economy (Calavita 2003; Castles, 2004; 
Cornelius 2005). In this perspective the state is still the facilitator of the employers aiming to 
grease the wheels of industry by openly or secretly allowing irregular migrant labour.  
 
Segmented labour market theory, starts from the structure of the modern western economy 
itself. In this perspective there is a structural imbalance in the economies of western states 
that fuels the need for (irregular) migrant labour. This theory stresses the imbalance between 
the structural demand for entry-level workers and the limited domestic supply of such 
workers – partially the result of the social protection to citizens and denizens provide by the 
welfare state - which has generated a structural demand for immigrants in developed 
countries (Massey et al. 2005: 33). In an age of globalization this mismatch is often corrected 
by means of relocating certain industries to low wage countries. Capital is in most cases far 
more mobile than labour. However, many of the sectors in which irregular migrants are 
typically concentrated – such as agriculture, horticulture, tourism, food processing, some 
segments of the textile industry, low level services (hotel, catering, caring and domestic work) 
and prostitution - “ must be considered as industries which cannot be outsourced to low wage 
countries. Instead low wage labour is taken in” (Düvell 2006: 32). Analysts of globalization 
and migration, such as Saskia Sassen (2001: 293), have stressed the ‘need’ of big business for 
cheap and docile labour. Firms profit from migrant workers because they are cheap and 
above all flexible workers that can be hired and fired according to their needs. Or, in 
Calavita’s (2003: 400) words: “It is not particularly original to point out that undocumented 
workers provide capitalist economies with a source of labour that lacks the power of domestic 
labour to exact concessions from employers”. The demand for immigrant labour seems to 
become a structural feature of globalized economies, especially in the large ‘global’ cities, 
where the labour market polarizes (Stalker 2000: 133; Sassen 1991). Marcuse (1989) calls 
this the hourglass economy in which the lower and top end of the economy are growing at the 
expense of the middle. Burgers & Engbersen (1996: 624) maintain that ‘opportunities’ for 
(irregular) migrants in the global city tend to concentrate in two economic spheres. In the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
whole bourgeoisie” (Marx and Engels 1990/1888: 15). 
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first place they find employment in the traditional sectors of industry that ‘survived’ the 
various waves of deindustrialisation. These industries often rely on minimising their labour 
costs to make ends meet by making use of cheap immigrant labour, or even cheaper, irregular 
immigrant labour. The second economic sphere is found in the expanding services sector. 
The growth of high-end services has been accompanied by a growth in the lower strata of the 
services economy: low status jobs that are poorly paid and physically demanding also tend to 
be filled by migrant labour. In more elaborate welfare states these job are often taken by 
irregular migrant labourers. The lower strata of the Dutch and German economies - the 
‘shadow’, ‘underground’ or ‘informal’ economy – are roughly in the same league in terms of 
size. Schneider & Ernste (2000, 2002: 35-6) estimate that between the years 1989 and 1993, 
the informal economy ranged from 11.8 per cent to 13.5 per cent of official GNP for the 
Netherlands and from 10.5 per cent to 15.2 per cent of official GNP for Germany. However, 
there are also other methodologies and estimates that show larger variation, or indeed very 
divergent figures for the same country (see Samers 2004: 203-7, see also Portes & Haller 
2005: 413-418 for various methods of measurements). Still, by most accounts both countries 
have a sizeable informal economy that is likely to provide jobs for irregular migrants. 
Obviously, the informal economy and irregular migration should not be seen as fully 
overlapping phenomena. Even though the informal economy is of vital importance to 
irregular migrants, it is first and foremost a ‘domestic’ affair. Many legal inhabitants, citizens 
and denizens alike, engage in social security fraud, unreported labour, unreported self-
employment and barter. The labour market participation of irregular migrants is but one 
component of the shadow economy (Van der Leun 2003: 36, Van der Leun & Kloosterman 
2006: 62).  
 
A third cluster of theoretical explanations does not start from the state’s intentions (as do the 
Marxists) or from the pressures from the structural features and changes of the economy (as 
segmented labour market theory does), but from political pragmatism and structural flaws of 
state control itself. These perspectives all start from the so-called policy gap between official 
immigration policy aims and actual policy outcomes that, according to Cornelius & Tsuda 
(2004), is inevitable. In other words, states may produce laws and rhetoric about curtailing 
immigration all they want, the policy result will none the less not live up to the stated aims of 
immigration policy. A number of reasons are often put forward. Some have to do with the 
benefits that businesses reap from employing illegal migrant workers as described above. 
Others have to do with matters of political convenience as some battles are easier fought in 
politics than others. Many authors have pointed out that states may issue harsh statements 
on irregular migration and implement tough border policies, but turn a blind when it comes 
to the irregular migrant work force. In the United States the employment of irregular 
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migrants is pretty much a public secret. According to Cornelius (2005: 777) US policies on 
irregular migrants address only the supply side. Large sums of money are invested in border 
management in an effort to reduce the flow of irregular migrants, but the US does nothing 
serious to reduce employer demand for irregular migrant labour. This explanation seems at 
odds with the cases of the Netherlands and Germany that have developed substantial internal 
migration policies. The general notion of turning a blind eye may of course have specific 
Dutch and German transplantations. For example, given a tradition of protection of the 
private sphere in both countries (domestic) work in private households is likely to be a blind 
spot. Both public resentment of governments controlling behind the front door and a small 
expected ‘return’ makes private households a relatively expensive and unattractive site for 
labour market controls. Freeman (1998) has pointed out he clientelist nature of immigration 
politics in America. When benefits are concentrated and costs are diffuse – as is often the 
case with immigration policies- clientelist politics are more likely to develop (see also 
Hollifield 2000: 145). Obviously clientelism finds a more fertile ground in political systems 
that have a tradition of professional lobbying in mainstream politics, as is the case in the 
United States. In Germany and the Netherlands – lacking such a tradition - this line of 
reasoning may follow the track of electoral politics, rather than clientelist politics pur sang. 
Still, lobbies on behalf of big industries or their unionized counterparts (for example the 
union of the construction industry) may influence policy. Even though political and business 
elites may look favourable on globalization and labour migration, a large part of the 
workforce and the electorate regard it as threatening. So there are important electoral 
reasons for governments to block immigration and protect the domestic workforce and 
population. Or more pragmatically, the government should not be seen to harm the workers’ 
interests in favour of the agenda of business and industry. This pragmatism also applies to 
the employers. Boswell & Straubhaar (2003) point out that hiring irregular workers saves 
them the trouble of making public pleas for immigrant labour, which are often politically 
sensitive in the eyes of the domestic labour force and electorate. Irregular migrants give 
employers access to low-cost, flexible labour without the problem of having to ‘fight the issue 
out in a highly politicized public arena’ (Boswell & Straubhaar 2003: 1).  
 
Most of the theoretical notions discussed above assume and suggest that irregular migrant 
labour is a structural feature of rich and advanced welfare states. Interestingly, it is also often 
suggested that the state does not seem very troubled by this feature of its economy. Rich 
global countries tolerate (irregular) migrants because of their vital role in the smooth running 
of the economy (especially at the fringes) or out of political pragmatism, either pacifying the 
demands of employers or pacifying the state’s own disability to implement effective (internal) 
migration controls. However, in recent years advanced welfare states such as Germany and 
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the Netherlands have become increasingly adamant in their political resolve to banish 
irregular migration and irregular migrant labour from their societies. Although most EU-
countries are equal in their public rejection of irregular migrants, there is ample evidence 
suggesting that some countries are more equal than others in this respect. Boswell & 
Straubhaar (2004: 5) suggest that a number of governments are increasingly taking the 
‘combat of illegal foreign labour’ seriously: “Germany, the Netherlands and France all have 
tough legislation, and have stepped up efforts at enforcement since the early 1990s”. In his 
analyses of (irregular) immigration and the underground economy Michael Samers (2004: 
242) notes “… there is also considerable evidence that at least northern European 
governments are doing everything but ignoring it”. In other words, these countries go against 
the theoretical grain by developing an approach of the problem of irregular migration that is 
characterized by tough legislation and increasingly tough implementation and perhaps even 
challenge the inevitability of the policy gap. This raises two lines of questions. The first 
results mainly from the theoretical framework presented in chapter two and concerns the 
question whether and to what extent Germany and the Netherlands are developing internal 
surveillance policies on the labour market that follow the two logics of exclusion and the 
different demands they have on surveillance technologies of documentation and registration. 
The second line of questions results from the theoretical notions set out in this chapter and 
concerns the role of the state in balancing between the double movement of ‘capitalism’ and 
‘welfare’ on the one hand and on capacity and control on the other. This will be analysed with 
a typology for labour market surveillance in the Netherlands and Germany based on the two 
logics of exclusion that were introduced in chapter two. 
 
3.3 Labour market surveillance in Germany and the Netherlands: a typology 
Advanced welfare states, such as the Netherlands and Germany, that are serious about 
countering and discouraging the residence of irregular migrants, will focus their attention 
first and foremost on the vital institution of the labour market. To a large extent, labour 
market surveillance is meant to discourage the various actors in the field: discourage 
employers to make use of irregular migrant labour, discourage criminal elements to facilitate 
the supply and demand for irregular labour, discourage civil servants and other authorities to 
bend or ‘loosely interpret’ the rules and ultimately, to discourage irregular migrants to try 
their luck on the Dutch or German labour market.  
 
As set out in chapter 2, both countries are expected to develop a policy program of exclusion 
of irregular migrants that is increasingly operated through the management of information, 
registration and identification. Controlling access to the labour market and excluding 
irregular migrants from it is likely to require the operation of both ‘logics of exclusion’ that 
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were set out in the previous chapter. The two logics combined aim to make the presence of 
irregular migrants in the formal and informal labour market as limited as possible. Policies 
operating under the first logic of exclusion – exclusion from documentation - are primarily 
aimed at institutions (especially employers, but also other institutional ‘providers’). Policies 
operating under the second logic of exclusion (exclusion through documentation) are aimed 
at the irregular migrant himself.  
 
The two logics of exclusion are combined with two basic policy methods that are used in 
labour market surveillance. The first of these is the concept of ‘deputation’. The idea of the 
‘sheriff’s deputy’ was used by both Torpey (2000: 36) and Lahav & Guireaudon (2000: 57) to 
indicate that governments are ‘enlisting’ third parties in order to make migration policy more 
effective (see also Garland’s (2001: 124) similar notion of responsabilization strategy). When 
governments shift responsibilities to private parties (especially employers, subcontractors, 
temp agencies) they turn them into ‘deputy sheriffs’ by making them responsible for a part of 
the regulation of access to the formal labour market. Governments are then ‘outsourcing’ 
some, or maybe even many, of its registration and verification responsibilities to private 
parties or lower levels of government. The second is the more traditional policy approach of 
‘control and punishment’. Deputation only works with those willing to be deputised – no 
matter how grudgingly - or those who have been given enough incentives to comply with 
rules and regulations. Employers that do not intend to ‘play by the rules’ and illegal or even 
criminal organizations functioning in the informal economy cannot be (effectively) deputized. 
Controls and punishments (fines, imprisonment) are needed to exert direct control on the 
labour market. More importantly, the existence of a credible threat (a risk of getting caught) 
may be the most important lever that turns ‘undeputable’ employers into ‘deputable’ ones. 
This framework for the exclusion of irregular migrants from the labour market is 
summarized in table 3.1 below.  
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 Table 3. 1 The exclusion of irregular migrants from the labour market: 
discouragement by deputation and control  
  
Exclusion from documentation 
 
 
Exclusion through 
documentation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deputation 
 
1. Deputizing employers 
- Administrative 
requirements 
- Authentification of 
ID documents 
 
2. Instrumentalizing 
discontent 
- Industrial self-
restraint 
- Private snitching 
 
3. Limiting discretionary 
powers  
 
 
1. Organizing inter-agency 
cooperation 
 
2. Linking database systems 
(labour, residence, social 
security and migration etc.) 
 
3. Mandatory cross-checking of 
data 
 
 
 
Control and 
punishment 
 
1. Controls and fines 
(increasing the perceived 
risk of getting caught) 
 
 
1. Controls (not fines!) 
 
2. Identification is integral part 
of control system 
 
3. Chain approach in control 
system (control, detection, 
identification, incarceration, 
deportation) 
 
 
 
Targeting institutions Æ targeting irregular migrants  
 
 
T
argetin
g th
e ‘ d
ep
u
table’ Æ
 targetin
g th
e ‘ u
n
d
ep
u
table’  
 
The first logic of exclusion – exclusion from documentation and registration – is aimed at 
blocking the access to the formal entry tickets to the labour market. These policies target the 
gatekeepers to the formal labour market. The policy subject, one might say, is not the 
individual irregular migrant himself, but all the institutions – in a very broad sense – he 
needs to gain entry to the formal labour market. These institutions are government 
institutions (such as the work permits office) but primarily private parties such as employers, 
subcontractors and temp agencies. Deputation is possible in a number of cases. The central 
government can limit the discretionary room to manoeuvre for lower level or decentralised 
state authorities – those issuing permits for example – that deal with the labour market. In 
these cases central governments limit the discretionary movement of street level bureaucrats 
even though these are already formally deputized. Employers are obviously the prime targets 
for deputization as they are the ‘de facto’ gatekeepers of the labour market. Their role can 
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take various forms. Administrative requirements may scare off irregular migrants lacking the 
proper papers and an obligation to report information on workers to the authorities helps 
detection and may also scare off migrants. Making employers responsible for the checking of 
documents and the verification of their authenticity turns them almost into deputy 
immigration officials. A third possibility is that the state organizes the discontent of 
employers and employees, or even the general public, into an advantage and a source of 
information for state policies. Employers jealous of the competition or feeling cheated by 
colleagues bending the rules (and increasing their margin of profit) can be turned into a 
source of information on irregular practices. However, there are limits to deputation as it 
relies on self-restraint and law abiding behaviour on the part of the employer and a 
willingness to fulfil certain obligations. It is therefore primarily suitable for formal 
institutions and organizations that will ‘play by the rules’. Whether or not employers and 
street level bureaucrats ‘play by the rules’ is, among other factors, a matter of balancing 
profits against the chance of getting caught for employers and intermediary organisations. In 
the case of street level bureaucrats it may also be a matter of balancing the discretionary 
room to manoeuvre against the chance of being reprimanded or worse.  
 
He, who cannot be deputized, has to be controlled. By controlling and fining employers the 
state raises the stakes, but only if it manages to increase the chance of getting caught and – 
more importantly – the perceived risk of getting caught. So it is not just a matter of 
increasing control, more important is the increase in a credible threat of control. Often, it is 
not the ‘balance of power’ that regulates the actors’ choices and behaviour but the ‘balance of 
threat’, an argument made in International Relations theory by Stephen Walt (1985). In this 
way bona fide employers and institutions may be coerced into compliance and may become 
deputable. However, when the government is dealing with irregular migrants working in the 
shadow economy it is likely to be confronted with shady or even criminal institutions, 
organizations and individuals that cannot be ‘deputized’ at all. Furthermore, some employers, 
that are usually not so shady, have hardly any fear of control. In many countries employing 
domestic workers for cleaning, childcare and care of the elderly is commonplace and the 
often middle class employers feel relatively certain that they will not be controlled by the 
authorities. For these (diverse) groups controls are the only means to influence behaviour. 
Increasing the (perceived) chance of getting caught and being heavily fined is vital here as 
well: it is the only way of ending their business, making them go out of business or choosing 
another business.  
 
Policies targeting the individual irregular migrant himself, operating under the second logic 
of exclusion, have an even greater need for identification. It is no longer sufficient to establish 
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that an individual worker does not belong (and fine the employer) but it becomes necessary 
to identify the irregular migrant himself. Under the first logic the aim is to block access to the 
(formal) labour market by using a system of (digital) gatekeepers, the second logic requires a 
database system that can identify or re-identify irregular migrants. This makes deputation 
much more an affair of organizing procedures within the government. In essence, it requires 
new policies that change procedures and routines within certain government institutions, 
shifting tasks from ‘mere’ exclusion of irregular migrants to (aiding in) the detection and 
identification of irregular migrants. Sometimes it will mean new tasks and procedures and 
sometimes it will entail a limitation of discretionary room to manoeuvre. It requires the 
organization of interagency cooperation and especially the interconnection of the databases 
they have at their disposal. It also requires an active policy of connecting and crosschecking 
data between the various systems of information. This time not to refuse access to certain 
institutions but to investigate and verify status and identity. For government authorities it is 
the difference between (passive) administration and (active) investigation. Governments that 
seriously intend to limit the presence of irregular migrants in the labour market, and even 
within the borders of the country, will have to adopt policy measures that penetrate, rather 
than shield off, certain institutions. Registration and documentation should be aimed at 
identification and actual removal rather than at refusing entry and discouragement. Needless 
to say, the second logic requires a much more ‘hands on’ approach, making surveillance and 
control even more important. Policies aimed at immigrants, instead of employers, require a 
different mode of operation for the authorities involved. Controls are vital, but are only 
effective if apprehension and identification become an integral part of the control 
procedures: first to detect illegal status and then turning irregular migrants over to the 
authorities that will establish their identity. Different authorities will have to cooperate as 
they all have different sources and data systems that can be used for investigation and 
identification. And finally, a chain approach is necessary to make this an ‘effective strategy’ 
resulting in the return of the irregular migrant to his country of origin. Investing in control 
systems like this is only meaningful if the whole chain of control, detection, identification, 
incarceration, deportation (see also chapter 4 on this issue) is staffed and funded and 
followed through by the authorities responsible for each part of the chain. And of course, as 
the cliché will have it, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Operating a control system 
like this is labour intensive, which also implies that the state has to be more selective, and has 
to choose its interventions well. The following paragraphs will analyze how the policy 
approach and instruments to deal with irregular migrants on the labour market that have 
been developed in Germany and the Netherlands relate to these two logics of exclusion.  
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3.4 Exclusion from documentation 
Entering the labour market in Germany and the Netherlands is a matter of paperwork, 
registration and cross-referencing. Anyone - natives and legal aliens alike - has to fill out 
forms, hand over documents and has to be ‘recognised’ by the proper systems and 
authorities. Anyone who lacks the proper papers or is not registered where he or she should 
be registered, is a suspect employee in the eyes of the Dutch and German labour law. Over the 
years a dense web of restrictions has developed: regulations and registrations that together 
have formed a paper and increasingly a digital wall around the labour market. This network 
can be used to shield the labour market and to identify irregular immigrants. Closing off the 
labour market through documents and registrations is the ‘classic’ way of discouraging 
irregular migrants in both the Netherlands and in Germany. The exclusion also serves to 
prevent irregular migrants from holding tax paid jobs on which they can build a claim for 
regularisation at a later stage. As can be seen in the typology in the previous paragraph, 
‘exclusion from documentation’ is made up of two sections. The first is ‘databases and 
deputation’, i.e. the digital wall around the labour market mentioned above. The second is 
‘control and punishment’ indicating that this form of exclusion is also in need of a more 
hands on approach of exclusion. Those who cannot be deputised or those who were able to 
circumvent the digital wall can only be reached and excluded through a credible system of 
controls.   
 
3.4.1 Deputation and databases 
Both in Germany and the Netherlands the exclusion of irregular migrants from documents 
and registration, and hence from the formal labour market itself, is an interplay between 
government authorities and employers. Authorities (do not) issue documents and employers 
are to some extent responsible for checking certain documents and legal requirements. 
Employers are increasingly responsible for the ‘legality’ of their employees as a result of 
deputation by the government.  
 
In Germany there is a maze of bureaucratic institutions and registrations that make up a wall 
around the labour market. Dita Vogel (2001: 329-335) describes this bureaucratic obstacle 
through the example of two fictional ‘irregular migrants’ (with a different migration history) 
looking for work. Both Carol – a Pole that entered on a tourist via – and Maria – a Zairian 
woman who entered illegally and is now an asylum claimant – are shown to have virtually no 
chance of getting a job in the formal economy as a result of the “dense jungle of German 
documentation, registration and data management practices” (Vogel 2001: 329). In Germany 
employers are obliged by law to ask for the social security card and the income tax card 
before hiring a person (Sinn et al. 2005: 46). So in order to take up a job in the regular 
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economy they would have to be in possession of social security cards and tax cards, which are 
impossible to get as they are not registered in the local registration office 
(Einwohnermeldebehorde) in the case of Carol, or registered with restrictions for work in the 
case of Maria. In any case, they would both need a work permit, an impossibility in the case 
of Carol (because of his illegal residence) and extremely difficult in the case of Maria, as 
employers would first have to look into prioritised unemployed candidates suitable for the 
job. If they had found an employer, they would be able to get hold of a legal social security 
card, as the employer would apply for the card and the authorities would send it without 
cross-referencing. However, they would still not be in possession of a tax card or a work 
permit, without which not many employers would hire them, so the chances of getting one 
are slim. If they would use falsified papers, they will probably be detected in a later stage as 
their employer would send in the documents to the statutory health insurance, where the 
documents would be cross-referenced by a computer programme. Vogel (2001: 333) explains 
that “This verification procedure is made possible by the fact that the last two numbers of any 
social security number are calculated from the other numbers”. A slightly more effective 
strategy would be to borrow papers from another person, but the cross-referencing of the 
health insurance provider is likely to result in a notification of the local branch of the Federal 
Labour Office, which would investigate on the basis of local files and other (missing) 
registrations and would contact the employer for clarification on missing data and 
documents. Data crosschecking will filter out many attempts by irregular migrants to secure 
a legitimate job. Vogel (2001: 334) points out that these procedures will not normally lead to 
much more than a warning letter to employers, but ‘as a general rule will prevent the 
inadvertent hiring of undocumented immigrants in the regular economy’. In other words, the 
system in operation at the time of writing was both well equipped as a means of blocking 
access to the formal labour for irregular migrants as well as a means to discourage employers 
from hiring them. Vogel (2001) suggests that employers may even suspect that there is a 
much more efficient system of data crosschecking that the one that actually exists. There is in 
other words an elaborate system of verification in place that will alert authorities when 
‘mismatches’ occur, and has a ‘discouraging’ effect on employers.  
 
In the Netherlands an irregular migrant bounces off a similar wall of registrations, 
documents and crosschecks. Most importantly an irregular migrant will not be able to obtain 
a (legal) social-fiscal number (sofi-number), which is the main pre-condition and entry ticket 
when applying for a legal tax-paid job. A sofi-number, which is issued by the tax authorities, 
can only be obtained on the basis of a valid residence permit that is issued by the 
immigration authorities (IND) and a registration in the population register, or the Municipal 
Basic Administration (Gemeentelijke Basisadministratie – GBA). For obvious reasons this is 
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not a possibility for irregular migrants. Irregular migrants can always try to work on the sofi-
number of a legal compatriot or on a sofi-number otherwise obtained. There have been 
examples of groups of people that were all working on one and the same sofi-number. By now 
the tax authorities have inserted an ‘alert’ into their database that is triggered if more than 
one contract is registered on a single sofi-number. In principle it is now impossible for a 
group of people to work on one number (Barents & Eijkelenboom 2006: 69). In November 
2007 a ‘new’ identification number, the so-called Citizen’s Service Number (Burger Service 
Nummer), replaced the sofi-number. The idea behind this change is that all citizens and 
denizens will now only have to have one number in their dealings with various government 
agencies and administrations instead of the many that were in use before. It is, in other 
words, a centralisation of ‘identity management’ and an opportunity to streamline the 
connection and interoperability of various databases, if they may be legally linked. Exchange 
of information on one person is made easier for government authorities. The municipalities 
will issue the new Citizen’s Service Number when people register themselves in the Municipal 
Basis Administration. Ironically, that means a decentralisation compared to the limited 
number of tax offices that could issue a sofi-number and may increase the possibilities for 
gaining fraudulent access to a Citizen’s Service Number10. Prins (2006) has argued that a 
single number may be more attractive for swindlers and criminals (one number, multiple 
access to various systems) and may thus increase the chance of identity fraud.  
 
In addition to the sofi-number there is the general requirement that employees have to be 
able to identify themselves as a result of the 1994 Compulsory Identification Act. This is an 
important linchpin for the deputation of employers. Employers have always been responsible 
for the ‘administrative legality’ of their employees, but in 2000 a new article 15 was inserted 
into the Aliens Employment Act (WAV) that obliges employers to check the identity of 
employers and to keep a copy of their identification on file. This was a reaction to the growing 
use of subcontractors. At the same time a new article 16 enabled the Labour Inspectorate to 
exchange information with other authorities. So currently, employers are legally obliged to 
check the identity papers of their employees, to keep copies in their administration and to 
make sure that employees will be able to produce identity papers if called upon by the 
authorities during an inspection. In its Year Plan for 2006 the Labour Inspectorate added 
extra weight to employer’s responsibilities when it announced that employers that do not 
cooperate in establishing the identity of employees will no longer be guilty of a 
misdemeanour but of a criminal offence and fined accordingly. This is a strong form of 
deputation that raises questions on the limits and the extent of the employers’ responsibility 
                                                        
10  Starting January 2004 the tax authorities limited the number of offices that could issue sofi-numbers to 
sixteen. This decision was taken to counter the possibilities for identity fraud (Minster van Justitie 2004: 6). 
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for the ‘legality’ of their workforce, especially in an age in which ‘identity fraud’ is taking on a 
widespread character (Barensen & Eijkelenboom 2006: 62). Against a backdrop of intensified 
controls and much higher fines in recent years (see paragraph 3.4.2), the incentive for 
employers to increase their efforts on the matter of the control of documents has become 
bigger. The government also tries to facilitate this process. In 2003 the Labour Inspectorate 
sent a brochure out to 700.000 employers, detailing how to verify the identity of their 
employees. A number of CWI offices (employment agency/social security services) have 
started with a pilot with so-called verification- and information points. At these points 
employers can have the identification documents of their employees checked (Barentsen & 
Eijkelenboom 2006). This is a government service, but this will not necessarily remain so. 
Furthermore, if this system will be spread out it will put extra pressure on employers to make 
use of it (...you could have known…). The tax authorities were looking into something similar 
for the link between identity (documents) and the social-fiscal number (Minister voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 26). Another recent innovation that draws 
employers deeper into the labour market control system is the introduction of the First Day 
Notification (Eerstedagmeldding). The government introduced a compulsory notification 
prior to the actual first workday of new employees to the tax authorities. This way when an 
employer is being investigated and irregular workers are found, employers cannot use the 
classic pretence that an irregular worker only started working the day prior to the inspection 
(Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 23, Barentsen & Eijkelenboom 
2006: 69).  
 
In both countries employers – in a broad sense - are encouraged to function as gatekeepers to 
the institution of the labour market. Not only by the direct deputation of employers but also 
by stimulating self-regulation at the level of industries and employers’ federations. This holds 
true especially for those sectors in which irregular migrant labour is a common phenomenon, 
that are well organised at industry level and which have also been highlighted by the 
government as prime sectors for labour market controls (see also paragraph 3.4.2). So it is 
especially ‘notorious’ sectors such as construction (in both countries, but especially 
Germany), commercial temp agencies and agriculture and horticulture (especially in the 
Netherlands) that start up projects to counter undeclared labour and irregular migrant 
labour. Unsurprisingly, governments are more than willing to lend a hand. In Germany, the 
Finance Ministry is setting up joint campaigns with the construction sector and the transport 
sector under rallying cries such as ‘Schwarzarbeit. Nicht mit mir!’ and ‘Illegal ist unsozial’ 
(see also Sinn et al. 2005: 50). In the Dutch construction sector employers federations and 
unions jointly introduced an “agency for compliance in the construction sector” (Bureau 
Naleving Bouwnijverheid) that gathers information and tips from workers and employers in 
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the sector and exchanges this information with the controlling authorities (Podium 2006: 1). 
The employers’ federation for agri- and horticulture (LTO Nederland) runs a special 
programme to certify (specialised) temp agencies for the sector to ensure that they won’t 
send irregular migrant workers to the employers that use these agencies for flex workers11. 
This form of deputation at the meso-level of industries has its own logic. Employer 
federations want to be responsible partners of the government and also have to look out for 
their members, whose interests may be shifting from non-compliance to labour laws to 
compliance when controls and fines are increasing. Unions also have important incentives to 
be against irregular migrant labour as they ‘threaten’ the legal workers by undercutting prices 
and offering greater flexibility than their legal co-workers. However, in sectors where 
irregular (migrant) labour is rife, these initiatives are unlikely to turn the tables on the 
phenomenon of irregular migrant labour. On the other hand, deputation doesn’t stop at the 
level of industries and unions. In fact, control authorities such as the Labour Inspectorate or 
the German custom authorities get much of the information that direct their controls from 
the general public in the form of tips and information about ‘suspicious’ workplaces or 
workers. Citizens, employers (jealous or wary of unfair competition) and (legal) co-workers 
often point the authorities in the direction of irregular migrant workers, their employers and 
the places they work. In the Netherlands a significant number of controls and investigations 
by the authorities are based on tips (Arbeidsinspectie 2007). For Germany Sinn et al. (2005: 
47) and Stobbe (2004: 101) maintain that external controls are triggered by two sources of 
information. First, they are conducted on the basis of information and analyses by the 
authorities themselves (both those directly responsible for labour market control, and other 
authorities such as the police, social insurance agencies etc.). Secondly, controls are initiated 
because of information and tips received from the general public (business competitors, 
neighbours, trade unions and regular employees).   
 
Lastly, deputation can also apply to those who already are formally deputies, i.e. the public 
and semi-public authorities that control the registrations and issue the documents that 
irregular migrants need to get access to the labour market. To make exclusion work these 
agencies will have to improve their information exchange to increase the control on 
ineligibilities. Secondly, the central government will want to limit discretionary powers that 
may result in cracks in the paper and digital walls. Especially in the Netherlands the existing 
maze of bureaucratic requirements was not originally set up to function as a paper or digital 
wall to exclude irregular migrants. Over time it has been made to function as such, as laws to 
that effect were introduced during the 1990s. Van der Leun (2003: 170) showed that the 
                                                        
11  See: http://www.lto.nl, under ‘projecten’: ‘certificering van uitzendbureaus’.  
Or see: http://www.kiesria.nl (both accessed 10.1.2008) 
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exclusion of irregular migrants by various authorities has become stricter over the years. 
Especially in those sectors where workers have a lower level of professionalisation there is 
tendency to comply with the new laws more legalistically resulting in harder digital or paper 
walls that effectively shut out irregular migrants. This legalistic approach is also found in 
Germany. Perhaps even more so, as a more lenient approach, grounded in a tradition of 
‘gedogen’(toleration), is hardly a part of German ‘bureaucratic history’. In 2001 Cyrus & 
Vogel (2003) conducted in-depth research on the German Federal Labour Office 
(Bundesanstalt für Arbeit) which, among many other tasks, is responsible for decisions on 
work permits and the combat of illegal employment. The latter task has been centralized at 
the Customs authorities in 2004. Their research focused on the decision-making procedures 
in granting or refusing work permits and on the level of discretion of these ‘street level 
bureaucrats’. They conclude that these important gatekeepers of the labour market have a 
legalistic and professional attitude in which regulations from higher levels within the 
hierarchy are closely followed. Employment relations are hierarchical, and employees are 
aware that their decisions will be subject to scrutiny by higher levels of the organization. As a 
result they try to solve cases face-to-face within their level of hierarchy and in accordance 
with written norms, such as regulations, decrees and operating instructions issued at the 
level of the Federation and the refinements at the level of the Länder (Cyrus & Vogel 2003: 
253). The fact that Germany does not have a linking act may be explained by the fact that it 
does not seem to need it. According to Vogel (2001) a tradition and practice of cross-
referencing and data-exchange between the various agencies that are responsible for labour 
market access has developed. “Identification procedures in the German labour market are 
characterized by organizational decentralization and fragmentation, on the one hand, and 
cooperation and central databases on the other” (Vogel 2001: 340). 
 
Obviously, crosschecking databases, curtailing street levels bureaucrat’s room to manoeuvre 
and deputising employers can only attribute to the exclusion of irregular migrants from the 
labour market in as far as employers and irregular migrants have some connection with the 
formal labour market. Not all employers are ‘deputable’ and not all irregular migrants seek 
access to legal documentation. Employers determined to make use of irregular (migrant) 
labour and irregular migrant workers can only be approached through more active policies of 
control and punishment.  
 
3.4.2 Control and punishment 
The proof of the pudding is always in the eating. When governments reach the limits of what 
they can achieve through regulations (what is and isn’t allowed according to the law) and 
through deputation (outsourcing control to employers and other actors) they have to turn to 
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more active policies if they want to intensify internal migration control further. In both 
countries successive governments have tried to increase their grip on labour market fraud, 
tried to curtail irregular migrant access to the labour market and consequently have stepped 
up direct controls on the labour market. Vogel (2006) summed up the recent developments 
in labour market control in Germany under the heading: ‘höher – schneller- weiter!’. Higher 
fines, speedier controls as a result of computerisation and innovations such as chip cards, 
and more means and personnel for the control authorities. As the following pages will show 
‘higher, faster and more’ is also an apt slogan for the recent Dutch policy developments. The 
aim of labour market controls is primarily a matter of raising the stakes for employers, 
irregular migrants and intermediaries. Entering the labour market will become more difficult 
if the chance of being controlled increases. Recruiting irregular migrant workers is much less 
attractive if the chance of getting caught or even the perceived chance of getting caught 
increases. In other words, the primary aim of controls is still discouragement, also in 
recognition of the fact that it is simply impossible to subject all employers to controls. A 
number of trends stand out in both countries: increases in manpower and controls, a more 
restrictive policy framework and higher fines and a more targeted approach, often organised 
in special control teams, consisting of various enforcement authorities.  
 
Organization and manpower 
In 1999 the Netherlands Court of Audit established that the Labour Inspectorate 
(Arbeidsinspectie) employed circa 80 inspectors responsible for inspections under the Aliens 
Employment Act (WAV) (Algemene Rekenkamer 1999: 9). The report notes that this 
constitutes a significant increase compared to 1993, but no specific numbers are mentioned. 
Institutional and organisational changes in labour market control system also influenced the 
numbers of inspectors. In 2000 the Dutch government decided to create a new agency, the 
SIOD (Social Intelligence and Research Unit), a new investigative unit with the broad task of 
investigating cases on all matters concerning the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. 
The launch of the SIOD in 2002 entailed a new division of labour and responsibilities 
between the Labour Inspectorate and the SIOD. The Labour Inspectorate is responsible for 
the less complicated investigative tasks under the Aliens Employment Act, while the SIOD 
takes care of the heavy cases involving criminal organizations and requiring an inter-sectoral 
approach (Arbeidsinspectie 2002: 48). The creation of the SIOD entailed the transfer of a 
significant part of the Labour Inspectorate’s capacity to the SIOD. A large number of 
inspectors (35 fte) were transferred to the SIOD and the Labour Inspectorate aimed to be 
back at normal strength (100 fte) in 2004 (Arbeidsinspectie 2002: 50). However, since then 
the political priority for labour market surveillance and the fight against the employment of 
irregular migrants has been intensified almost every year, resulting in a significant rise in the 
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number of inspectors after the Labour Inspectorate’s ‘losses’ to the SIOD had been 
replenished. In 2003 the number of inspectors stood at 91, rising to 131 in 2004, 170 in 2006 
and coming to a provisional halt at 180 inspectors in 2006. In short, the number of 
inspectors dealing with irregular migrant labour was more than doubled and in addition to 
that large scale fraud with irregular migrants is now being investigated by the new 
investigative branch of labour market control, the SIOD. 
 
The German numbers dwarf those in the Netherlands, even when compensated for the 
obvious differences between the two countries. The 1981 law on the control of illegal 
employment (Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der illegalen Beschäftigung) introduced new measures 
on information exchange among agencies, heightened the fines and deputized transport 
companies by obliging them to cooperate with migration controls. In addition to the 
development of the legal instruments and intensification of sanctions, the number of staff 
involved in workplace controls at the Federal German Labour office (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeit) was continually increased (Schönwalder et al. 2006: 72). External controls used to be 
a task of the German labour offices and the Custom Administration (Hauptzollämter). Since 
the last major reform of the legal framework in 2004 the responsibility for labour market 
controls has been centralized. Since the entry into force of the new law 
(Schwarzarbeitsbekämfungsgesetz) it is the federal customs organization, and more 
specifically the Department for Financial control of irregular employment (Finanzkontrolle 
Schwarzarbeit – FKS) in Cologne that holds the exclusive mandate. According to Cyrus, 
Düvell & Vogel (2004: 55) the number of inspectors at the Labour Offices increased from 50 
to 2.450 in the years between 1982 and 1998. Since then numbers have risen both 
autonomously and as a result of the centralisation of responsibilities at the Customs office 
that entailed a transfer of staff from the labour offices to the Customs office. In the early 
2000s there were 5,200 customs officials fighting against undeclared work and illegal 
employment and according to the Federal Ministry of Finance, this figure will rise to 7,000 
officials in the course of the year 2005, the ensuing personnel costs amounting to about € 
250 million (Sinn et al. 2005: 75-76). 
 
Increasing controls and rising fines  
With the rising numbers of inspectors the Dutch Labour inspectorate has significantly 
stepped up its controls. In the years 2001-2003 the number of inspections dropped, but this 
was largely due to the ‘transfer’ of inspection capacity to the newly founded SIOD. Obviously 
the loss of capacity to the SIOD is not a full loss as these inspectors are for a large part also 
working on cases that involve the employment of irregular migrants. After that the increase 
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in labour market inspectors translates into a rapidly increasing number of labour market 
inspections (see table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Labour market controls and reports of offence/administrative 
fines, 1999-2006 in the Netherlands  
 Controls Reports of offence/administrative fines 
   
1999 6.034 783 
2000 5.040 718 
2001 3.840 739 
2002 3.737 688 
2003 3.700 731 
2004 5.950 1.063 
2005 8.633 2.201* 
2006 11.026 3.013 
Sources: Arbeidsinspectie 2000-2007  
* From 2005 onwards it is not the number of PV (reports of offence) but the number of  
 administrative fines that is counted. In reality the number of administrative fines in 2005 is 
 well over 2500 as in many cases both the employer and the facilitator are fined  
 (Arbeidsinspectie 2005: 67). 
 
With the increase of the inspections the number of fined employers has also risen 
substantially (from 783 fined employers in 1999 to 3.197 in 2006). However, the main reason 
for the recent steep increase in the number of reports of offence and fines has been the 
introduction of the administrative fine in January 2005. In fact, the administrative fine has 
been a proverbial ‘giant leap’ for the Labour Inspectorate. Prior to 2005 the procedure for 
fining employers that violated the Aliens Employment Act was a lengthy and somewhat 
cumbersome procedure. The Labour Inspectorate drew up a report after an inspection 
revealed that an employer illegally employed (irregular) migrants and sent its report of 
offence to the Public prosecution Department (OM). The public prosecutor then determined 
the height of the fine. In 1999 the Public prosecution Department set a fine of 2000-5000 
Dutch Guilders per illegally employed person in the case of a first offence as a general 
guideline. However, in practice the Court of Audit found in 1999 that the fines were usually 
equal to or below the minimum fine of 2000 Guilders (Algemene Rekenkamer 1999). The 
Public prosecution Department argued that it was a lack of information in the reports of the 
Labour Inspectorate that was the bottleneck of the whole procedure and hence, the root of 
the relatively low fines. In 2004 the Court of Audit looked into the matter again and 
concluded that the fines that the Public Prosecutor imposed were still too low to have a 
deterring effect on employers. This lack of deterrence had much to do with the fact that fines 
had only risen 10 per cent over the years coming to an average amount of €980 per illegally 
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employed person (Algemene Rekenkamer 2004). The introduction of the administrative fine 
made life a lot easier for the Labour Inspectorate, as it can now fine employers directly, 
instead of through the channel of the Public Prosecutor. The procedure is faster and 
administratively less complex, but most of all, the fines have been raised substantially. Since 
2005 an employer is fined €8.000 per illegally employed worker; if the employer is a repeat 
offender the fine goes up to €12.000. In the case of a private person as an employer the fine is 
set at €4.000 and at €6.000 for repeat offenders. If the labour inspectors find administrative 
deficiencies concerning the hiring and (sub-) contracting of alien workers, employers are 
fined €1.500 per deficiency. The Department for Social Affairs and Employment considers 
the administrative fine a very successful tool in the fight against the illegal employment of 
irregular migrants (Staatssecretaris van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2006).   
 
In Germany the large number of inspectors also translates into high numbers of controls. 
Sinn et al. (2005: 48) state: “Due to the relatively large number of checks and the intensive 
cooperation and data-technological interconnection, the frequency and intensity of checks 
can be regarded as high, in comparison to other industrial countries”. However, keeping 
track of statistics concerning controls and fines is even harder than in the Dutch case. The 
recent transfer of responsibilities from the Labour offices to the Federal customs authorities 
complicate matters further. Statistics until 2003 by the Labour Offices give some insight into 
the development in the control system (see table 3.3). Between 1992 and 2003 the number of 
warnings and fines has generally decreased while the number of reports of offence (the start 
of legal proceedings) has increased over time. For the period 2000-2003 the numbers of the 
employees that are warned, fined or prosecuted are available separately. However, the 
statistics do not distinguish between legal foreigners workers irregularly and irregular 
migrants working irregularly (Kreienbrink & Sinn 2006: 24).  
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Table 3.3 Warnings, fines and reports of offence resulting from labour 
market controls, employers and employees, Germany, 1992-2003 
Year Warnings and fines 
 
Reports of offence 
 Employers 
and 
employees 
 
Of which 
foreigners 
working 
irregularly  
Employers and 
employees 
Of which 
foreigners 
working 
irregularly 
1992 18.928  4.131  
1993 30.736  5.884  
1994 36.876  5.281  
1995 42.402  6.486  
1996 46.160  9.147  
1997 43.157  11.484  
1998 37.740  10.597  
1999 42.881  9.919  
2000 41.255 17.445 11.374 5.165 
2001 30.486 12.591 10.409 5.411 
2002 31.342 12.881 13.728 6.611 
2003 27.670 11.052 13.931 6.355 
Source: Kreienbrink & Sinn 2006: 23-24 
 
In Germany, at least until 2003, legal procedures were gaining in importance when 
compared to fines. Even so, the height of the fines has been increased in 2000 and in 2002. 
Since 2002, employers who employ illegal aliens (or, who irregularly employ aliens) are no 
longer subject to a fine of maximum €250.000, but are liable for double that amount 
(€500.000). Since 2004 social security fraud by employers can be punished with prison 
sentences up to 5 years (Vogel 2006, see also Sinn et al. 2005: 49). The actual height of the 
fines and the length of the terms of imprisonment depend on the seriousness of the violations 
of the labour law, the number of illegal aliens employed and the conditions of their 
employment. Employees can also be fined for up to €5000 for working without a permit. The 
German authorities seem to have a similar problem as the Dutch authorities with enforcing 
the system of fines and imprisonment that hinges on the role of the prosecutors and the 
courts. Sinn et al. (2005: 49) point out that courts are inclined to lower the fines because of 
lack of evidence, often resulting from the reluctance of employees to testify against 
employers. They observe that there is ample room for the employer and the employee to 
make a deal and ‘stick to a story’. Also, the reports of offence sometimes reach the public 
prosecutors office after the irregular migrant already entered the repatriation procedures, 
which complicates the collection of evidence. Nonetheless, more recent figures from the 
Federal customs Authorities do indicate that the new 2004 law and the steep increase in 
 85 
personnel have resulted in a very substantial increase in the numbers of controls in recent 
years (see table 3.4). This would suggest that the pressure on employers is rising in Germany.   
 
Table 3.4 Labour market controls in Germany, employers and employees, 
2003-2006 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 
 
Persons controlled at the worksite 
 
79.269 264.500 355.876 423.175 
Controls of employers 
 
32.572 104.965 78.316 83.258 
Sources: Bundeskriminalamt 2004: 50 & Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit 200812 
 
Between 2003 and 2006 the number of controls has increased significantly. The number of 
employers that were visited has more than doubled, while the number of employees that were 
checked increased more than fivefold.   
 
Risk analyses and specialised control units 
During the 1990s the Dutch approach to the problem of illegal employment of irregular 
migrants lacked an information-based strategy. In 1999 the Dutch Court of Audit concluded 
that the inspections lacked a systematic approach based on a risk analysis. The control 
system was thus open to so-called ‘white spots’, sectors that may be heavily populated with 
illegal labour, but are nonetheless left in peace (Algemene Rekenkamer 1999: 5, 18). Since 
then the Labour Inspectorate has invested in a risk analysis based approach to labour market 
fraud, leading to the selection of certain sectors as ‘risk sectors’ and to the introduction of a 
number of special intervention teams. If we go by the facts and figures of the most recent year 
report of the labour inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie 2007) we get the following ‘top 5’ of 
sectors in which the employment of irregular workers is the highest: (1) retail trade (2) agri-
and horticulture (3) hotel and catering industry (4) construction and (5) temp agencies. A 
number of these sectors of the Dutch economy have been ‘classics’ over the years (agri- and 
horticulture/hotel and catering/construction) and some, such as the temp agencies, have 
become problematic sectors in recent years. In the latter case it has been an official 
government policy of deregulation of the sector of employment intermediation that was the 
origin of a fast rising number of legal, shady and criminal temp agencies that mediate in the 
demand for (irregular) migrant labour (Van der Leun & Kloosterman 2006). The year report 
over 2006 also gives an interesting breakdown of the controls, in terms of the information 
source on which the control was started, revealing the Labour Inspectorate’s underlying risk 
calculation. The largest number of controls were on the Labour Inspectorate’s own initiative 
                                                        
12  http://www.zoll.de/d0_zoll_im_einsatz/b0_finanzkontrolle/l0_statistik/index.html (accessed 15.1.2008) 
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(based on their own information analysis), second were the controls that were conducted in 
cooperation with other partners in the so-called intervention teams and third were the 
controls that were started up on the basis of tips and other notifications from outside of the 
inspectorate (Arbeidsinspectie 2007: 10). The ‘returns’ on the controls (in terms of number of 
fined illegally employed persons) are highest when the controls are based on tips of the 
general public, underscoring the effectiveness of using the general public’s discontent to the 
state’s advantage. 
 
Since the late 1990s the Dutch government has introduced an increasing number of so-called 
intervention teams for those sectors of the economy that have a high risk profile for 
employing workers illegally and employing irregular migrant workers. There were some early 
predecessors such as the Clothing Intervention Team that was active during the years 1994-
1997 and targeted the (predominantly Turkish) sewing shops in Amsterdam (Raes et al. 
2002). The intervention teams are made up of inspectors and officials of various government 
agencies such as the Labour Inspectorate, Tax authorities, Social Insurance Bank, Public 
Prosecutors Office, municipalities and the Aliens Police. Within these teams the patchwork of 
government control agencies is pulled together. In the 2004 White paper on irregular 
migrants the Dutch government announced its intention to create a ‘nation wide network of 
intervention teams’ (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 24). In addition 
to existing (or previously operational) intervention teams, such as the Westland, 
Construction and Confection intervention teams there will be new teams for sectors such as 
Warehouses and Distribution. Despite the fact that a number of these teams have been in 
operation for some years, there are no systematic evaluations of their effectiveness. There 
was a recent more procedural evaluation of the ‘internal’ cooperation that gave an overall 
picture of satisfaction with the interagency cooperation in the intervention teams. Tellingly 
however, it points to the participation of the (aliens) police and to problems with information 
exchange and access to the (systems) of the various participations as priorities for 
improvement (Castenmiller et al. 2007). The police have to deal with multiple demands on 
their services and the information systems of the various organizations are not always able to 
‘communicate’. The Ministry of Social Affairs is setting up a system for the intervention 
teams to overcome the difficulties, but none of the members of intervention teams were 
aware of this at the time of the evaluation (ibid: 17). Moreover, different sectors have 
different problems in terms of labour law violations and the structural characteristics of 
certain sectors also influence employers’ behaviour and the impact of the control system. Not 
all sectors are equal and therefore not all intervention teams achieve, or are able to achieve, 
the same results. See for an illustration box 3.1.  
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Box 3.1 Why some sectors are more equal than others 
 
One of the earliest Intervention Teams was the Clothing Intervention Team. In the early 1990s it 
was a public secret that illegal practices, especially irregular migrant labour, were widespread in the 
Amsterdam garment industry (Raes et al 2002). Until 1993 it was estimated that 10.000 illegal 
(migrant) workers worked in this sector. State responses were twofold. First, there were legal 
initiatives such as the extension of the Dutch Act on Chain Liability to the garment sector in 1994, 
which made retailers formally responsible for the illegal practices of their contractors. Secondly, the 
authorities organized crackdowns through the introduction of a Clothing Intervention Team, which 
organized raids on Turkish sewing shops and especially targeted violations of the Aliens Employment 
Act (WAV). The activities of this intervention team were one of the main reasons for the nearly 
complete disappearance of the garment industry in the Dutch capital (Raes et al 2002). However, the 
demise of the (Turkish) garment industry from the Dutch capital also had a lot to do with changing 
strategies from retailers (relying more on imports from low(er) wage countries).  
 
A traditional Dutch sector in which irregular (migrant) labour is common is agri- and horticulture. 
For years the Labour Inspectorate noted an average of 20% violations of the Aliens Employment Act 
during their controls. Only recently has this figure has been dropping to 17.5% in 2005 and 13% in 
2006 (Arbeidsinspectie 2007b). The percentage of irregular resident migrants involved in labour 
market fraud is however relatively stable (18%). The sector as a whole has some specific 
characteristics: the vast majority of irregularly employed aliens are Poles and other middle- and 
eastern Europeans. At the same time the number of work permits issued for the sector has been on 
the rise for years: from 9.675 in 2002 to 39.645 in 2006. 92% of these permits are granted to Poles 
and other middle- and eastern Europeans. The Labour Inspectorate attributes the drop in the 
violations of the labour law to the wider availability of permits, measures taken by the sector itself 
and to the increase of controls. However, this general picture contrasts sharply with a more specific 
(geographical) part of the sector. If agri- and horticulture are ‘traditional’ sectors of (aliens) labour 
law violations, then the greenhouses of the Westland district are ‘notorious’. The Westland 
Intervention Team (WIT) specifically targets this ‘district’ of greenhouses that is roughly wedged 
in between the large cities of The Hague and Rotterdam. The team became operational in 1999 and 
conducts controls in cooperation with a number of different control authorities. Despite these 
controls and the general tightening of the legal framework (including the administrative fine), the 
Westland still lives up to its ‘reputation’. While the Labour Inspectorate finds 13% violations of the 
Aliens Employment Act for the sector as a whole (not including the Westland) the WIT scores a 
percentage of 35% for the same year (2006). The Labour Inspectorate points especially to the supply 
side to explain the differences: the proximity of large cities and specialised intermediaries and temp 
agencies (Arbeidsinspectie 2007b). However, other explanations may also be feasible. The demand 
may be high because of availability, but also simply because of profitability, because the chance of 
getting caught is a calculated risk, or even because irregular (migrant) labour is a necessary lever to 
make a profit and to keep business afloat. Furthermore, outsourcing this industry is possible in theory 
but – in contrast to the garment industry - is hardly an economic or political possibility.   
 
In Germany controls are based on both the analysis of the authorities themselves and on the 
basis of tips and information received from the general public (Stobbe 2004: 101). The prime 
sector for labour market controls, especially since the Berlin ‘building boom’ started in the 
early 1990s, is the construction sector. Another reason for its central place in the control 
regime is the fact that this is a sector in which the numbers of irregular migrant workers are 
often considered not to be dropping, in spite of the many controls (Liedtke 2005: 212). Over 
the years a number of other sectors have been put forward as prime sectors for irregular 
migrant employment, such as hotel/catering, transportation, cleaning services, food industry 
and agriculture (Liedtke 2005, Bundesregierung 2005: 107). However, Schönwalder et al. 
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(2006: 48) are very critical of the information the German government has on the 
distribution of irregular migrants workers over the various sectors of the economy: “The basis 
of individual estimations is often not transparent or it is derived from individual examples. 
Workplace controls by the authorities are not systematically evaluated. In the absence of such 
systematic evaluation, the reports of the authorities on the raids carried out and cases of 
illegal employment discovered can only be dealt with as individual cases”. The fact that the 
construction sector has been a hotbed of irregular migrant labour in Germany is however 
relatively uncontested. Especially during the 1990s construction boom in Berlin, special 
teams were formed to counter illegal employment in construction. According to Martin and 
Miller (2000) these were very large teams composed of policemen and labour inspectors that 
organized at least one major inspection of a construction site per month. “A major work site 
inspection involves up to 100 police with dogs to surround the construction site to prevent 
anyone from leaving during the inspection, and 200 to 300 labour inspectors to check the 
legal status of each worker on the site” (Martin & Miller 2000: 23). However, there are also 
some indications that illegal employment during this period of rapid expansion of the 
building industry in the German capital has also been tacitly approved (Sinn et al. 2005: 48). 
 
The Bundesregierung (2005: 107) also states that there is a ‘sectoral shift’ in progress. Private 
employment of irregular migrants is supposed to become relatively more important. Van der 
Leun & Kloosterman (2006) hypothesize about a similar shift from more ‘public’ to more 
‘private’ spheres in the Netherlands. A sectoral shift towards private households – in building 
activities such as house renovations for example – and the well known but hardly touched 
upon ‘private sector’ of the domestic aid for cleaning, childcare and care for the elderly causes 
problems for the control agencies. Especially female migrants tend to be employed in 
domestic work which is only very seldom a tax paid job, regardless of the legal status of the 
domestic worker. In this sector, as in many others, migrant workers are not necessarily illegal 
residents, sometimes they just lack a legal right to work or ‘only’ engage in labour market 
fraud through tax evasion. The literature on female (irregular) migration and domestic work 
shows a clear divide between the north and the south of Europe. In many Southern European 
countries the 24 hour live-in domestic worker is a normal phenomenon, whereas in countries 
such as Germany, the UK and the Netherlands they tend to be employed on live-out 
conditions (Anderson 2000, Jordan 2006). In her characterization of migrant domestic 
workers in various European cities Anderson (2000: 85) places Berlin in the quadrant 
typified by “live-out” working conditions and a “documented” status. That does not mean that 
there are no irregular migrants in domestic work in Northern Europe, as both Anderson 
herself documents and can be seen from other studies such as those by Philip Anderson 
(2004) and Lutz (2007). As the demand for migrant domestic work is not met through 
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special recruitment policies as it is in on a certain scale in the Southern Europe, Lutz (2007b: 
189) maintains that countries such as Germany and the Netherlands “(…) ignore the 
existence of this phenomenon by transforming it into a ‘twilight zone’ that exists only as an 
irregular market”. This twilight zone gives (female) irregular migrants a certain shelter 
against government control, although not against dangers of exploitation and violence that 
employment in private households can entail. Cyrus & Vogel (2006: 104) indicate that most 
of the women they interviewed that worked in a domestic setting were unafraid of the ‘virtual 
possibility’ of labour market controls. Work in the private sphere is an obvious ‘white spot’ 
for labour market controls. If governments would like to change this, it would probably cause 
more problems for the German authorities than it would for the Dutch authorities. There are 
a number of reasons why the German authorities do not and cannot control private 
households, ranging from the constitutional protection of the private household to 
considerations of effectiveness and a low public ‘visibility’ (Stobbe 2004: 103; Sinn et al. 
2005: 48). When in 2001 they did look behind the front door - the authorities in Frankfurt 
raided 200 private households for the first time - it created such a public outcry about the 
intrusion on the private sphere that they were also the last. Nonetheless, the German 
government tried to include the private sphere when it introduced its new legislation for 
labour market control in 2004. This proposed intrusion into the private homes of German 
citizens was heavily criticized in the ensuing parliamentary and public debate and was 
ultimately withdrawn from the bill (Cyrus, Düvell & Vogel 2004: 55). In contrast, the Dutch 
Construction Intervention Team is increasingly directing its attention to construction work at 
private households, primarily on the basis of tips (Bosse & Houwerzijl 2006). In 2005 for 
example, half of the controls that the Labour Inspectorate conducted in the construction 
sector were at private households, which has caused no public unrest to speak of. However, 
controls in private homes on domestic work are also unheard of in the Netherlands. Despite 
the common knowledge that domestic work can almost be equated with labour market fraud 
(at the very least tax evasion) this traditional ‘white spot’ is left unbothered and has never 
been prioritised by the labour control authorities.  
 
In the day-to-day practice of labour market controls the exclusive mandate for the Customs 
authorities since 2004 does not mean that there is no cooperation with other authorities. 
Cooperation at the level of information exchange, coordination and joint investigations are 
commonplace. The Bundesregierung (2005: 108) lists 11 organisations that work together on 
controls and information exchange, including the police, the border police, immigration 
authorities and social insurance authorities at the federal level and the level of the Länder. 
The competences of the inspectors of the Customs authorities are however remarkable. Since 
1998, the officers of the custom authorities have the same rights and duties as police officers. 
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That means that the inspectors no longer have to call on the police if in the course of their 
investigation certain suspicious facts – indicating an offence or misdemeanour – emerge 
(Sinn et al. 2005: 47). Dita Vogel’s qualification of faster (schneller) had to do with the 
increased possibilities for checking documents and cross-referencing as a result of new 
technologies. Faster applies to the databases and registrations and crosschecking that is done 
at the ‘back office’ of the control authorities, but also at the increased possibilities to do so on 
the spot. Sinn et al. (2005: 47) point out that the checking of identities and legal status 
through the verification of documentation is an integral part of external controls. The 
introduction of new documentary requirements intended to prove ‘legality’ went hand in 
hand with new data systems that allow for fast track ‘checking procedures’: “So wurde zum 
Beispiel zunächst ein Sozialversicherungsausweis eingeführt, dann wurde es in einigen 
Branchen verpflichtend, den Ausweis am Arbeitsplatz mitzuführen, und heute soll in einem 
Pilotprojekt in Berlin-Brandenburg mit offen getragenen Chipkarten experimentiert werden” 
(Vogel 2006: 112). The Bundesregierung (2005: 111) stresses the contribution that on line 
access during the controls to the databases of the social services, labour offices and the 
central aliens register could make to the effectiveness of the controls. However, controls 
aren’t the only measures taken in Germany against the illegal employment of irregular 
migrants. The heavy intensifications of the control regime aimed at the exclusion of irregular 
migrants are implemented alongside measures to widen the possibilities for legal labour 
migration, especially in some sectors where irregular migrant workers were/are 
commonplace. In the case of Germany, these ‘new guest worker schemes’ already started in 
the early 1990s, for example for seasonal labour in agriculture and subcontracting to foreign 
construction companies for the construction industry. Most of the schemes were meant to 
accommodate and legalise (irregular) labour migrants from Eastern Europe, especially 
Poland. Though the intention was to regularize irregular labour migration this goal has only 
been met partially, as the new schemes could not compensate for all the demand and also 
opened up new possibilities for fraud and irregular labour migration (Menz 2001, see also 
Broeders 2001: 145-146). In fact, the new government schemes also required new control 
efforts on behalf of the state, as is often the case. All in all, a clear example of what Portes & 
Haller (2005: 409) call a ‘paradox of state control’ meaning that “(…) official efforts to 
obliterate unregulated activities through the proliferation of rules and controls often expand 
the very conditions that give rise to these activities”. 
 
Higher, faster, more!……more effective?  
The question remains whether all these investments in technology, interoperability, 
manpower and control capabilities amount to a more effective labour market control regime 
and to a decrease in irregular migrant labour and labour market fraud. As can be seen from 
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the statistical material gathered and presented above, ‘effectiveness’ is hard to measure on 
the basis of the available data. Furthermore, the fact that there are no data at all available on 
the target population – in this case the ‘stock’ of irregular migrant workers – makes it even 
more difficult to comment on effectiveness. There is a general lack of reliable evaluations of 
controls and the working of the various (intervention) teams, as many researchers have 
observed before. For the Dutch case, there is an evaluation study on the internal procedures 
of the intervention teams and there are two studies on the employers’ compliance to the 
Aliens labour law based on surveys and interviews with employers (Mosselman & Van Rij 
2005; Groenewoud & Van Rij 2007). All three studies have been commissioned by the 
authorities themselves. The two surveys among employers have methodological ‘flaws’ that 
seriously influence the reliability of the answers that employers give. The responsible 
minister for Social Affairs and employment aims to seek alternative venues of research to 
gain insight into compliance among employers (Minister van Sociale Zaken en 
Werkgelegenheid 2007). That being said, the studies do give some insight into the relative 
weight that employers ascribe to the various factors that influence their choice on whether or 
not to employ irregular migrants. The material may not give much insight into the actual 
developments in irregular employment and the control thereof, but it does say something 
about the employers’ perception of the field. As such, it comments on the ‘balance of threat’ 
rather than the ‘balance of power’ so to speak. On the basis of the survey studies two, 
somewhat contradictory or at least parallel, conclusions can be drawn. The first is that 
financial gain – and not the lack of an available legal workforce - is the predominant motive 
for employers to use irregular migrant labour. More supply of labour, or the now ‘legalised’ 
EU-workforce from Central and Eastern Europe is therefore unlikely to alleviate an 
important part of the demand for irregular migrant labour. A second conclusion is that the 
perceived risk of being caught by controls and being fined (by higher fines) does seem to have 
a preventive effect. The perceived chance of getting caught and fined is substantially higher 
than the actual chance of being subjected to labour market controls, underlining the 
discouraging effect of controls and fines. This is also substantiated by the fact that the 
percentage of repeat offenders has been dropping, especially since the introduction of the 
administrative fine. So there are both indications that some employers remain incorrigible 
(and undeputable), as well as indications that other employers can be discouraged into 
compliance with labour laws.      
 
3.5 Exclusion through documentation 
Exclusion through documentation requires roughly the same ‘infrastructure’ as is used for 
policies operating under the logic of exclusion from documentation that was described in the 
previous paragraph. It is a shift of goals, methods and procedures rather than means. The 
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focus of interagency cooperation and control authorities should tilt towards the irregular 
migrant himself, instead of a dominant focus on the employer. Obviously, since the two logics 
of exclusion use the same ‘infrastructure’ they are not mutually exclusive. More than that, in 
an ‘ideal world of policy efficiency’ they are mutually reinforcing: employers are sanctioned 
and irregular migrants are apprehended and returned to their country of origin. Both goals 
can be achieved in a single worksite control, but they do require a different approach towards 
detection, documentation and identification as well as a different deployment of manpower 
and resources. The intensifications in the labour market control regime and the increasing 
political attention for the phenomenon of irregular migrants and irregular migrant labour 
that is apparent in both countries, would suggest that this second ‘layer’ of the control regime 
aimed at the irregular migrants also comes to the fore. Two interrelated phenomena take up 
centre stage in this second logic. In the first place, identification becomes even more 
important than in the first logic. Irregular migrants have to be recognised first as irregular 
migrants, and then later on have to be (re)identified and connected to their legal identity and 
their country of origin. Secondly, the need for identification almost automatically increases 
the role and importance of the deployment of modern identification techniques such as 
database technology.  
 
The paragraph on ‘exclusion through documentation’ is divided into two sections, 
corresponding to the analytical framework in table 3.1. Paragraph 3.5.1 deals with deputation 
and databases and paragraph 3.5.2 with control and punishment.  
 
3.5.1 Deputation and databases   
Under the second logic, identification becomes the goal for the databases and database 
technology. It is no longer sufficient to establish that a certain worker is an irregular migrant 
worker who should be excluded from the labour market. Instead, identification should be 
geared towards revealing the identity of an irregular migrant with a view to later expulsion 
and return policies (see chapter 4). In other words; the authorities at work in the field of 
labour market regulation would be required to look further than the labour market itself and 
place their control efforts in the service of direct control on irregular residence and even 
expulsion policies. Obviously, that would not only mean a shift in working procedures (and 
legal requirements) but also in the mental map of the professionals working in the field of 
labour market fraud. Previous experiences in the Netherlands with a similar shift - when the 
introduction of the Linking Act in 1998 required various authorities in education and housing 
to act as gatekeepers and executors of exclusionary policies towards irregular migrants - 
showed mixed results (Van der Leun 2003). Some authorities readily took up their new gate 
keeping functions, while other professions dealt with it in a more ‘flexible’ manner and 
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moulded the requirements to fit in with their own professional standards. Deputation in the 
case of exclusion through documentation is primarily aimed at the authorities of the state 
itself. Unlike the previous paragraph, this paragraph therefore mainly deals with internal 
reorganization, within and between various agencies. One reason for this is that all policies to 
do with apprehension, incarceration and expulsion are at their very core only within the 
jurisdiction of the state itself. Deputizing private individuals, private organisations or even 
semi-public organisation on these issues is politically and legally impractical or even 
impossible13. A second reason is the fact that not all government authorities are necessarily 
responsive to the needs and demands of the central government. They have institutional 
practices and interests, standard operating procedures and they mostly regard their tasks 
from the perspective of their core business, which, in this case, is the fight against labour 
market fraud.         
 
In the Netherlands ‘identification’ has become a central notion in many government policies. 
Labour market (fraud) policies are no different. After all, one of the main routes to work for 
irregular migrants is to appear legal which is often achieved by using false papers or by 
illegitimately using legal papers that do not belong to the migrant in question (Broeders & 
Engbersen 2007). Against the backdrop of an increasingly strict control regime, the 
importance of obtaining false papers or buying or borrowing of legitimate documentation – 
sometimes known as look-alike fraud - have become (even more) important strategies to keep 
the door to the labour market open. The Dutch government has responded in kind: identity 
management and identity fraud have become household policy concepts. According to Prins 
& De Vries (2003) policies relating to ‘immigration’ and ‘security’ are two of the main 
accelerators for the development of system of digital identification, i.e. controlling and 
verifying identities by means of database systems and/or other technical means. Indeed, the 
proliferation of identity related databases that have been created in the field of labour market 
fraud, or other databases that can be useful to labour market inspectors, has steadily grown. 
The state department is developing a Document Information System Civil Status, a database 
containing the document characteristics and markers needed for the authentification of 
foreign passports and ID’s that will be accessible for various authorities. The SIOD has 
created an ‘identity expertise centre’ (De Vries et al. 2007: 64-66). Furthermore, the police 
use a Verification and Information System that stores the numbers of all lost and stolen 
passports (Barensen & Eijkelenboom 2006), which may help in the matter of fraudulent use 
of non-falsified documents. Look-alike fraud, that uses legal documents, is one of the reasons 
                                                        
13  There are of course exceptions, especially private carriers, such as airlines and shipping companies, have 
been deputized on at least two counts: checking documents and refusing passengers if they are found lacking 
(an immigration task) and transporting irregular migrants back to their countries of origin (expulsion 
policies).   
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that the Dutch authorities are increasingly looking into the possibilities to include biometric 
features into identification documents. If a person is linked to his identity document by 
means of a fingerprint, look-alike fraud will be detected and proven more easily in the case of 
direct controls. The police also maintain a register of all aliens in the Netherlands, which 
used to be called the Aliens Administrative System (Vreemdelingen Adminstratie systeem-
VAS) and is now part of a more comprehensive police database, the Politie Suite Handhaving 
(PSH – V). More in general, politicians are eagerly looking into database technology as a new 
instrument in the fight against identity fraud and irregular migrant labour. In 2004 both the 
Dutch Minister for Justice and the Dutch Minster for Aliens affairs and Integration stressed 
the need to connect databases and to facilitate the exchange of information between several 
authorities in order to fight identity fraud en counter irregular migrant employment.      
 
As was already indicated in the previous paragraph, the German authorities responsible for 
counteracting illegal employment are perhaps even more geared to information exchange 
than the Dutch (Sinn et al. 2005). In addition to the ‘filtering out’ of irregular migrants on the 
basis of information exchange, the German authorities are also increasingly investing in 
systems that can establish identities. For a long time, all foreigners are registered in the 
Central Aliens Register (Ausländer Zentral Register – AZR). This database contains personal 
information on all foreigners in Germany, who are officially registered or whom the police 
investigated, who have been apprehended or who have been repatriated. The catalogue of 
data registered in this database has gradually expanded. For example in 2002, information 
on issued and rejected visa has been added (Sinn et al. 2005: 43). The foreign-resident 
authorities, the Federal Border Police (Bundesgrenzschutz - BGS), the Federal Office of 
Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt – BKA) and the police departments of the 
Länder have access to this database. If an irregular migrant is an asylum seeker, or has 
applied for asylum in the past, he might be traced through his fingerprint, which would be 
registered in the AFIS system of the BKA. In 2005 a ‘lost papers’ database was set up within 
the Federal Administration Office, registering lost and found identification documents that 
belonged to nationals of third countries requiring a visa and that were issued by foreign 
authorities (Sinn et al. 2005). These data might be used to counter (look-alike) identity fraud 
and determine the identity or citizenship of a foreigner and thus facilitating the 
implementation of repatriation later.  
 
However, the actual use of these systems in many cases still seems to confirm the (first) logic 
of exclusion from documentation, rather than the second. As far as can be deduced from the 
available literature the data systems are used to detect fraud and block access to the labour 
market, rather than using them in a more investigative way to detect irregular migrants with 
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the aim of transferring data to the immigration and police authorities, potentially and 
ultimately leading to arrest and expulsion. If anything, the flow of data seems to be more in 
the direction of the labour market authorities than in the direction of the immigration and 
police authorities. This suggests that the controls mainly target employers and exclude 
irregular migrant workers, rather than result in the apprehension of irregular migrants with a 
view to expulsion. Furthermore, in a number of cases, access is restricted to immigration and 
police authorities because of the nature of the data. This makes deputation of labour market 
officials at the level of data-exchange more difficult and the exchange of information more 
‘one-sided’. There is of course data-exchange at a more general level, in the form of inter-
agency workgroups that gather and discuss information to make controls more specific and 
effective. The Dutch white paper on Irregular Migrants (2004) did include a proposal for the 
direct deputation of labour market inspectors in matters of identification. However, this 
proposal to give labour market inspectors the authority to conduct identification 
investigations was dropped in favour of making it a punishable offence for employers not to 
cooperate in establishing the identity of an employee (Minster voor Vreemdelingenzaken en 
Integratie 2005: 9). The government apparently saw a greater advantage in deputizing 
employers, who can be severely fined, than in widening the investigative duties of the Labour 
Inspectorate. In sum, deputation in data-exchange is limited in the sense that Labour 
inspectors can only be deputised to a certain extent. However, the policing competences of 
the German Customs inspectors are an example of the mixing the two functions of policing 
and labour market controls to an extent much further than what was even proposed in the 
Netherlands. In connection to illegal employment the German inspectors have the authority 
to establish identities, conduct interrogations, confiscate evidence and to search and arrest 
suspects. An entirely different level of deputation altogether. 
 
When targeting irregular migrants themselves, deputation and databases are very much 
entwined with controls. The (electronic) resources for identification are of more interest 
when an irregular migrant has been apprehended and identification is needed to detain 
and/or expel him. Under the logic of ‘exclusion through documentation’ controls are 
important, but only if they (also) lead to the arrest of irregular migrants, rather than the 
fining of employers. If the authority to apprehend irregular migrants cannot be transferred, 
then the police authorities must cooperate closely with the labour inspection.   
 
3.5.2 Control and punishment 
When the authorities fix their eyes on the irregular migrant the height of the fines becomes of 
lesser importance. Fines can be of importance for migrants who do not have a work permit 
but do have a legal status of residence. It might deter them from working irregularly again. 
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But if an irregular migrant worker does not have a valid residence permit the ‘logical’ thing to 
do from a state perspective is to detain, identify and expel them. That is, for a government 
that seriously places ‘irregular resident migrants’ as a policy problem at the same levels as 
labour market fraud. Legally speaking this was always the logical thing to do, but there are 
many indications that the police did not see irregular residence as an important priority for a 
long time (Engbersen et al. 1999; Van der Leun 2003). This was the case for both the ‘normal’ 
police surveillance, in which irregular migrants were not considered a priority, as well as for 
the assistance that the police gave to labour market inspections. In Germany, irregular 
residence is a criminal offence and is therefore officially a priority. How this translates in day 
to day practice is however unclear (see also chapter 4). However, since successive Dutch and 
German governments have tagged irregular residence and irregular migrant labour as a 
significant problem the pressure from the central government on agencies such as the Labour 
Inspectorate, local authorities and the police has been mounting. In part this can be seen in 
the changes that have been implemented in Dutch and German policing in general and the 
developments within the aliens police more specifically. This will be dealt with in chapter 4. It 
can also be seen from the involvement of the police in labour market controls. Since labour 
market inspectors lack the authority to deal with irregular residence, irregular migrants can 
only be dealt with if they are transferred to the police or immigration authorities, or if the 
police are participating in the controls. In other words, labour market controls would have to 
become part of a chain of control, starting at detection at the workplace and leading 
ultimately to expulsion.  
 
In the Netherlands the political pressure on the police, and especially the Aliens Police, or 
Aliens Department as they were previously known, to actively deal with the irregular migrant 
population has increased since the early 1990s (Engbersen et al. 1999; Engbersen et al. 
2002). The 2004 White paper on Irregular Migrants explicitly announces the intensification 
of joint controls by the (aliens) police and the labour inspectorate. The underlying goal is to 
increase the number of expulsions as a result of the joint controls (Minister voor 
Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2004: 23). This would imply that police involvement in 
labour market controls has been rising since then. Again the available data make it difficult to 
get a good impression of the development in police controls on the labour market. Engbersen 
et al. (2002: 30) pointed out that the registrations in the Aliens Administrative Register 
(VAS) do not systematically differentiate between irregular resident migrants that were 
apprehended during a labour market control or as the result of any other form of police 
control. Many of those found working illegally, have been entered into the system as irregular 
resident migrants, i.e. in breach of the Aliens law, rather than in breach of the Aliens 
Employment Act (WAV). Their analysis of the VAS-data for the years 1997-2000 even show a 
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decline of the number of apprehensions under the Aliens Employment Act, dropping from 2,1 
per cent to 1,0 per cent of all apprehensions (ibid: 32). A later analysis of VAS-data stretching 
to 2003 confirms this trend, with labour market related apprehensions hovering around 1 per 
cent (Leerkes et al. 2004: 224-5). The ‘real’ number of labour market apprehensions is 
anywhere between the 1 per cent that is registered and the unknown percentage that may be 
hidden in the figures registered under breaches of the Aliens Act. It is however noteworthy 
that the authorities apparently do not feel the need or the political pressure to register these 
figures more accurately. If we assume that at least a number of  irregular migrants 
apprehended during a labour market control are not accurately registered, we should turn to 
other data that may give some insight into the matter. One could for example look at the 
activities of the Westland Intervention Team. Their year report on 2003 – the most recent 
that has been published! – suggests an intensification of joint controls by the Labour 
Inspectorate and the police. The number of so-called ‘A-controls’ in which the police 
participated rose to 15 per cent of all WIT controls in 2003, which is still a very modest 
percentage, especially given the reputation of the Westland. The report notes that these A-
controls are far more effective in terms of detecting and prosecuting cases of violating the 
Aliens Employment Act. They calculate that the chance of getting caught is 6.5 times higher 
for employers and employees than in the case of B-controls, in which the police does not 
participate14. The main reason for this is that the participation of the aliens police makes it 
possible to identify nearly all of the migrant workers. During the A-controls 760 employees 
were checked, of which 161 were found to be irregular resident migrants. The Aliens police 
reports that 82 per cent of these irregular migrants have been effectively expelled, 16 per cent 
has been ‘discharged’ (heengezonden) and 4 per cent was still in detention by the time the 
year report was published (Westland Interventie Team 2003: 11). Interestingly, the report 
notes a decline in the number of apprehended irregular migrants when compared to 2002, 
but attributes this to the fact that in 2003 they controlled smaller firms. All in all, there 
seems to be only scattered information that does not add up to a clear picture of whether 
joint checks are increasing and to what effect. For example, an evaluation report on labour 
market controls in agri- and horticulture (excluding the WIT controls) reports an increase in 
joint controls from 2002 to 2005, but a drop in 2006 that takes the percentage below that of 
2002 (41 per cent in 2006, 46 per cent in 2002). Also, between 2002 and 2006 the number 
of apprehended illegally resident aliens drops from 315 in 2002 to 76 in 2006. This report 
does point to the fact that the results of the WIT in the same period (which have not been 
published), show an entirely opposite picture (Arbeidsinspectie 2007b). 
                                                        
14  The increased effectiveness is of course also likely to be the result of a selection effect: the police will be asked 
to participate in those controls where the labour market authorities expect the largest groups of irregular 
migrant workers. 
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In Germany the situation is similar to that of the Netherlands. The political pressure to do 
something about irregular migrant employment and irregular residence is evident, but there 
is little evidence available to pinpoint the exact developments in practice. As in the Dutch 
case, the police statistics of the Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) do not differentiate between 
irregular migrants who have been apprehended on the basis of violating the labour laws and 
those apprehended for violating the residence laws. Police statistics for 2006 list 92.633 
suspects for offences against the residence law, asylum law and EU rules for free movement. 
When this is combined with the statistics for the number of irregular migrants among all 
non-German suspects, of which there were 64.605 in 2006, the number of irregular migrants 
apprehended for violations of the labour laws drop well below this last figure (as irregular 
migrants can obviously be suspects in various crimes and misdemeanours other than the 
violation of residence laws). To be more precise, the number of irregular migrants 
apprehended for violating the residence laws in terms of illegal residence (illegaler 
aufenthalt) stood at 40.424 and there were an additional 12.642 ‘other’ breaches of the 
residence laws15. There is also an indication of ‘offences connected to irregular migrant 
labour’ but the numbers are so low (369) that they most likely relate to the bigger cases of 
labour market fraud. Moreover, the suspects are more likely to be employers than employees 
(Bundeskriminalamt 2007: 108, 110, 116). Both in Germany and the Netherlands, the 
registration of irregular migrants apprehended during work site controls seems flawed. There 
are indications that they are not separately listed and are thus ‘hidden’ within the larger 
statistical category of those apprehended for being ‘irregular residents’. However, that leaves 
the size of their relative share in the total of apprehensions wide open to debate: it could 
mask small numbers or it could mask larger numbers. Some of the scattered indications 
found, suggest that the numbers may be – ‘disappointingly’ - low, especially against the 
background of an unmistakable political pressure to increase the number of apprehensions. A 
more sophisticated registration in order to gain insight in the increase or decrease of 
apprehended irregular migrant workers over the years has however not been implemented by 
the authorities, nor demanded by politicians. Apparently it is not considered a priority.   
 
The proxy of police involvement in labour market controls, as an indication of turning 
towards the second logic of exclusion, is not a very easy one in Germany either. A distinction 
has to made between the legal framework and practice before and after the new law on 
irregular migrant labour. Stobbe (2004: 100-102) maintains that until the early 1990s the 
legal framework in Germany was primarily aimed at the regulation of the labour market. Its 
                                                        
15  There may be overlap in these figures as the statistics count offences rather than individual persons.  
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contribution to migration control came second. The labour market inspectors did not 
prosecute irregular migrants themselves; they left this to the police and immigration 
authorities with whom they cooperated. Especially when the labour agencies suspected the 
presence of irregular migrants at a certain worksite, the police were called in to ‘surround’ the 
worksite and to arrest irregular migrants if necessary and immigration officials were called in 
to do the document checks. In short, labour markets inspectors required police assistance to 
deal with irregular migrants themselves in terms of identifying and apprehending them. 
However, no figures are available. Since 1998 customs officers have the competences of 
police officers when it comes to irregular migrant labour and since 2004 the customs officers 
are solely responsible for labour market controls and have seen their ranks swelling. These 
competences include establishing identities and taking irregular migrants into preliminary 
custody. In short, the customs authorities have no need for police assistance anymore.  
 
There is no central record of the number of apprehensions resulting from these labour 
market controls. Given the steep increase in the number of inspectors and inspections and 
the police-like competences of the inspectors, one would expect an increase in the number of 
irregular migrant labourers that were caught and arrested. A report on the ‘fight against 
undeclared labour in 2004-2005’ by the Senate16 of the Land Berlin however, gives different 
indications. Despite the fact that Berlin was and is a traditional hotbed of irregular migrant 
labour – especially in construction – the numbers of apprehended irregular migrants have 
been dropping from 1.340 persons in 2000 to 404 in 2004. There is a number of reasons for 
this drop in the figures. The first is the fact that the apprehensions and procedures that result 
from the controls of the Customs officers are not entered into the statistics of the police and 
are hence missing from these data. Another reason is that the EU free movement of workers 
now covers Polish workers, who accounted for much of the irregular migrants in previous 
years (Senatsverwaltung für Wirtschaft, Arbeit und Frauen 2005: 20-21). The relation 
between the statistics of the Customs offices and the police data is somewhat unclear and is 
further hampered by the fact that there are no reports of the Berlin Customs offices that 
contain statistics. A year report of the Bavarian Customs authorities, containing facts and 
figures on the activities of the Bavarian branch of the Finanzkontrolle schwarzarbeit, also 
lacks figures on what happens to irregular migrants detected during their controls 
(Oberfinanzdirektion Nürnberg 2007).     
   
                                                        
16 In Berlin, one of three German city state Bundesländer, the Senate is the executive body, or  
government,  of the state.   
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3.6 Conclusions 
Evaluating these policy developments in Germany and the Netherlands is not a 
straightforward affair. Conclusions may be drawn on three different levels: the political level, 
the policy level and the level of the execution of policy. Descending further to the level of 
daily practice information becomes scarcer and it is less easy to determine its value and 
validity for the processes this chapter aims to describe. The best that can be obtained from 
the facts and figures gathered in this chapter are indications for a number of developments, 
some indications more firm than others. The general trend for labour market controls with a 
view to irregular migrants workers for both countries is neatly summed up in Dita Vogel’s 
characterization ‘higher, faster, more’. An added characterization of my own in reference to 
the quality of the data could be ‘Dancing in the dark to faster music’. The speed of the music 
definitely has effects on both the controllers and the controlled, but the darkness makes it 
difficult to be very specific.  
 
That being said, a number of observations and indications do stand out. The first being the 
fact that the two countries are strikingly similar in the policy choices they make at a general 
level. At the political level there is a marked trend to intensify policies that are aimed at 
blocking irregular migrants’ access to the labour market (policies following the first logic of 
exclusion) and a more reserved trend towards incorporating the second logic of exclusion, 
aimed at the irregular migrant himself, into the labour market control system. In the 
Netherlands the government seems more explicit in its stated aim to target the irregular 
migrant himself. Both trends are characterized by an increasing use of database technology 
and the creation and refinements of digital boundaries: more registration is combined with 
networked registration. For policies aimed at the irregular migrant himself this trend is 
especially apparent in the heavy investment in new databases aimed at identification, identity 
fraud and the establishing the authenticity of documents and identities. Blocking access has 
also increasingly shifted ‘out of the state’ in more recent years; deputation of employers and 
enlisting the help of the general public to get information and tips have become popular 
choices in policy development.  
 
At the level of policy itself, one might say that both governments have put their money where 
their mouth is. Measured in terms of funding and staffing, the Dutch and German labour 
market control agencies have definitely been on the receiving end of government spending. 
These intensifications have resulted in more controls and more fines. Furthermore, both 
countries have invested in making the control regime more precise in terms of directing 
attention to those sectors in which irregular migrant labour is commonplace. Again, the 
biggest steps have been taken in strengthening the control regime aimed at blocking access to 
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the labour market. The main emphasis is on the demand side of irregular (migrant) labour 
and hence on employers. When it comes to the second logic of exclusion it becomes more 
difficult to see if, where and how the political priorities are translated into policy. 
Identification has become a more central feature of the control system. In the Netherlands 
the police are (supposed to be) more involved in the labour market control regime and in 
Germany the Customs authorities – solely responsible for labour market controls since 2004 
- have been ‘fully deputized’ and now have police-like duties and competences. How this 
translates into a control regime that functions along the lines of the second logic of exclusion, 
and thus aimed at the irregular migrant, his apprehension and ultimately expulsion, is hard 
to tell as the data are either missing or ‘misty’ at best.  
 
As usual, the level of the daily practice of labour market controls is the most difficult level to 
get a clear view of. Here, an interesting paradox evolves. The first logic is primarily aimed at 
discouragement and blocking access, both phenomena that are difficult to measure as the 
‘discouraged’ can’t be listed or counted. Yet most of the statistical information available is 
only able to provide indications for the first logic. The second logic is aimed at apprehension 
and detention, i.e. of entering a subject into the state apparatus (instead of shutting him out), 
yet the data on this category are by and large missing, or not adequately registered. It is 
therefore impossible to distinguish between irregular migrants apprehended during worksite 
controls and those apprehended during the course of some other form of control. Neither the 
size of the group of apprehended irregular migrants workers, nor the development of the size 
over time can be accurately determined, thus making any comment on ‘effectiveness’ 
impossible. It seems reasonable to assume that the control regime targets the individual 
irregular migrant now more than it did in the past as a result of the steadily mounting 
political pressure in recent years and the investments in identification procedures and 
databases. But to what extent is impossible to say as the numbers are simply not gathered 
and calculated. The following chapter on detention and expulsion may provide more insight 
into this matter. This lack of reliable data means that governments themselves are ‘dancing in 
the dark’ even though they are bound to have more information than is out in the open. The 
fact that these data are not gathered and/or made public may indicate any of a number of 
things ranging from disappointing results to priorities at the level of implementation 
differing sharply from national political priorities to rising apprehensions hidden within a 
larger category of apprehended irregular migrants. However, it also means that scientists, 
journalist and parliament for that matter, have no way of evaluating the control system and 
the recent changes in its operation in any real, empirical sense.    
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What do these developments in policymaking – with all the restrictions on the interpretation 
thereof mentioned above – amount to in terms of the Dutch and German political 
economies? How can we theoretically typify the Dutch and German welfare states in terms of 
the relation between state, market and irregular migrant labour? The neo-Marxist theorem 
that irregular migrants are a ‘new reserve army of workers’ can be rejected. The investment in 
legislation, manpower and resources are simply too substantial. If anything, these policy 
programmes of restriction point away from the idea of governments providing the market 
with cheap and docile labour. ‘Government’ is not the footman of ‘business’ in this respect.  
 
Segmented labour market theory however, holds more than a little sway. Irregular migrant 
workers are found in specific sectors of the economy and there are some indications that 
governments have turned a blind eye in some cases (Berlin construction during the ‘boom’) 
and also the new guest worker schemes indicate a willingness to cater to needs of the 
(segmented) labour market. Furthermore, there are notorious ‘white spots’ where the 
authorities cannot and/or will not intervene with controls. Governments are restricted as well 
as reluctant to control private households, thereby de facto consenting to widespread 
fraudulent domestic work, including domestic work by irregular migrant workers. Needless 
to say this lack of control also places domestic workers in a vulnerable position in a 
potentially exploitative environment. In short, there is segmentation in the Dutch and 
German labour market of which governments are fully aware, but which is nonetheless left 
alone as a result of political choices and/or restrictions in capacity. But where the authorities 
do target known ‘hotbeds’ of irregular migrant the Dutch and German governments cannot 
be said to be helpful or even conveniently ‘uninvolved’ towards these sectors. Controls are 
most intense, and increasingly so, in those parts of the economy that are well known for 
labour market fraud and irregular migrant labour. The stated aim of these control policies is 
the reduction of irregular migrant labour as far as possible. An interesting witness of this 
phenomenon is the category of the ‘undocumented unemployed’ that emerged from fieldwork 
among undocumented migrants in the Netherlands in the 1990s (Burgers & Engbersen 
1999). Roughly a third of the interviewed undocumented aliens were unemployed, and since 
that time the intensity of the control regime has been pushed up further. The fact that the 
greenhouses of the Westland region are still, and incorrigibly, in need of irregular migrant 
labour indicates segmentation, but the control regime does not indicate sympathy or 
benevolence towards its employers. There is not much pressure on government from these 
sectors of the economy, if anything there is political pressure on employers. Neither the 
Dutch nor the German government is likely to get itself into trouble by actively addressing 
these parts of the labour market. GNP simply does not depend on it and firm policies are 
more likely to create political capital with the electorate, than they cost in terms of ‘economic’ 
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loss. Policy gaps are hardly the result of active lobbies on the state. Nonetheless, in spite of 
intensifications in funding and manpower, policy gaps and a degree of segmentation cannot 
be avoided. Governments and agencies select the sectors they prioritize for control, and by 
default they de-prioritize other sectors. Sometimes they even skip whole sectors of the 
economy, such as domestic work, that are notorious hotbeds for labour market fraud and 
irregular (migrant) labour due to political and legal restraints. But the most dominant 
constraint remains a matter of capacity: there are simply too many companies to control. 
When the EU proposed a framework policy against employers of irregular migrants in 2007, 
it aimed for the control of 10 per cent of all registered companies in each member state, even 
though the Commission’s own assessment indicated that only 2 per cent were being 
controlled at the time (Carrera & Guild 2007: 5). According to a covering note on this 
proposal by the Foreign Ministry to the Dutch parliament, reaching the target of 10 per cent 
would require an increase in staff from the current 180 to 930 inspectors (Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken 2007). Perhaps unsurprisingly the Dutch government opposed the 10 
per cent target. White spots are therefore inevitable and we may conclude that while 
segmentation is not the intention of policy, some foreseeable segmentation may well result 
from it, or in some cases simply cannot be avoided.  
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4 POLICE SURVEILLANCE, DETENTION AND EXPULSION 
 
4.1 Introduction 
On entering the domain of police surveillance, detention and expulsion we increasingly enter 
the domain of the coercive state. At least in theory, exclusion here means exclusion from the 
state altogether: first removal from society (through arrest and detention) and ultimately 
removal from the national territory (through detention and expulsion). States that genuinely 
invest in expulsion policies will have to organize a chain approach of police surveillance, 
detention and expulsion. Or at least, that is what logic would dictate. The closer organizations 
are to the actual expulsion, the more dominant the organizational logic of exclusion becomes. 
In the ‘chain’ of government agencies that is central to this chapter, competing interests and 
demands gradually lessen and make place for what might be called ‘organizational single-
mindedness’. The police have ample room to maneuver between the various political 
demands and societal claims on their organization. In the past the Dutch police have always 
adhered to their own interpretation of the political demands for the control on irregular 
migrants (Engbersen et al. 1999, Van der Leun 2003), often favoring community relations 
over migration control. The next link in the chain, the detention of irregular migrants, is 
much more singular in its task of exclusion. Immigrant detention centers have and need less 
room than the police to deviate from their task of ‘detaining immigrants’. The fact that 
immigrant detention is usually separate from the normal prison regime, where return to 
society plays a role in the day to day regime, makes it even more singularly oriented on 
societal exclusion. The same can be said for the last part of this chain of exclusion: those 
parts of the immigration authorities that are charged with the expulsion of illegal aliens have 
a clear agenda that does not leave much room for weighing off different options against each 
other. Exclusion, in the most definite sense, defines their organizational rationale.  
 
Obviously, the surveillance, detention and removal of illegal aliens are not phenomena 
without historical precedent. States, and before the advent of the nation state, cities, have 
always differentiated between various groups within their territory and have controlled, 
detained and removed those elements that were considered criminal, dangerous or simply 
‘alien’ to the socio-political body (Morris & Rothman 1998, Matthews 2005). Illegal aliens 
now figure as a present day incarnation of the vagrant and the vagabond. However, some 
other things have changed over time. Expulsion in modern constitutional states is not simply 
within the full discretion of the state executive. Expulsion policies are embedded in a legal 
and societal framework and an international legal environment that restrict the possibilities 
for expulsion policies. National legal frameworks bind the executive’s discretion in a direct 
way, while societal resistance against expulsion policies, invoking vivid images of 
deportations, mass expulsion and population transfers in the past, may shame governments 
into inaction (Walters 2002). Other practical and important restraints are the costs and the 
heavy drain on other government resources such as detention capacity and personnel. Or as 
Noll (1999: 269) puts it, forced returns come with ‘high economic, political and psychological 
costs’. Despite the contested nature of police surveillance, detention and expulsion and the 
heavy practical and financial costs, these policies do seem to be on the rise in many EU 
member states, not in the least in Germany and the Netherlands. ‘Unwanted’, irregular 
migrants are increasingly subjected to detention regimes and the efforts to expel them have 
become a political priority. Even though expulsion remains in essence a ‘solution of last 
resort’ it has in recent years come to be regarded and treated as the indispensable closing 
section of any serious immigration policy. In the Dutch white paper on return it is even stated 
that ‘return policy should not be the closing section but rather an integral part of immigration 
policy itself’ (Minister van Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie 2003: 5). And even though 
voluntary return is the preferred option in both the Netherlands and Germany, the ‘use of 
forced returns cannot be missed’ as it is phrased by the German Ministry of the Interior 
(Bundesminsterium des Innern 2008: 154). This raises the question why and to what extent 
Germany and the Netherlands are intensifying the implementation of their expulsion 
policies. How serious are these political wishes and how are they translated into policies of 
practical implementation? If both the domestic and foreign obstacles are high, what underlies 
the determination to see these policies through?  
 
There are two interesting theoretical takes on the issue of police surveillance and detention 
and to a lesser extent on expulsion. Migration control literature, as also discussed in chapter 
two, offers explanations for the intensification of these policies, while the criminological 
theory on the ‘new penology’ offers some alternative lines of thought explaining especially the 
intensifications in immigrant policing and detention. The theoretical framework for this 
chapter will be elaborated on in paragraph 4.2. The paragraphs 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 will deal with 
the policy developments and implementation in Germany and the Netherlands for 
respectively police surveillance on irregular migrants, immigrant detention and expulsion 
policy. Paragraph 4.6 will draw some conclusions. 
 
4.2 Internal surveillance: the state in control and/or the penal state in action? 
Theoretically, police surveillance and detention take us into the world of ‘crime and 
punishment’ and raises criminological perspectives. To a certain extent this is strange. In the 
Netherlands irregular residence is not a criminal offence, and therefore not punishable by 
criminal law. In Germany it is a criminal offence though it is seldom punished under criminal 
law. Detention of irregular migrants is usually administrative detention and the goal is not to 
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punish migrants with a prison sentence or fine for their irregular stay, but to prepare (them) 
for expulsion. Yet, in terms of explanations for the increase of the internal migration control 
by the police and the increase in the use of immigrant detention, it is especially 
criminological theory that seeks to explain these phenomena. The theories on the ‘new 
penology’ and the ‘new punitiveness’ put forward explanations and expectations on the 
increase of control and surveillance and on the spread and evolvement of detention regimes. 
In this chapter these theories are applied to the specific case of internal migration control on 
irregular migrants which sometimes requires some adaptation of the original insights that 
were not always concerned with irregular migrants. Moreover, this criminological theory is 
less concerned with the issue of the intensification of expulsion policies. The issue of 
expulsion, together with policing and detention, is also a matter of migration control theory, 
which – in a nutshell – expects governments to try to close the policy gaps in immigration 
policy even at high costs in order to increase their grip on immigration flows. Expulsion is 
also an issue for political theory on interstate relations. A number of authors have placed the 
issue of expulsion at the transnational level, invoking questions of citizenship, statelessness 
and international relations between states.  
 
Prison plays a central role in this chapter, both ‘theoretically’ and ‘empirically’. It is the 
central link in the chain that starts with the apprehension of irregular migrants and ends in 
either their expulsion or their return to the streets and their life in irregularity.  
 
 
 
 
Police surveillance Prison Expulsion 
 
Police surveillance can only lead to expulsion if there is enough capacity in detention facilities 
for the irregular migrants that are apprehended by the police. Detention can only lead to 
expulsion if all the necessary preparations for expulsion are facilitated and made during the 
time in detention. The detention regime regulates the inflow of irregular migrants through 
capacity and to some extent also regulates the outflow by arranging the conditions for 
expulsion. If not, detention will interrupt an irregular migrant’s residence but not end it.  
 
4.2.1 Police surveillance  
The ongoing criminological debates about the ‘new penology’ and the ‘new punitiveness’ 
provide a theoretical background for the developments in the policing and imprisonment of 
irregular migrants. Feely & Simon have coined the concept of the ‘new penology’ in 1992. 
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According to them “(…) the new penology is markedly less concerned with responsibility, 
fault, moral sensibility, diagnosis, or intervention and treatment of the individual offender. 
Rather, it is concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by 
dangerousness. The task is managerial, not transformative” (Feely & Simon 1992: 452). In 
the new penology the emphasis is on actuarial policies that are instrumentalized by 
‘aggregate classification systems for purposes of surveillance, confinement and control’. In 
short, the penal system becomes a system of control that manages ‘dangerous’ populations, 
while ideas of rehabilitation and correction are left behind. “In particular, the emergence of 
what is seen as a permanently marginal and, thus, irredeemably dangerous segment of the 
population – the so-called ‘underclass’ – calls for their control and containment, while 
rendering any prospect of treatment and integration futile” (Cheliotis 2006: 315). The goal of 
policy programs characterized by a ‘new penology logic’ is not so much to eliminate crime, 
but rather to make it tolerable through systemic coordination (Feely & Simon 1992: 455). 
 
One of the main indicators of the existence of this ‘new penology’ are the rising incarceration 
figures in western countries; first and foremost in the USA but increasingly in Western 
Europe as well. Moreover, this ‘dangerous underclass’ that is managed through detention is 
increasingly a ‘colored underclass’, consisting of African Americans in the USA and of 
immigrants and irregular migrants in the EU (see the next paragraph). However, the new 
penology also influences the police, who are obviously one of the prime actors in the control 
and management of ‘the underclass’, and are responsible for the ‘supply’ of detainees. The 
main tasks of the police are to secure and maintain the legal and social order. A general 
feeling of insecurity and fear of an underclass will increase popular and political demands on 
the police to provide security and to keep the streets safe. This culture of fear and insecurity, 
that underlies the ‘new penology’, is said by a number of authors to thrive on the political 
dominance of neo-liberalism, which is obsessed with insecurity and the search for policies to 
address the (presumed) sources of this societal fear (Ericson 2007, Reiner 2007, Wacquant 
2001b). Ericson (2007) claims that this broad current of societal and political insecurity fuels 
the production of new measures and laws that criminalize all kinds of potential sources of 
harm and insecurity. It does so through two mechanisms. The first is the introduction of 
“counter law”. These are laws that are invented to “(…) erode or eliminate traditional 
principles, standards, and procedures of criminal law that get in the way of preempting 
imagined sources of harm (Ericsson 2007: 24). This counter law also involves efforts to blur 
the traditional distinctions between the legal forms of criminal, civil and administrative law. 
Ericson’s second principle is that of the “surveillant assemblage”, in which new surveillance 
infrastructures are developed and new uses of existing surveillance networks are extended 
that also erode or eliminate traditional standards and procedures of criminal law.  
 108 
 The police are adapting to these changing circumstances. Sheptycki (2007: 490) states that 
the police have undergone a number of transformations. Policing institutions have been 
changing in response to new transnational policies, the effects of the information technology 
revolution, and by the spread of neoliberalism. In other words, international events and 
transnational crime - such as terrorism, international drugs trafficking and irregular 
migration – lie at the roots of contemporary insecurity and fear (see also Bauman 2009). 
International policy responses to these phenomena influence the tasks and possibilities of 
police organizations. Neoliberal obsessions with insecurity have increased the demand on the 
police to deal with insecurity, while the spread of information technology has pushed 
technology to the fore as the new prime instrument of control and the management of 
‘dangerous populations’. A surveillance assemblage is being developed that is also aimed at 
irregular migrants, as this group is part and parcel of the new underclass (Engbersen 1999). 
Moreover, irregular migrants constitute a group that is both local in its presence and global in 
its origin. The internal control on this ‘glocal’ underclass of irregular migrants will depend 
heavily on the capacity of modern database technology to link (inter)national data sources, 
especially when the police are pursuing policies that are ultimately meant to lead to 
expulsion. Linking anonymous irregular migrants in Germany and the Netherlands back to 
legal identities in countries of origin worldwide requires a new scale and scope of data 
gathering. However, the widespread use of ICT in police organizations also carries the risk of 
what Sheptycki calls ‘compulsive data demand’, meaning that these organizations have an 
insatiable thirst for information, resulting in a ‘volume of data so great that trying to analyze 
it has been likened to ‘drinking from a fire hose’ (Sheptycki 2007: 495). 
 
A ‘new penal’ perspective on the police surveillance on irregular migrants differs from a 
perspective of migration control. A new penal approach to irregular migrants is likely to favor 
control on criminal and troublemaking irregular migrants combined with a detention regime 
that is primarily aimed at keeping them off the streets. Policies for either their return to 
society or their country of origin would not be considered a priority, similar to the 
devaluation of rehabilitative programs for the normal prison regime. Expulsion is likely to be 
limited, perhaps confined to the return of criminal (legal and illegal) migrants. Furthermore, 
the arrests themselves would probably suffice for the statistical indicators that have to be 
met. Migration control theory, on the other hand, would consider expulsion a logical aim for 
government to strive for as it is the ultimate indication of government’s control of migration 
flows. The police would then be the first shackle of a chain approach of both control and 
information between various agencies. Identification of irregular migrants, without which 
expulsion is impossible, is a task that requires various sources of information, the gathering 
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and processing of which usually lies between the police, detention and immigration 
authorities. Identification with a view to ‘detecting’ and arresting irregular migrants is 
primarily within the domain of police surveillance, identification with a view to (re-) 
documenting an irregular migrant in order to expel him often takes place within the walls of a 
police station, detention centre or prison. 
 
4.2.2 Prison 
One of the crucial questions – in view of the two logics of exclusion used in this book - is 
about the nature of immigrant detention in Germany and the Netherlands. The answer to 
that question depends (1) on the policy goals that underlie immigrant detention and (2) the 
seriousness with which these goals are pursued in day to day practice. A new penal approach 
to immigrant detention is more likely to limit itself to a policy goal of exclusion of irregular 
immigrants from society and its institutions (getting them out of sight and off the streets). 
Deporting the easy cases would however not be shunned. A migration control perspective 
would see the prison in a different light and expect a policy approach and practice in which 
detention is seen as a necessary space of transit in preparation for expulsion. Even though 
‘giving the impression of control’ is not alien to this approach either, one would expect a 
more serious preoccupation with efforts to close the ‘policy gap’ in detention and expulsion in 
order to gain and claim control over migration processes. In the first case, adhering to the 
first logic of exclusion that merely blocks access to society and societal institutions, detention 
centers would function as Bauman’s (1998) ‘factories of exclusion’, in which people are 
‘habituated to their status of the excluded’. Detention would only be a deterrent, a harsh and 
symbolic way of sending the message that ‘our’ immigration systems are not soft (cf. Walters 
2002: 286). On the other hand, if countries like Germany and the Netherlands are 
implementing policies that adhere to the ‘second logic of exclusion’, which is under 
investigation in this book, this would not be enough. The second logic of exclusion requires 
more of the immigrant detention regime. Prisons and immigrant detention facilities will have 
to be geared to gathering documentation and information with a view to the identification of 
irregular migrants, as this is the only way to make expulsion possible. Detention is then truly 
part of a chain approach running from arrest to the ultimate form of exclusion: expulsion. In 
short, if the Dutch and German prisons are part of the second logic of exclusion they will have 
to be operated as factories of identification.  
 
The overall rise of the prison population in many western countries has been taken as one of 
the prime ‘icons’ of and indicators for the new penology (Feely & Simon 1992). Against a 
background of popular uncertainty and fear criminologists see governments seeking 
‘neoliberal’ solutions in matters of crime and security. This new approach to control is 
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predominantly coercive and sees the prison system as a means to control populations, but 
has lost faith in the notion that prisons can contribute to ‘solving’ social problems through 
correction and rehabilitation. Increasingly prisons are governed with an actuarial logic by a 
new generation of professionals “who are more inclined to talk the language of performance 
indicators and are perhaps less interested in ‘classical’ goals of rehabilitation” (Cheliotis 
2006: 319). Of course, for irregular migrants, whether they are expelled or simply put back 
on the street when detention can no longer be (legally) justified, correction and rehabilitation 
are not relevant options. Governments see no need to rehabilitate those who were not 
supposed to be there in the first place. Only a doorway to a legal status would be an incentive 
for such rehabilitative programs, but such opportunities are rare and exceptional in countries 
such as the Netherlands and Germany.  
 
Turning the focus towards immigrants and detention, various authors stress that the increase 
in incarceration rates has a distinct colour. Wacquant (1999, 2001a) notes that African-
Americans are increasingly overrepresented in the American prison population. According to 
him this is a deliberate move on the part of the government to control the black underclass in 
a time when ‘traditional’ control mechanisms, such as the black ghetto, are no longer able to 
fulfill that function. Or perhaps more accurately (and dramatically), he sees a ‘deadly 
symbiosis’ of the ghetto and the prison: we live in a time when “ghetto and prison meet and 
mesh” (2001a). In essence Wacquant sees mass- incarceration of African–Americans as the 
new penal management of poverty, which replaced welfarism as the dominant strategy to 
deal with the underclass (Matthews 2005: 177). In a comparison of the American and the 
European prison regimes and the rise in mass–imprisonment on both sides of the Atlantic, 
Wacquant (1999: 216) notes that “foreigners and quasi-foreigners would be the ‘blacks’ of 
Europe”. In other words, European prison populations are increasingly made up of non-
native inmates with a legal status varying from full citizenship to that of an illegal alien. 
Those with a legal status tend to be overrepresented within the normal prison system; those 
without a legal residence are usually incarcerated within their own special ‘branch’ of the 
detention regime. There is a specific trend to use the so called administrative detention 
regime as an instrument of the ‘management of unwanted migrants’. Wacquant (1999: 218) 
notes that in France, and by implication also in wider Europe, there has been a “deliberate 
choice to repress illegal immigration by means of imprisonment”. Weber & Bowling (2004: 
206) note a sharp increase in immigration related detention capacity in the UK (see also 
Gibney & Hansen 2003). And even in the United States, where illegal migration is usually not 
subject to much internal migration control, Inda (2006: 116) notes a ‘surge in the numbers of 
undocumented immigrants incarcerated in county jails, federal prisons and immigration 
detention centers’ (see also Ellermann 2005).  
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 A new penology approach to immigrant detention would imply that irregular migrants are 
not being held with a view to expulsion per se, but mainly to keep them off the streets. 
Basically detention would be used to address the visible symptoms of the societal problems 
that irregular migrants ‘cause’, but would be less interested in addressing the root causes of 
the irregular residence itself. The prison system would be used to manage ‘irregular migrants’ 
as representatives of a ‘dangerous underclass’ that society fears and/or does not wish to see. 
A number of authors seem to detect the logic of the new penology in the practices of 
(irregular) immigrant detention. For example Boswoth (quoted in Lee 2007: 850) holds that 
“The point is that prisons and detention centres … are singularly useful in the management of 
non-citizens because they provide both a physical and a symbolic exclusion zone”. Morris and 
Rothman (1998, again quoted in Lee 2007: 857) maintain that “As such, imprisonment 
arguably serves the purpose of merely warehousing the unwanted and undeserving poor”. If 
however the state has it aims set on making expulsion policies effective, simply ‘warehousing’ 
irregular migrants would be pointless. If migration control is the dominant consideration 
underlying policy, detention would have to serve different goals. Firstly detention is meant to 
prevent abscondment and secondly, and most importantly, detention should serve to prepare 
for expulsion through the identification of irregular migrants and by organizing 
documentation. Turning irregular migrants back on to the street would have to be considered 
defeat from the perspective of control; another chapter in the story of states losing control on 
migration.   
 
When it comes to the imprisonment of (irregular) migrants Wacquant’s Prison-Ghetto 
metaphor is not the only popular metaphor. Agamben’s metaphor of the camp, ultimatly 
referring to the horror of the German death camps, is also often used (Walters 2002, 
Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2004, Schinkel forthcoming). To Agamben the camp is the most 
extreme materialization of the ‘state of exception’, a place where there is no longer any 
distinction between law and violence (cf. Walters 2002: 285) and there are no longer any 
restrictions on the behaviour of the ‘sovereign’. The state of exception, of which the camp is 
the most extreme manifestation, is a situation in which the law is suspended in order to 
defend the law, or even a situation in which the law is suspended in the name of the law 
(Andrew 2005: 12). Although there are certainly modern examples of the camp as a 
manifestation of this extreme state of exception - the American detention regime in 
Guantanamo Bay17 is a good fit – it seems a top heavy metaphor for the administrative 
                                                        
17  Besides the fact that the prisoners in Guantanamo Bay were not held on American soil (and could hence not 
claim access to the American legal system) it was the legal definition of the prisoners themselves that placed 
them outside the law. They were neither ‘prisoners of war’ nor ‘criminal suspects’, which would have given 
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detention of irregular migrants. Irregular migrants, though very vulnerable in a legal sense, 
are certainly not stripped of every right. Human rights, often with a national constitutional 
translation, and certain procedural rights such as appeal and judicial review may be limited, 
but are nonetheless real. That does not mean that it should be considered impossible that 
modern western states might bend the law, choose ‘particular’ interpretations of the law or 
even suspend parts of the legal framework in their dealings with irregular migrants. As such, 
the state of exception is a more interesting notion than that of the camp itself. Especially in 
its interpretation by Ericson as ‘counter law’: “Normal legal principles, standards and 
procedures must be suspended because of a state of emergency, extreme uncertainty, or the 
threat of catastrophic potential. The legal order must be broken to save the social order” 
(Ericson 2007: 26; emphasis added). Another important reason to entertain the possibility of 
the use of ‘counter law’ in the detention of irregular migrants is the fact that the state is 
dealing with non-citizens that lack a legal immigrant status and are only protected by human 
rights, international treaties and a limited set of constitutional and procedural rights. Modern 
liberal states have - also in recent history - tried to limit the legal rights of legal immigrants, 
changed their legal frameworks to limit access to procedures, rights and institutions for 
asylum seekers and have in a sense suspended national asylum laws by means of European 
policy innovations such as the doctrines of ‘safe countries of origin’ and ‘safe third countries’, 
and more recently even ‘supersafe third countries’. It should be mentioned here that modern 
states have also been responsible for extending legal rights and strengthening the position of 
migrants vis-à-vis the state, in spite of declared political intentions to curtail immigration 
(see for example Joppke 1998, 1999 and Cornelius et al. 2004). Legal inclusion and legal 
exclusion of (irregular) migrants are sometimes simultaneous processes and there is pressure 
on both directions. Either way, it points to the importance of (the lack of) citizenship and 
legal status, which plays an important role in matters of immigrant expulsion. A lack of 
proven citizenship, often the result of an irregular migrant destroying, hiding or lying about 
his or her legal identity, provides protection against expulsion by the state. So naturally, the 
state tries to limit the possibilities of irregular migrants to obscure their identity (Broeders & 
Engbersen 2007). Question is how far the state wants to try to bend the law when it comes to 
detention and expulsion? More specifically, how much ‘counter law’ or how much of a ‘state 
of exception’ will it allow (itself) in dealing with irregular migrants, who are by law the 
ultimate ‘non-citizens’? 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
them access to a certain degree of due process and legal protection, but they were named ‘enemy 
combatants’, a status beyond the law (Loader & Walker 2007: 89).  
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4.2.3 Expulsion 
If we exclude the odd diplomat that gets sent home every now and then, expulsion in Western 
Europe is nowadays primarily a matter of immigration policy. Expulsion and return policies 
target two semi-separate groups: irregular migrants and rejected asylum seekers. These two 
groups are semi-separate because in the eyes of the law they are both ultimately considered 
illegal aliens. Expulsion policies have two dimensions. The first is the internal organization of 
expulsion policies; the second is the external, international dimension, as liberal western 
states have found there is no such thing as unilateral expulsion in the modern state system. 
The new penology perspective is largely ‘empty-handed’ when it comes to expulsion policies. 
It may account for the deportation of the easy cases, as this is good for the image of control 
and the production figures – but it would be hard-pressed to find a justification for the 
insistence on a policy that requires as much effort and resources as expulsion policies do. 
Migration control theory, on the other hand, focuses on the preoccupation of politicians to 
(try to) keep migration processes under control and to ‘close the gaps’ in policy outcomes. 
High investments to increase the actual expulsion rates are more easily explained from this 
perspective.  
 
Internally, there is a distinct trend in which governments are increasingly “obsessed with the 
need to ‘tighten up’ their deportation and repatriation policies” (Walters 2002: 280). 
Immigration policies are considered to be ‘unfinished’ without a serious return policy that 
sends the message that policies have come full circle. This message of an immigration policy 
without soft spots is intended for the (would be) migrants and the domestic population alike. 
In the context of the UK, Gibney & Hansen (2003: 7) speak of a ‘removal gap’ that according 
to the British Home secretary undermines public support for asylum policies, and therefore 
needs to be ‘closed’. Policy gaps, according to Cornelius & Tsuda (2004: 5), are usually caused 
by either unintended policy consequences or result from an inadequate policy 
implementation. Either way, trying to resolve the problem of a ‘removal gap’ implies that 
governments have to look at their own procedures and bureaucratic organizations. The 
answer18 to the removal gap lies primarily within the governmental organization itself. In 
Walter’s (2002: 278) view this leads to a process in which states embark on ‘governing the 
governmental system, rather than governing the population in a direct manner’. The 
government becomes preoccupied with scrutinizing and reforming its own procedures. 
Reforming the procedures with an eye to expulsion would imply a turn towards 
‘identification’ as a main bureaucratic task. Internally, the detention system will effectively 
                                                        
18  In Cornelius’ & Tsuda’s view there can be no real answer to a policy gap. Even though they discuss the policy 
gap under the heading of “The gap hypothesis”, they immediately pose that policy gaps are in reality an 
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have to function as a factory of identification which can be very difficult as many irregular 
migrants refuse to cooperate with identification in order to avoid expulsion. Despite the 
known difficulties and restrictions, governments will embark on this course to prevent being 
seen as ‘soft on migration’ or worse, out of control in matters of migration control. Whether 
or not irregular migrants can be identified, documented and expelled also heavily depends on 
the external dimension: expulsion requires at least the (minimal) cooperation of another 
sovereign state.  
 
Deportation then, is a bilateral affair. Or as Walters (2002: 275) puts it: “Modern deportation 
is both a product of the state system, and […] one of a number of techniques for the ongoing 
management of a world population that is divided into states”. That makes citizenship a vital 
marker in the international system “advising state and nonstate agencies of the particular 
state to which an individual belongs” (Hindess 2000: 1487). However, different states have 
different interests when it comes to the migration of their own citizens or the citizens of other 
nations. Sometimes states have good reasons to read the marker right and sometimes there is 
ample reason to misread it. Effective expulsion policies imply a need to know which country 
to return a migrant to and that this country recognizes the migrant as its own citizen and 
‘accepts’ him back. If irregular migrants who hide their identity are the main obstruction to 
expulsion policies, then uncooperative or unwilling countries of origin are a very good 
second. Even though the right to return is a human right enshrined in international law, a 
right of entry is still something which has to be codified and documented by sovereign states. 
Returning to China for example, is notoriously difficult because of the highly impractical 
requirements of passport re-issue, replacement and extension (Liu 2008). Putting political 
pressure on China to take back its own citizens is even harder. Many countries of origin are 
reluctant to take back their citizens, often because it is far more interesting for them to have 
young men and women working elsewhere and sending home remittances than having them 
(back) home where they have a good chance of being unemployed (Ellermann 2008). That 
makes expulsion policies also a matter of foreign policy, diplomatic relations and, in the case 
of Germany and the Netherlands, a matter of multilateral EU foreign policy. At the level of 
the EU, member states have started some cooperation in matters of expulsion policy and the 
negotiation of readmission agreements (Cholewinski, 2004; Mitsilegas et al., 2003; Samers, 
2004a). It also means that the scale and the dimensions for the surveillance and data 
gathering needed for the identification of irregular migrants, takes on a multilateral scale. 
That issue is partly dealt with in this chapter and partly in chapter 5 on the development of 
EU migration databases.   
                                                                                                                                                                             
empirical fact, as there are no immigration policies that are perfectly implemented or do not have unintended 
consequences (Cornelius & Tsuda 2004: 4-5).  
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 4.2.4 Factories of identification? 
If we combine the insights from the ‘new penology’ perspective and the migration control 
thesis with the general framework of the two logics of exclusion of this book, the question 
basically boils down to this: is the state apparatus of policing, detention and expulsion 
(beginning to) function as a factory of identification? 
 
The first logic of exclusion concerns itself with shutting off access to societal institutions. 
Within the new penology this is taken to the extreme and access to society as a whole is cut 
off by means of imprisonment. Irregular migrants are part and parcel of the feared (new) 
underclass and this societal fear has to be mitigated by the state. But as the state is hardly 
interested at addressing the root causes (either of criminal behavior or of illegal residence) it 
only addresses the visible manifestation of irregular migrants: their presence itself. Irregular 
migrants are arrested (taken off the street) and detained (taken out of sight). In short, the 
new penal approach expects policies preoccupied with the visible signs of social unsafety, 
which would explain increased police surveillance and full prisons. Expulsion is an added 
bonus but will be much less of a priority, as the prison ‘does the trick’. The actuarial logic that 
dominates the perspective of the new penology will rather aim for measurable results (arrests 
and detentions) that require less troublesome procedures and efforts than those needed for 
expulsion policies. In short, the system functions as a factory of exclusion, that ends at the 
level of detention.  
 
The question under investigation in this book, however, is whether and to what extent states 
such as Germany and the Netherlands are making a turn towards the second logic of 
exclusion in their internal migration control policies. In order to take exclusion to its ultimate 
form and have an effective expulsion policy, the need for documenting and identifying 
irregular migrants becomes paramount. Under the second logic the system of policing, 
detention and expulsion should function as a factory of identification. This is not easy 
because it requires a lot of the internal organization of state bureaucracies, as well as the 
external relations with other sovereign states. However, the anxiousness of modern 
governments to be able to control the phenomenon of migration and the increasing 
availability of (technological) means to help them do that, may explain why states embark on 
the difficult road to expulsion. Migration control theory and surveillance theory would expect 
states to construct new internal migration policies that may close the policy gaps that 
undermine migration control. That means policies that not only just detain and exclude, but 
also detain and identify, in order to make expulsion policies feasible. To work as a factory of 
identification the German and Dutch state have to effectively organize police, detention and 
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expulsion into a chain that can ‘secure the pre-conditions of removal’, meaning all measures 
that serve the identification, localization and documentation of irregular migrants (Noll 1999: 
268).  
 
4.3 Police surveillance 
The police in Germany and the Netherlands are organized in different ways. Like many 
government organizations in Germany the police has both a federal ‘branch’ and a police 
force at the level of the Länder. Until 2005 the German Bundesgrenzschutz was responsible 
for the border patrols, the patrols directly behind the border and at sea- and airports. In 2005 
this Bundesgrenzschutz was rebaptized as the Bundespolizei. The responsibility for the 
internal controls on irregular migrants lies with the police forces of the Länder, and in the 
case of labour market controls with Finanzkontrolle Scharzwarbeit (FKS) of the Customs 
Department. In the Netherlands there is a similar division of labour between the (military) 
Royal Constabulary (Koninklijke Marechaussee, Kmar) that is responsible for the checks at 
and directly behind the borders and the regular police force that is responsible for the 
internal surveillance on (irregular) migrants. In the Netherlands the regular police is 
organized into 25 districts. Moreover, within these district police forces, there are special 
units who have been delegated the task of internal surveillance on (irregular) migrants within 
the police force. Until 2003 these units were called Aliens Services (Vreemdelingendienst) 
and after the re-organization in that year they were renamed the Aliens Police 
(Vreemdelingenpolitie). Especially in the Netherland there are clear indications that the 
internal control on irregular migrants has been stepped up due to political pressure in recent 
years, even though this intensification is also a source of strain between the police 
organization and the national government on the issue of who determines policing priorities.     
 
4.3.1 Trends in police surveillance: priorities and organization  
For a long time the internal control on irregular migrants could hardly be considered a 
priority for the Dutch police. Studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s indicate that the 
discretion in the day to day practice of policing was very big (Aalbers 1989, Clermonts 1994, 
Engbersen et al. 1999) making the internal surveillance on irregular migrants to a large 
extent a matter of local decisions. For a long time discretion was used as a rule to not 
apprehend irregular migrants if they were not engaged in criminal behavior (Engbersen et al. 
2002: 21). The Aliens Police use a five point list of priorities that is predominantly focused on 
criminal irregular migrants and those that cause public order disturbances. Only the last of 
the five points is on the surveillance of irregular migrants in a more general sense 
(Boekhoorn et al. 2004: 137-8). There have also been practical constraints on the surveillance 
of irregular migrants. In 2002 the Dutch Advisory Council on Aliens Affairs (ACVZ) 
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conducted interviews with members of the Aliens Police in the four largest Dutch cities (the 
‘Randstad’) who indicated that the shortage of detention capacity was larger than recorded in 
the official figures. The interviewed police officers indicated that they often got instructions 
to limit the number of apprehended irregular migrants due to a shortage of detention 
capacity (ACVZ 2002: 22, see also Den Hollander 2004: 162). Nonetheless, during the 1990s 
the pressure on the police to become more active in the police surveillance of irregular 
migrants has been rising.  
 
In 1994 the Law on Compulsory Identification was introduced which significantly widened 
the possibilities and competences of the police to increase controls and identity checks. It 
also called upon the police to cooperate with other control organizations, such as the Labour 
Inspectorate, the Tax Authorities and the FIOD. In terms of staff and budgets the 
introduction of this Act was also important for the Aliens Service. In the years following 1994 
various intensifications almost doubled the number of staff (from 700 to 1360 fte). According 
to Boekhoorn et al. (2004: 126) this had an unforeseen side-effect. In the Netherlands, police 
surveillance on irregular migrants is both a general task for all police officers (the so called 
basic police) as well a specific task that is delegated to the Aliens Service. The vast increase in 
staffing at the Aliens Service was taken up by the basic police as a sign that internal 
surveillance on irregular migrants could now be considered a specific responsibility of the 
‘specialists’, and not so much one of theirs anymore. In 2001 the new Aliens Act 2000 
entered into force. One of the measures in this act was to broaden the competence of the 
police to conduct (identity) checks and controls on irregular migrants. The new Act made it 
easier to stop, interview and investigate aliens suspected of irregular residence (the criterion 
was changed from ‘having concrete indications’ into having ‘an objective reasonable 
suspicion’ about irregular residence). It also became easier for the Aliens Service to enter 
private houses without the permission of the owner. The aim of these reforms was to increase 
the number of controls, detentions and expulsion of irregular migrants (Boekhoorn et al. 
2004: 115). In 2003 the Aliens Service was thoroughly reorganized and ‘renamed’ Aliens 
Police. This reorganization served both a long standing desire of the Aliens Service 
organization to focus more on their operational tasks and the political wish to increase 
operational surveillance. Until 2003 the Aliens Police had two basic tasks. The 
“administrative surveillance” of the Aliens Law (also known as the ‘paper surveillance’) and 
the “operational surveillance”. The administrative tasks consisted mainly of the paperwork 
concerning the entry and stay of legal aliens, such as the issuing of documents. Until 2003 
the circa 1500 staff were divided over the two tasks of the Aliens police. The majority was 
assigned to the ‘paper surveillance (900) while the remaining 600 worked in the ‘operational 
surveillance”. The reorganization meant transferring all paper surveillance out of the police 
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organization and into the hands of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (IND) and the 
municipalities on the one hand, and an intensification of the means for the operational 
surveillance on irregular migrants on the other (Boekhoorn et al. 2004: 106). While the 
transfer of the ‘paper surveillance’ to the IND and the municipalities meant the loss of 900 
jobs, the organization at the same time received extra staffing to be able to increase the 
controls that the government insisted on. An extra 450 fte’s were added to the ranks of the 
Aliens Police, which totaled 1050 fte after the completion of the reorganization, this time all 
for the operational surveillance on irregular migrants.  
 
In Germany, the internal control on irregular migrants is much less characterized by 
organizational expansion and new policies and laws. Two things account for at least part of 
that: the first is that irregular residence is considered a criminal offence; the second is that 
there is no specialized subdivision within the police of the Länder dealing with the issue of 
aliens and irregular migrants. As a general principle the German police are obliged to 
investigate all crimes that come to their knowledge. Because irregular residence is a criminal 
offence, punishable by a fine or imprisonment, the principle of legality prohibits that the 
police dismisses a case; only the public prosecutor has that authority (Vogel et al. 2009). This 
is of course a very formal restriction that will still allow policemen on the street to make use 
of their discretionary space, but the formal incentive is to deal with irregularity when it is 
encountered. In Germany there is no special branch of the police force that is directly 
responsible for ‘immigration policing’. There is however a division of labour between 
different agencies that can be translated into the Dutch terminology of the ‘paper 
surveillance’ and the ‘operational surveillance’. The Auslanderbehörde (the Foreign-Resident 
Authority) take care of the ‘paper surveillance’ as they are responsible for all administrative 
dealings with both legal (administration and documents) and illegal (removal orders) aliens 
in Germany. The ‘operational surveillance’, the enforcement of the Foreigners law, is in the 
hands of the police, the Federal police and the FKS.  
 
The Federal police are responsible for the borders and further only come into play for the 
internal surveillance of irregular migrants at very end of the procedure as the actual 
deportations of irregular migrants are the responsibility of the Federal police. Internal 
operational surveillance is divided between the FKS and the police of the Länder. The FKS, 
though formally not police officers, deal with the labour market controls including the tasks 
that in the Netherlands are fulfilled by the police. As explained in the previous chapter they 
have police like powers including the authority to arrest and interview suspects. General 
internal surveillance is within the competence of the regular police. Irregular migrants are 
sometimes encountered during the investigation of other crimes and misdemeanors, or may 
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be stopped on the basis of a (well-founded) suspicion. As all foreigners are legally required to 
carry identification documents, and most native Germans usually carry and are willing to 
show them (cf. Vogel et al. 2009), identity checks are not a very controversial topic in 
Germany. There are differences between the competences of the various Bundesländer and 
the various ‘police organizations’ with regard to the authority to conduct identity checks. All 
police can ask suspects to identify themselves, but there are differences in the discretion to 
stop and ask people for identification when there is no direct suspicion. The FKS has the 
widest scope of discretion albeit only within the confines of labour market controls. They can 
check identities without the need for an informed suspicion. In 2006 they checked 423.1745 
identity documents during the course of labour market controls (Bundesrechnungshof 2008: 
29). In all Bundesländer the police need to have a special search warrant to enter a private 
house and in 6 of the 16 Bundesländer the police need a special permission to conduct 
identity checks in public. In the other ten states the police may stop and check any individual 
if they can justify it by the characteristics of the situation (Vogel et al. 2009).    
 
4.3.2 Measuring police surveillance  
Just about the only data that are available to get some impression of police surveillance on 
irregular migrants and the intensification thereof, are police data. For the Dutch case there 
are figures available for the time period between 1999-2004 (Boekhoorn et al. 2004). These 
figures indicate a clear increase in the number of apprehensions of irregular migrants19 
during this timeframe, rising from roughly 12.000 apprehensions in 1998/1999 to roughly 
23.000 apprehensions in 2003/2004 (see table 4.1).  
                                                        
19  The number of apprehensions does not equal the number of irregular migrants as one irregular migrant may 
be apprehended more than once or for different violations. Engbersen et al (2002: 23) corrected their dataset 
of police statistics for the time period of 1997-2000 for this fact. In the timeframe 1997-2000 they counted 
53.733 apprehensions, but only 47.764 individual irregular migrants (roughly 89%). This may be used as a 
rule of thumb when looking at the figures presented in table 4.1 . 
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 Table 4.1 Apprehended irregular migrants specified by reason of 
apprehension in the Netherlands, april 1998-april 2004) 
Reason for 
apprehension 
1998- 
1999 
1999- 
2000 
2000- 
2001 
2001- 
2002 
2002- 
2003 
2003- 
2004 
 
Aliens Law 6.604 
(55%) 
6.428 
(52%) 
6.978 
(46%) 
7.742 
(44%) 
10.564 
(46%) 
9.629 
(42%) 
Criminal Law 
 
2.859 
(23%) 
3.439 
(28%) 
5.125 
(34%) 
6.667 
(38%) 
8.664 
(38%) 
9.076 
(40%) 
Other laws* 2.538 
 (22%) 
2.516 
(20%) 
3.069 
(20%) 
3.133 
(18%) 
3.697 
(16%) 
4.253 
(18%) 
Total 
(100%) 
 
12.001 
 
12.383 
 
15.172 
 
17.542 
 
22.925 
 
22.958 
Source: Boekhoorn et al. (2004: 157) 
* Other laws include (non limitative): the Opium Law (narcotics), local decree (APV) and Car  
 traffic laws 
 
Though the police are not always very accurate with ‘booking’ an irregular migrant under the 
‘proper’ legal article (see the previous chapter on the apprehensions under the Aliens 
Employment Act), it is interesting to note that the relative share of irregular migrants booked 
purely for the breach of the Aliens Law is actually decreasing, where an increase would have 
been expected as a result of the intensification on ‘normal’, i.e. non-criminal, irregular 
migrants. The relative share of irregular migrants booked under criminal law on the other 
hand is rising fast, climbing from 23 per cent in 1998/1999 to 40 per cent of all 
apprehensions in 2003/2004. This may mean two things. One explanation may be that the 
Aliens Police conducted the intensification of irregular migrant surveillance strictly according 
to their own set of priorities which favors the control on criminal and public disorderly 
irregular migrants over ‘normal’ irregular migrants. An alternative explanation posits that the 
general build up of the exclusionary Dutch illegal aliens policy in the last decade marginalizes 
irregular migrants through the exclusion from the labour market and public provisions. The 
success of these policies contributes to forms of ‘subsistence crime’. The exclusion of illegal 
immigrants seems to result in groups of irregular immigrants resorting to poverty-related 
crimes in order to finance their stay in the Netherlands. This ‘marginalization thesis’ is 
supported by the fact that the increase in apprehensions under criminal law are to a large 
extent explained by apprehensions for minor offences such as theft, shoplifting and burglary 
(see Engbersen & Van der Leun 2001; Leerkes 2009). Obviously, the one explanation does 
not foreclose the other.  
 
Unfortunately, it is hard to determine on the basis of the available data whether the 
intensifications and reorganization of the Dutch Aliens Police in 2003 has translated into a 
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general increase in the active surveillance of irregular migrants, other than the criminal 
irregular migrants that are prioritized by the police themselves. The available data (computed 
on the basis of police datasets) run only to 2004. As the reorganization and the recruiting of 
new operational personnel took quite some time and severely burdened the organization 
(Boekhoorn & Speller 2006), even an extra two years wouldn’t have told us much more. The 
data from 2006 onwards could tell us more if and when they become available. In order to 
monitor the effects of the reorganization and the political desire to intensify police 
surveillance, the Ministry of Justice introduced new performance-indicators. The most 
important of these are the number of primary and secondary identification investigations 
that Aliens Police department are to conduct annually. A primary investigation means that a 
person whose identity cannot be established on the spot is taken in for further investigation 
to find out his identity and legal status. A secondary investigation is the identification and 
documentation of an irregular migrant with a view to expulsion. For the Aliens Police as a 
whole (all 25 districts) the target for the primary identity investigations was set at 40.000 
and the target for the secondary investigations was set at 11.883 for the year 2006 
(Boekhoorn & Speller 2006: 67). For a city police district like Amsterdam-Amstelland this 
translates into an average of 400 primary and a 150 secondary identity investigations per 
month. In some districts this has already led to a professionalization of the identification 
process and the introduction of an ‘identification street’ in the police station, where all the 
practical and technical means available for identification are lined up. The police regard this 
professionalization of the process of identifying and documenting irregular migrants as one 
of the main goals for the future development of expertise (Boekhoorn & Speller 2006: 69).  
 
Surprisingly, the police data for Germany show a decline in the number of apprehended 
suspects without legal residence between 1996 and 2005 (see table 4.2). To a certain extent 
this can be explained by the specifics of the German immigration history that shows an 
enormous peak in asylum migration during the early 1990s that has gradually subsided since 
then. If the apprehensions at the border are subtracted – as they are not considered a result 
of internal migration control – there were 46.196 apprehensions of irregular migrants as a 
result of the internal police surveillance in 2005. This roughly doubles the numbers for the 
Netherlands, but given the differences in population size of the two countries it cannot be 
considered much.     
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Table4.2 Irregular migrants in police statistics in Germany, 1996-2005 
 Suspects without legal 
residence1 
Suspects without legal 
residence minus illegal 
migrants apprehended at 
the border2 
 
illegal residence as 
offence3  
1996 137.232 110.208 - 
1997 128.146 102.941 - 
1998 140.779 100.578 - 
1999 128.320 90.531 - 
2000 124.262 92.777 - 
2001 122.583 94.023 - 
2002 112.573 89.935 - 
2003 96.197 76.223 60.615 
2004 81.040 62.825 48.296 
2005 64.747 46.196 41.883 
1. ‘Tatverdächtige mit illegalem aufhalt’, source: Kreienbrink & Sinn (2006: 16) 
2.  ‘Tatverdächtige abzüglich der an den Grenzen aufgeriffenen unerlaubt eingereisten 
Ausländer’, source: Kreienbrink & Sinn (2006: 16) 
3. Straftat: ‘Illegaler aufenthalt nach Auslandergesetz’, source: Bundeskriminalamt (2007: 42), 
(2005: 44) 
 
There is another aspect of the apprehension figures in table 4.2 that seems to mark a 
difference between the Netherlands and Germany. Though the data are only available from 
2003 onwards they indicate that the vast majority of the irregular migrants are apprehended 
(or at least booked) for their irregular residence and not for committing another crime. The 
proportion is even increasing over the documented years (2003-2005). This is confirmed by 
the police in Frankfurt, who estimate that only a small number (about 8 per cent) of the 
detected irregular migrants have also committed other crimes (in Vogel et al. 2009). This 
suggests that the irregular migrants in Germany are ‘less criminal’ than those apprehended in 
the Netherlands. In light of the marginalization thesis, this might be explained by a relatively 
better position, room to maneuver and possibilities to ‘make a living’ for irregular migrant in 
Germany, compared to the position of irregular migrants in the Netherlands. This would 
suggest that there is less reason for irregular migrants in Germany to engage in ‘subsistence 
crime’. Even though the difference is noteworthy, the available data are not sufficient to 
support more than a suggestion.       
 
4.4 Detention as an instrument of migration control 
Immigrants are a steadily growing part of the prison population in most European countries, 
and Germany and the Netherlands are no exception. When compared to the other European 
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countries, both states are in the ‘upper part’ of the ‘middle section’ when it comes to the 
number of foreigners in prison. In 2005, 28 per cent of the German prison population was 
foreign and 32.9 per cent of the prison population in the Netherlands was of foreign descent 
(Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 11). The annual statistics for 2006 gathered by the Council of 
Europe confirm these relative positions, setting the proportion in the Netherlands at 32.7 per 
cent and in Germany at 26.9 per cent (Aebi & Delgrande 2008). The overrepresentation of 
foreigners in German and Dutch prisons seems to confirm the general new penology thesis 
on detention and its specific interpretation on immigrant detention by Waquant. Oddly 
enough, in Germany the overrepresentation of foreigners is highest in the former East 
German Länder, where the foreign population is much smaller (proportionally) than in the 
former West (Dünkel et al. 2007: 351). On the whole, Dünkel et al. (2007: 358) attribute the 
differences to discrimination, a much more restricted access to non-custodial measures for 
foreigners and to a more violent behavior among certain groups of foreigners. However, the 
normal disclaimer applies and Dünkel et al. assert that more research is needed on these 
issues. In addition to these reasons, one has to consider that some violations of the law can 
only be made by immigrants, such as breaches of the immigration and residence laws. The 
significance of this category within the general ‘foreign’ prison population, the majority of 
them irregular migrants, will be elaborated on below.  
 
4.4.1 Trends in administrative detention in Germany and the Netherlands 
The detention of irregular migrants is an increasingly substantial part of policies of internal 
migration control in which detention is seen as an instrument to achieve certain policy goals 
that are otherwise (considered) impossible to achieve. The UNHCR, who is primarily 
concerned with refugees, lists a varied number of grounds on the basis of which member 
states of the EU detain asylum seekers. The list includes: “pre-admission detention, pre-
deportation detention, detention for the purposes of transfer to a safe third country, 
detention for the purposes of transfer to the responsible state under the Dublin Convention 
and criminal detention linked to illegal entry/exit or fraudulent documentation” (UNHCR 
2000, quoted in Hailbronner 2007: 163). This list can be widened to other groups than 
asylum seekers to discern a number of semi-separate groups of (irregular) migrants that 
populate the Dutch and German prisons. In the first place there are foreign born criminals 
who will lose their residence as a result of the crime they committed. They are declared 
persona non grata and will be deported after they served (part of) their sentence which they 
typically serve in a regular prison. In the second place there are asylum claimants that are 
detained during the procedure of their asylum application in so-called “pre-admission 
detention”. Not all countries use this practice in which detention is used as a preventive 
measure (see Hailbronner 2007). Pre-admission detention almost turns an asylum 
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application into a “crime of arrival” (Weber & Bowling 2004: 198). These first two categories 
are however, not the primary focus of this study. The third category consists of migrants who 
do not have a legal right of residence (anymore) and who are the subjects of internal 
migration control. This category comprises irregular migrants apprehended at the border, 
arrested by the police while residing in the territory of the state (see preceding paragraph) or 
asylum seekers whose asylum request was turned down. This last group becomes irregular 
after the time that they are granted to prepare for their own independent return has expired. 
The reasons that states give for the use of detention are usually centered on two main issues. 
The first is the prevention of abscondment. Detention is obviously the ultimate form of 
‘localization’, one of Noll’s (1999) ‘preconditions of removal’. The second reason is that of 
identification: determining nationality in the absence of travel or identity documents and 
arranging travel documents. Van Kalmthout (2005: 325) mentions that one of the main 
justifications for immigrant detention in the Netherlands is insufficient cooperation of an 
irregular migrant with the authorities to establish his identity, the shedding or destroying of 
identity papers, and the use of false papers (see also Grimm 2004 for the German case). 
These are also the reasons that the UNHCR lists as the grounds on which detention may be 
resorted to if necessary (see Hailbronner 2007: 167). 
 
There are huge differences between EU member states in the legal framework that regulates 
the detention regime for irregular migrants. Two indicators are often mentioned to determine 
the ‘severity’ of the regime, which are also indicators for the degree of ‘exception’ that states 
allow themselves in the incarceration of irregular migrants. First of all states differ in the 
legal definition of whether ‘irregular residence’ or ‘irregularity’ is considered a criminal 
offence. The majority of the EU countries, including the Netherlands do not consider 
irregular stay to be a criminal offence, meaning that there is no ground under criminal law 
for detention. In a smaller group of EU countries20 that includes Germany, irregular stay is a 
criminal offence that is usually punishable with fines and detention (Van Kalmthout et al. 
2007: 64). However, the legal differences are usually not translated into practical differences 
between the various detention regimes. Even though irregular residence is a criminal offence 
in Germany, irregular migrants are usually not detained under criminal law. As in most 
countries immigrant detention is administrative detention and is not considered a punitive 
measure, but rather a measure to safeguard other purposes, mainly expulsion (Dünkel et al. 
2007: 377). And reversely, the fact that irregular residence is not a criminal offence in the 
Netherlands does not mean that some actions related to irregular stay are not punishable by 
                                                        
20  Besides Germany these countries are Finland, Ireland, France and Cyprus. 
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law. For example illegal entry, producing false documents, and not leaving the country while 
being a ‘persona non grata’ are all punishable offences (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 64).  
Secondly, the EU member states vary considerably in terms of the time an (irregular) migrant 
can be held in detention: some countries measure the length of stay in hours, others in days 
and others in months. Some even lack any maximum prescribed by law. The length of 
administrative detention in Germany and the Netherlands is long when compared to most 
other European countries. The German authorities can detain irregular migrants up to 18 
months. The administrative detention for irregular migrants is initially 6 months, which can 
be extended by a further 12 months. This maximum length of 18 months is however an 
exception. On average the administrative detention lasts six weeks. Obviously, this ‘average 
length’ is made up of both detainees that stay shorter and much longer than this six week 
period. Research published in 1990 showed that that the proportion of detained irregular 
migrants awaiting expulsion who spend more than six months in custody lies at roughly 10-
20 per cent (Dünkel et al. 2007: 383). The decision to detain an irregular migrant is made by 
a judge on the basis of recommendation of the local Foreign Nationals Agency. In Germany 
the constitution prescribes that all decisions concerning the deprivation of liberty have to be 
made by a judge. In the Netherlands there is no fixed duration of imprisonment (Van 
Kalmthout et al. 2007: 59). In principle it can last until expulsion is realized or still remains a 
possibility. “When expulsion has not been realized within 6 months, the courts generally rule 
that the interest of the detained foreigner weighs heavier than the interest of expulsion of the 
government. However, this does not apply when the expulsion is to be expected shortly or 
when the foreigner himself can be blamed for not being able to realize the expulsion” (Van 
Kalmthout & Hofstee-Van der Meulen 2007: 650). Figures for 2000-2001 show that the 
average length of immigrant detention in the Netherlands was 36 days (ACVZ 2002: 23). 
However practice also shows that long-term detention of 15 up to 18 months is no exception 
(Van Kalmthout & Hofstee-Van der Meulen 2007: 650).  
 
4.4.2 Detention capacity and organization 
An increasing role of detention in the organization of internal migration control on irregular 
migrants should be visible from the growth of the detention capacity and changes in the 
organization of the administrative detention regime. The build-up of the detention regime in 
the Netherlands provides insight in the importance the Dutch government attaches to 
detention (and ultimately expulsion) and also in the separate groups of (irregular) migrants 
that are targeted. Van Kalmthout (2005: 322) gives a brief overview of the increase in 
detention capacity since the early 1980s. In 1980 the capacity for administrative immigrant 
detention was 45 places and the measure to detain irregular migrants was executed 450 
times. The increase in capacity started in earnest during the 1990s. Moreover the new 
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detention capacity was specifically designated (and sometimes built) for (irregular) migrant 
detention, in stead of cells in normal prisons ‘earmarked’ for immigrant detention. In 1994 
the Willem II penitentiary in Tilburg was taken into use with 560 places for immigrant 
detention. In 1998 the so-called ‘departure centre’ Ter Apel opened its doors adding another 
394 places for immigrant detention with a view to expulsion. Since 1998 a large number of 
new places including the so-called ‘grens hospitia’ (‘border shelters’), the Expulsion centers 
at Schiphol airport and Rotterdam airport, new detention centers in Zeist and Rotterdam and 
also two detention boats in Rotterdam were taken into use. It is noteworthy that the Dutch 
Expulsion Centers were introduced as part of a government program that was called 
“Towards a safer society”. In other words the intensification of expulsion policies through 
these centers was introduced as a measure of public safety, and not primarily as a measure of 
immigration policy (Den Hollander 2004: 160). In 2006 the capacity for immigrant 
detention stood at 3.310 places (DJI 2007). The increase in capacity serves two goals: firstly, 
short term detention directly at the border (to turn back illegal immigrants apprehended at 
the border and asylum seekers whose claims are regarded ‘manifestly unfounded’ in fast 
track procedures) and secondly, detention to prepare for the expulsion of irregular resident 
migrants. If we set the increase in immigrant detention capacity against the background of 
the overall increase of the Dutch detention capacity in the same time period the following 
picture emerges. Total detention capacity has been steadily increasing since the 2000s, but 
seems to be stabilizing (and even sloping downwards a little) in recent years, whereas the 
capacity for immigrant detention keeps on rising steadily (see graph 4.1).  
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 Graph 4.1: Detention capacity in the Netherlands, 1999-2006 
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Total detention capacity includes: prison capacity, capacity institutions for youth offenders 
and the capacity for the enforced mental healthcare (TBS). Source: Data 1999-2002 from DJI 
(2004: 9), data 2003-2006 from DJI (2007: 47). Data from DJI 2007 include detention 
capacity in police cells. 
 
In relative numbers administrative detention capacity has also risen sharply. If we look at 
immigrant detention as a percentage of the total prison capacity (i.e excluding youth facilities 
and enforced mental healthcare) the share of immigrant detention has risen from 9.1 per cent 
in 1999 to 18.1 per cent in 2006. In short, the relative share of immigrant detention capacity 
doubled in the last eight years. Van Kalmthout (2005: 323) further adds that the annual 
number of migrants detained with a view to expulsion is roughly 12.000 which translates into 
25 per cent of the total annual inflow in Dutch prisons.  
 
The German regime for the detention of irregular migrants differs from the Dutch case in a 
number of aspects. First of all the prison system is decentralized. The Länder are responsible 
for the buildings and the personnel, which attributed to large differences between facilities 
and regimes. Furthermore, in 2006 the Federal government, despite heavy criticism from 
both academics and practitioners, decided to transfer the legislation for prisons to the level of 
the Länder as well (Dünkel et al. 2007: 345). Secondly, these differences are also visible in 
the more specific case of immigrant detention for the purpose of expulsion. Whereas in the 
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Netherlands, especially since the 1990s, the detention facilities are specifically designated for 
immigrant detention and immigrants are thus kept separate from the normal prison 
population, the regime in Germany is more ‘mixed’. The facilities for administrative 
detention vary considerably among the Länder, ranging from special facilities for the 
administrative detention of irregular migrants to normal prisons where they are held 
alongside criminal convicts. There are three different models of detention: (1) special 
establishments for the administrative detention of irregular migrants, (2) detention in 
regular prisons (Justizvolzugsanstalt, JVA) or (3) in special departments of such a JVA (Van 
Kalmthout et al. 2007: 54). A more detailed overview of the detention facilities in the various 
Bundesländer in 2004 gives the impression that a large part of the German capacity for 
administrative detention is realized within JVA’s, some of it in separate sections, but much of 
it as an ‘earmarked’ part of regular capacity (Dünkel et al. 2007: 381-382). A number of the 
German detention facilities have a rather bad reputation and have been visited and reported 
on by the Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment on numerous occasions throughout the 1990s and the 
2000s (Dünkel et al. 2007: 377-8).  
 
Due to the decentralized organization the development of the detention capacity over time is 
difficult to measure. Dünkel et al. (2007: 379-380) give some indication of development over 
time, but these data must be treated with the utmost care because they do not measure 
capacity, but the actual stock of detained foreigners who are pending removal at one specific 
day (January 1st) per year (see graph 4.2). The only information that can be taken from this 
graph is that capacity has increased since the early 1990s and that a small number of 
Bündeslander seem to take up the lion share of the detained foreigners pending removal 
(again: on January 1st of each year). The ‘top three’ of the sixteen Bündeslander are also 
depicted in the graph.    
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 Graph 4.2: Foreign detainees pending removal in penitentiary establishments 
in Germany (total) and selected Bundesländer, 1990-2006 (all 
measurements: the count of detainees on January 1st of the year) 
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Source: Dunkel et al. (2007: 379-380), adapted. 
 
The current capacity for the administrative detention of irregular migrants awaiting removal 
is roughly 2250 places (Dünkel et al. 2007: 380). That is not much, especially when set 
against a background of 222 German prisons with a total capacity of 80.000 places: a ‘mere’ 
2.8 per cent of the total prison capacity. Moreover the graph, with all its limitations, shows 
that in 1994 there were 2.600 foreigners imprisoned with a view to expulsion, meaning either 
that the total capacity has gone down since the middle of the 1990s or, more likely, that the 
German regime is more flexible in terms of placement of irregular migrants. The latter is an 
obvious option, as many irregular migrants are detained in normal prison facilities. This 
gives the German immigration authorities more flexibility in the placement of irregular 
migrants. The figures can be put in a better perspective by zooming in on Berlin, one of the 
Länder. Berlin lists very low figures in terms of the data underlying graph 4.2 (highest score 
is 18 in 1994) and therefore didn’t make it into the top 3 in the graph. This is ‘odd’ because it 
has a specialized immigrant detention center with 340 places in Köpenick, making it the 
Land with the second largest detention capacity (Dünkel et al. 2007: 381). A recent 
dissertation by Pieper (2008) on the topic of detention and migration gives exact figures for 
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this Berlin facility in the year 2002. According to official figures 5.676 people were taken into 
immigrant detention (abschiebungshaft) during that year (Pieper 2008: 187), which means 
that on average every place in Köpenick was used almost 17 times during 2002. Though it is 
of course impossible to extrapolate this figure to the other Länder, it does give some 
indication of intensive use of the available detention capacity. How effective this use is, can 
only be approximated by looking at the data for the actual expulsions in the next paragraph.  
 
4.5 Expulsion 
The crucial question is whether the investments in immigrant detention actually result in an 
increase of effective expulsions of irregular migrants. In 2005 the European Commission 
concluded on the basis of the then available information (for the period 2002-2004) that in 
the EU 25 roughly 1 in 3 of the formal ‘return decisions’ on irregular migrants are effectively 
implemented and result in removal (CEC 2005). Two thirds of the return decisions are not in 
any way implemented. In a number of countries governments are trying to close, or at least 
diminish this ‘deportation gap’, i.e. “(…) the gap between the number of people eligible for 
removal by the state at any time and the number of people a state actually removes (deports)” 
(Gibney 2008: 149). In short, states are investing in detention and expulsion policies, despite 
the knowledge that expulsion is difficult and costly. Germany and the Netherlands are also 
trying to improve their expulsion policies.   
 
4.5.1 Leaving detention, leaving the country? 
Immigrant detention can end in one of two possible outcomes: either the irregular migrant is 
expelled or he is released back onto the streets. In the latter case it is likely that he will go 
back to his prior life with the same irregular status for which he was brought into detention in 
the first place. On the basis of statistics from the Dutch Immigration Services (IND) for the 
years 2000 and 2001, the Dutch Advisory Committee for Aliens Affairs concluded that 
immigrant detention resulted in expulsion for 60,7 per cent of all detainees in 2000 and for 
56.9 per cent in 2001 (ACVZ 2002: 23). The remaining detainees were released either 
because of administrative errors (vormfouten) or because there was no realistic expectation 
that expulsion would be possible. Finally, a large percentage was released due to ‘unknown’ 
factors (26,6 per cent in 2000 and 35,1 per cent in 2001). Release from detention does not 
mean these irregular migrants won’t be detained again. Those who stay irregularly after their 
release have the same risk of being apprehended as they did before their first detention. Van 
Kalmthout et al. (2005: 145) find that of a subset of detained irregular migrants (N= 262) 
that have a dossier of the immigration authorities, 18 per cent have been in immigrant 
detention before. To some ‘undeportable’ irregular migrants the detention system risks 
becoming a revolving door.   
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 In 2005 the IND reported that it had been possible to proceed with deportation for 60 per 
cent of all irregular migrants detained in that year (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst 2006: 
65). On the basis of his research among 400 immigrant detainees in 2003-2004 Van 
Kalmthout (2007b: 101) claims the percentage of irregular migrants that are actually expelled 
is much lower and even lies below 40 per cent. A rather low percentage, especially when set 
against a background of rising length of detention and rising costs: an estimated €35.000 
detention costs per successful expulsion. The absolute number of expulsions from the 
Netherlands has also been dropping since 2003 (see table 4.3). The Dutch government 
distinguished between two sorts of ‘actual departures’, the category opposed to the so-called 
‘administrative removal’ where an alien is considered to have left the country when he is not 
found during a control of his last known house address. In the case of a deportation an alien 
is escorted past the border and/or back to his country of origin. The majority of the 
deportations are conducted by airplane (Immigratie- en Naturalisatiedienst 2006). A 
supervised departure entails that the immigrants’ travel documents are kept by the 
authorities until he has effectively passed the border. The absolute numbers for both 
categories have been dropping since 2003, signaling a trend of a decreasing effectiveness of 
expulsion policies.   
 
Table 4.3 Expulsions and supervised departures from the Netherlands,  
2000-2006  
 Deportations 
(uitzetting) 
Supervised departure 
(vertrek onder 
toezicht) 
Total actual 
departure 
2000 9.947 15.262 25.209 
2001 9.498 7.049 16.547 
2002 12.015 9.055 21.070 
2003 11.374 11.006 22.380 
2004 9.215 9.800 19.015 
2005 8.912 n.a.  
2006 7.765 n.a.  
Source:  Minister voor Vreemdelingenzaken en Integratie (2003: 8) and Ministerie van Justitie (2004:  
 48-49), (2005: 37-38), (2006: 48), (2007:42) 
 
There is also an important connection between the length of the detention of irregular 
migrants and the chances of them being actually expelled. In an earlier research project using 
a sample of 400 detained irregular migrants Van Kalmthout et al. (2004: 95-98, see also Van 
Kalmthout 2005: 332) found that 56 per cent was detained for less that three months, 22 per 
cent between three and six months and 22 per cent for longer than six months. Tellingly, the 
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number of irregular migrants that was effectively expelled was highest among those that were 
detained under three months (67 per cent). This percentage dropped significantly as time 
went on; only 19 per cent of those that were detained longer than three months were 
effectively expelled. This is confirmed by the data used by the ACVZ (2002: 23-24). Roughly 
80 per cent of the detained irregular migrants that were expelled were in detention for less 
than 28 days. Reversely, the average length of detention of irregular migrants that were 
released because expulsion could not be implemented was 121 days. So far it seems that the 
intensification of the detention regime has not translated into an increase of actual 
expulsions. It also seems that the detention regime is harshest, because of its length, for those 
irregular migrants that (eventually) prove to be ‘undeportable’.  
 
The history of German expulsion policy is closely entwined with the (sizable) migration flows 
into this country, especially in the years after the fall of the Berlin wall. According to 
Ellerman (2008: 173), the immigration authorities conducted fewer than 8,000 deportations 
in 1985, a number that climbed to 15,000 in 1990, peaked at 47,000 in 1993 and stabilized at 
around 35,000 by 2000. More recently, the German figures have a taken a more significant 
tumble (see graph 4.3). There was a steady decrease in the number of expulsions during the 
2000s that intensified after 2005 (Kreienbrink 2007). The category ‘forced removals’ is 
comprised of three different subcategories, two of which are taken into account in the figures 
underlying graph 4.3. Zurückweisung or ‘rejection at the border’ is not taken into account 
because it is a matter of border policy and not of internal migration control. 
Zurückschiebung, or removal, is meant to bring an apprehended irregular migrant back to 
the country from which he entered Germany. Force and detention can be used for this 
category of irregular migrants. If an irregular migrant has been in the country for more than 
6 months he has to be deported (Abschiebung), in which case an irregular migrants is usually 
physically transported (and sometimes escorted) out of the country. In 2006 the number of 
deportations stood at 13.894 and the total number of forced removals at 18.623.  
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 Graph 4.3 Deportation and forced removals from Germany, 1996-2006 
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Source: Bundesminsterium des Innern (2007: 151 & 289)  
 
The relation between (the length of) immigrant detention and actual expulsions cannot be 
accurately determined for the German case as the necessary statistics are lacking. However, 
estimates range from 60 per cent to 80 per cent of administrative detainees that are actually 
expelled (Dünkel et al. 2007: 386, Kreienbrink 2007: 152). That is significantly higher than in 
the Netherlands. For the length of immigrant detention there are also only estimates and 
‘averages’. Dünkel et al. (2007: 383) say that the average stay in immigrant detention is six 
weeks, but immediately add that this average obscures the fact that many detainees are only 
briefly in custody while roughly 10 to 20 per cent of them spend more than six months in 
detention. It is also interesting to note that during the 1990s the composition of deported 
aliens displayed a marked shift away from illegal immigrants and criminal immigrants in 
favor of rejected asylum seekers. While in the late 1980s asylum seekers accounted for only 
25 to 30 per cent of forced removals, in 1993 this had risen to 76 per cent and, by the end of 
the decade, continued to range between 47 to 58 per cent (Ellermann 2008: 173). 
Kreinenbrink (2007: 61) who uses data from 2000-2004, estimates that roughly one third of 
the current population in immigrant detention does not have an asylum background. 
Considering the dominant focus on failed asylum seekers in German expulsion policy – a 
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much more prominent emphasis than in the Netherlands – the drop in the expulsion figures 
becomes less dramatic than it seems at face value. Graph 4.4 shows the numbers for the total 
of all forced removals and the figures for the number of asylum applications in Germany for 
the time period 1990-2006.  
 
Graph 4.4  Forced removals from Germany, asylum applications in 
 Germany, 1990-2006 
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Source:  Bundesminsterium des Innern (2007: 151 & 289); Bundesamt für Migration und  
 Flüchtlinge (2006) 
 
As can be seen from the graph the gap between the number of expulsions and the number of 
asylum claims is closing fast and almost overlap in 2006. The drop in the number of asylum 
claims explains the decrease of the number of removals to some extent, but does not tell the 
whole story. Ellermann (2008) points to another explanation: the increasingly difficult 
process of identification due to the fact that migrants and asylum seekers do not carry 
identification documents. The impact of this ‘problem of the papers’ increased enormously 
since the mid 1990s. Officials of the Interior Ministry stated in 2002 that in the mid 1980s 
the immigration authorities had to obtain travel documents for only 30 to 40 per cent of all 
asylum seekers. Less than two decades later it is estimated that 85 per cent of all asylum 
seekers arrive without documentation (in Ellermann 2008). The situation in the Netherlands 
is similar. Of the 400 detainees in Van Kalmthout’s study 61 per cent had no documents at 
all, after taking out the remaining false and invalid documents a total of 88 per cent did not 
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have any useful documentation (Van Kalmthout 2005: 59). The bottleneck of identification 
seems an important contender to explain the decreasing deportation figures when budgets 
and staffing for detention and deportation process are rising.  
 
4.5.2 Searching for identities 
As said before, the bottleneck of identification is the result of a lack of cooperation – or even 
the active obstruction - of the irregular immigrant himself, his (supposed) country of origin 
or both. The problems with irregular migrants primarily involve the destroying of identity 
papers, being silent or lying about identity and country of origin and refusing to cooperate 
with the immigration authorities and the embassies of their (supposed) countries of origin. 
The fast increase in the number of undocumented cases in immigrant detention during the 
last decade is an important indication that irregular migrants are well aware of ‘the 
importance of not being earnest’ (Engbersen & Broeders 2009). Countries of origin – in this 
case represented by their embassies and consulates in Germany and the Netherlands – are 
often also unwilling to cooperate or use an array of tricks to frustrate the process of 
identification and repatriation (see for example Kreienbrink 2007: 116). Some countries, like 
Ethiopia, simply refuse to cooperate, while other countries, such as China, formalize their 
procedures to such an extent that repatriation often becomes de facto impossible (Liu 2008). 
Even though most countries cannot and will not blatantly refuse to accept their own citizens 
back, they can influence the timing and possibilities for return by informally stretching 
procedures. Noll (1999: 274) maintains that some countries of origin handle the issuing of 
travel documents for irregular migrants as a sort of an “informal filter for remigration”. 
Confronted with these obstructions that lead to dropping expulsion rates, the Dutch and 
German authorities have been looking for ‘counter measures’ to professionalize the 
identification process and to increase pressure on, or the incentives for, both the individual 
migrant and the authorities of the countries of origin. Ultimately the authorities try to 
develop instruments that make the process of identification less dependent on the 
cooperation of migrants themselves. 
 
Organizing identification: centralization and professionalization  
Both Germany and the Netherlands have been implementing organizational changes in 
recent years to increase the effectiveness of the expulsion process. Often these organizational 
changes were meant to increase the professionalization of the authorities involved in 
expulsion policies. Identification has proven to be a very specialized task that benefits from 
centralization, especially in Germany where expulsion is within the competence of the 
Länder. As early as 1993 the conference of the Interior Ministers of the Länder decided to 
install a special Working Group on the issue of return policies (AG Rück) to debate and 
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devise common strategies for expulsion (Kreienbrink 2007: 117). At the federal level the 
Bundespolizei direction in Koblenz established a Coordination Center for ‘return issues’ that 
specifically deals with the most ‘difficult’ countries of origin in terms of the identification, 
recognition and documenting of irregular migrants that are ‘suspected’ to be their nationals. 
Right now it deals with 14 countries, thirteen of them Sub Saharan African. This central 
direction relieves the Länder of the task of trying to obtain documents from these countries 
(Kreienbrink 2007: 134). At the level of the Länder there is a trend of centralization as well. 
Normally all Ausländerbehörde have the jurisdiction to issue expulsion orders, but in Baden 
Württemberg only four central Ausländerbehörde, out of a 120, can issue them in this 
Bundesland. According to Ellerman (2005: 1230-1231) this centralization also makes the 
process of expulsion less ‘vulnerable’ for public resistance and the “particularistic demands of 
constituency-serving elected officials”. In the Netherlands there has also been a process of 
organizational change. Following the priority given to ‘tackling’ the problem of irregular 
migration in the white paper on return (‘terugkeernota’) of 2003 and the white paper on 
irregular migrants (‘illegalennota) of 2004 the government decided in 2005 to create a new 
return migration organization. This new organization called the ‘Return and Departure 
Service (Dienst Terugkeer en Vertrek- DT&V) became operational in 2007 and deals with 
both ‘voluntary’ and forced returns. This DT&V will take over a number of tasks related to 
return from the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Aliens Police and the Royal 
Constabulary (KMar).  
 
Pressuring migrants  
Getting uncooperative irregular migrants to cooperate with the authorities in establishing 
their identity seems like a direct route towards identification and expulsion. The most 
important ‘instrument’ that the authorities use to this end has already been dealt with in the 
previous paragraph. The detention regime for irregular migrants is in itself a severe source of 
pressure on irregular migrants. Besides the mere fact of being incarcerated the regime is 
usually harsher than that of normal prisons as the facilities and circumstances are sober. 
There is often overcrowding, a lack of medical and legal aid and poorly or even unqualified 
staff (Dünkel et al. 2007; Van Kalmthout & Hofstee-Van der Meulen 2007). As irregular 
migrants are by legal definition not supposed to return to society, all activities and education 
that prepare regular prisoners for their return to society, are lacking. Furthermore, irregular 
migrants that refuse to cooperate have no way of knowing how long they are likely to stay in 
detention. The detention regime is meant to increase the pressure on irregular migrants to 
cooperate, just as it is meant to deter other migrants from a life in illegality (Van Kalmthout 
et al. 2007: 53).  
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The authorities use immigrant detention to find out the identity of irregular migrants by 
means of repeated interviews, language tests (though they are often considered expensive 
and inaccurate, see Kreienbrink 2007: 137) and research in files, documents, registrations 
and databanks. During the evaluation of the German immigration law in 2006 the question 
was also raised if the authorities should have the possibility to search the immigrants’ homes 
to look for clues of their nationality and identity (Kreienbrink 2007: 135). When the 
authorities suspect – as opposed to prove - they have determined an immigrant’s nationality 
they often have to ‘present’ this immigrant at an embassy or a consulate of the ‘suspected’ 
country of origin. The embassies must recognize the immigrant as a citizen before they 
(might be) willing to provide a new passport or a laissez passer. Depending on the available 
proof of the identity and nationality this is either done ‘in paper’ or in person (Van Kalmthout 
2005: 140-142). A ‘paper presentation’ entails that the irregular migrant has to fill out a form 
with questions regarding his identity, place of origin, family etc, that will then be examined 
by embassy personnel. A presentation in person means that the irregular migrant will be 
interviewed face to face by embassy personnel in order to establish his nationality. If the 
embassy accepts the migrant as its national, a document will be issued for his return. 
Presenting migrants is hardly an ‘exact science’ and in both Germany and the Netherlands 
the authorities sometimes present the same migrant to a number of embassies. Germany 
sometimes brings the representatives of various embassies together to prevent what the 
German authorities call ‘embassy tourism’, i.e. to limit the risk that various successive 
embassies reject the migrant as their own (Kreienbrink 2007: 137). In the Netherlands the 
authorities take some migrants past a number of different embassies without substantial 
indication for a specific country of origin, but in the hope of ‘passing’ the right one. However, 
this so called ‘embassy shopping’ does not yield very much result and does yield a lot of 
protest from the legal profession (Van Kalmthout 2005:194).   
 
Pressuring countries of origin 
Presenting immigrants to embassies is obviously not just meant to put pressure on the 
irregular migrant, it is also meant to influence the behavior of the countries of origin. Many 
countries of origin prove to be very uncooperative. As western states get keener on expulsion 
the number of uncooperative countries is rising. In 1990 the German authorities dealt with 
the representatives of 10 countries on a regular basis and that number rose to 80 in 2000 
(Ellermann 2008: 174). The documented cases are usually unproblematic, but “many 
governments drag their feet when it comes to issuing travel and identity papers to individuals 
who no longer possess these documents, thereby effectively rendering repatriation 
impossible” (Ellermann 2008: 171). One of the main efforts to increase the diplomatic 
pressure on countries of origin has been the negotiation of so called readmission agreements. 
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Germany has been negotiating these agreements unilaterally, while the Netherlands usually 
negotiates its readmission agreements as a part of the Benelux group (IOM 2004). 
Readmission agreements usually specify the procedures that will be followed in the case of 
immigrants whose identity and nationality are contested. As readmission agreements 
primarily serve the interests of the countries that wish to expel irregular migrants, they have 
to contain either effective threats or incentives for the countries of origin, in order for them to 
sign the agreement. One of the main bargaining chips used in the negotiation of these 
readmission agreements is making development aid dependent on cooperation in the matter 
accepting returning citizens (Kreienbrink 2007, Ellermann 2008). The negotiation of such 
treaties is usually a lengthy and difficult process that is sometimes subject to an endless array 
of ‘stalling tactics’. Furthermore, many states have found out that there can also be a huge 
difference between the paper reality of a bi-lateral agreement and the practical 
implementation of that agreement. Ellermann (2008) describes two readmission agreements 
that Germany negotiated during the early 1990s of which much was expected after signing 
the paperwork. The one with Romania was a big success and resulted in the repatriation of 
60.000 Romanians in 1993 and 1994 alone. The agreement with Vietnam did not even come 
close to the agreed targets and was considered a failure. The very different incentives for the 
countries of origin are usually considered the main explanation for the differences in 
compliance and effectiveness: the strong incentive of the lure of EU-membership made 
Rumania very cooperative, while the absence of such a tempting prospective explains the 
Vietnamese obstructionist tactics. The negotiation of readmission agreements at the level of 
the EU, a next step in the efforts to increase the effectiveness of expulsion policies, often 
suffers from a similar lack of quid pro quo in the (proposed) agreements (see chapter 5). For 
the German case, Ellermann (2008: 180-183) describes how interior officials in Bielefeld 
(Nordrhein Westphalen) circumvent the diplomatic and political levels and try to establish 
liaison structures with officials of the interior ministries in some countries of origin in order 
to (successfully) increase the number of readmissions. With the same agenda in mind, they 
also try to better the relations with lower level embassy personnel. This ‘small diplomacy’ 
seems to work as the cooperation of some of these countries has improved, but some of the 
‘side payments’ that are involved in the process come awfully close to bribing.  
 
Identification without the help of the immigrant himself  
The easiest way to identify uncooperative irregular migrants is by means of instruments that 
do not require their cooperation at all. The first thing both the Dutch and German authorities 
do, is to check the available national and international database systems that may provide 
information on the irregular migrant in custody. The German authorities especially check the 
Central Aliens Register (AZR), the central database of the immigration authorities that is also 
 139 
fed by various public and semi-public authorities that are obliged by law to exchange, check 
and pass on information relating to foreign nationals (Vogel & Cyrus 2008: 3). In the 
Netherlands an irregular migrant is checked against the data in a large number of databases 
including the Aliens Administrative System (VAS), National Schengen Information System 
(NSIS), the Municipal Basic Administration (GBA) and a number of (inter)national police 
databases such as Netherlands National Investigative System and the Europol and Interpol 
databases (Van Kalmthout et al. 2005: 129). However, many of these databases still require a 
minimal degree of cooperation from the irregular migrant in question as they only store so 
called ‘alphanumerical information’ – names, dates, places, characteristics etc – meaning 
that the authorities still need at least a name to make a match between a detainee and the 
information in the database. In light of this ‘structural flaw’ of the available data the German 
and Dutch authorities are increasingly embarking on a strategy of including biometric 
identifiers into these (immigration) databases. The use of biometric identifiers, such as 
digitalized fingerprints, photographs suitable for facial recognition or retina scans, would 
mean that the authorities do not need the cooperation of the immigrant anymore as they can 
use biometric information to make ‘sweeping searches’ in the available data. At both the 
national and the international level (especially the EU) there has been a biometric turn in 
(internal) migration control. As such a turn is both technologically and legally challenging as 
well as costly, progress is only made slowly.  
 
In Germany there were early pleas for a more structural approach to the use of biometrics in 
matters of immigration and identification. The Sussmüth commission proposed in 2001 to 
store all the data of visa applicants in a central register and make it available for the 
authorities that need to identify irregular migrants with a view to expulsion. As many 
irregular migrants enter the country on a legal visa it would be a logical step to store copies of 
documents, fingerprints, photos etc. (Unabhängige Kommission Zuwanderung 2001: 154-
156). The inclusion of biometrics would enable and speed up the identification of irregular 
migrants that travelled in on a visa. In the recent evaluation of the immigration law (2006) 
this plea was repeated. However, the photographic data that are currently available in the 
AZR are not ‘sophisticated enough’ to use them for identification purposes: the quality needs 
to be upgraded (Kreienbrink 2007: 136). In 2005 Germany also introduced a special section 
in the so-called fundpapierdatenbank, a database for ‘lost and found’ identity documents. 
Part of it is now reserved for the storage of all documents underlying a visa application for 
Germany. Copies of the passport, application forms and photographs are stored and available 
for searches by the immigration authorities and the police to identify irregular migrants. The 
biometric identifier in this database is also ‘facial recognition’ on the basis of photographs. 
The technology of this system is more sophisticated than the AZR, but due to its relatively 
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short existence it does not generate many hits yet (Kreienbrink 2007: 136). In the 
Netherlands the turn towards biometrics has taken a similar route. A number of the 
databases contain fingerprint data. That goes for some police databases, but especially for the 
so called HAVANK database, which is the central storage system of (government collected) 
fingerprints administered by the National Criminal Investigation Department (Nationale 
Recherche). One section of HAVANK is made up of the fingerprints of all asylum seekers in 
the Netherlands and can be used to trace identities. The fingerprints of irregular migrants 
who were taken into immigrant detention are also registered. The Dutch ‘White Paper on 
Return’ called for the increased use of biometrics to increase the effectiveness of 
identification. The ultimate aim was to gather biometric data on all people who enter into a 
procedure that may lead to entry to the Netherlands (Minster voor Vreemdelingenzaken en 
Integratie 2003: 4). In the eyes of the government this required a number of new national 
databases and the unwavering support for the EU initiatives in immigrant database 
technology that are underway (see chapter 5). One of the issues under investigation was to 
compel all airlines to (digitally) register a biometric identifier of all the passengers they 
transport (a scheme of which not much has been heard of since, but which is certainly not 
technologically impossible). For the registration of biometric identifiers of visa applicants the 
Netherlands prepares for the introduction of the national pendant of the European Visa 
Information System (VIS) that will store the fingerprints of all those who apply for a visa in 
Europe (see chapter 5). Once the gathering of biometric data on the various groups that enter 
Germany and the Netherlands takes on a greater scale and more data are stored, the 
identification process will become less dependent on the cooperation of individual migrants 
to reveal their true identities. Assuming that the body does not lie – and governments do 
assume this when they talk about biometrics – identification may become a ‘simple’ matter of 
cross-referencing for certain parts of the irregular migrant population (rejected asylum 
seekers, ‘visa-overstayers’).   
 
4.6 Conclusion: factories of identification? 
The general question of this chapter can be answered in the affirmative: the ship of state is 
turning towards identification in both Germany and the Netherlands. There is a noticeable 
turn towards policies that aim to identify irregular migrants with a view to expulsion. Both 
countries are investing in the identification process in all parts of the bureaucratic chain 
leading to expulsion. The police and immigration authorities introduce procedures and 
instruments that make identification possible and foreign policy is aimed at diplomatic 
relations with important countries of origin and the negotiation of readmission agreements. 
Furthermore, both countries are exploring the possibilities that can be provided by the ‘brave 
new world’ of modern surveillance techniques. Increasingly the immigration authorities turn 
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to database systems for the identification of irregular migrants. Where possible the database 
systems (will) work with biometric identifiers that can link immigrants to their legal identity 
and other personal data without needing their active cooperation. Given the enormous 
problem of uncooperative irregular migrants hiding their identity or lying about it to the 
immigration authorities, biometrics make it almost possible to ‘skip’ the immigrant himself 
in terms of identification. A ‘surveillant assemblage’ aimed at (irregular) migrants is clearly 
emerging. This issue will be taken up further in chapter 5 in the discussion on the new EU 
immigration databases (SIS II, Eurodac and VIS). In sum, we can say that Germany and the 
Netherlands are increasingly operating their policies of internal migration control as 
‘factories of identification’.  
 
However, we do have to note that the proclaimed aim of these policies – an increase in the 
number of expulsions – is not met. If anything, the numbers seem to be declining rather than 
rising. The intensification in policing and especially the rising incarceration rates are not 
translated into more expulsions. This important contra-indication has a number of reasons. 
For one thing, expulsions vary with the general volume of migration that can lead to irregular 
residence, such as asylum migration. This is however only part of the story. Dropping 
expulsion rates are an important counter indication for the desired return on the 
government’s investment in detention and identification policies , but at the same time can 
be seen as the prime motivation for investing even more resources in solutions for the 
problem of the identification of irregular migrants. The main reason for the dropping 
expulsion figures is the fact that irregular migrants are well aware of ‘the importance of not 
being earnest’. The fact that irregular migrants have realized the value of frustrating the 
identification process has lifted identification to an even more central place in policy making. 
Theoretically the migration control perspective explains best why the Dutch and German 
governments are embarking on the difficult road of expulsion. The efforts to close the 
deportation gap are based on the political incentive to be in control of migration. The heavy 
investments suggest that it is actual migration control they are after and not just the image of 
control as is often presumed. For example Gibney & Hansen (2003: 15) characterize 
deportation policies as a ‘noble lie’, necessary because “no state is willing to collapse the 
distinction between legal and illegal migrants”. However, irrespective of where the line 
between migration control and ‘image control’ may lie exactly, investment in the ‘factory of 
identification’ is likely to continue.  
 
The fact that ‘anonymous’ irregular migrants – often aided by countries of origin – are able to 
frustrate expulsion so effectively also has a profound effect on the way the detention system 
functions in practice. Given the difficulties with identification, immigrant detention cannot 
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optimally function as a clearing house for irregular migrants, i.e. being a (short) stop over 
preparing them for expulsion. This is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that the data 
strongly suggest that the overall majority of successful expulsions in both countries are 
effectuated in the first weeks and months of detention. The longer detention lasts, the less 
likely that the outcome will be expulsion. Still, both governments keep significant numbers of 
irregular migrants in detention for much longer than that and keep up a legal framework that 
allows for detention up to 18 months in Germany and theoretically even longer in the 
Netherlands. But the lengthy and very costly detention of an irregular migrant that will 
eventually end up on the streets again does not seem a very rational migration control 
approach. Making detention capacity available for newly apprehended irregular migrants 
with a higher chance of being deported – and thus releasing ‘undeportable’ cases much 
earlier – would seem a more effective and rational approach. What can account for this 
apparent irrationality? Here the new penology perspective comes to the fore. For those who 
have to stay in detention for a longer period of time, the detention regime has a ‘new 
penological’ character. The ‘undeportable’ irregular migrants are held in a detention system 
that is essentially not meant for long stays. The regime is usually harsher than that of normal 
prisons as the facilities and circumstances are sober. Overcrowding, a lack of medical and 
legal aid, poorly or even unqualified staff and a lack of all activities and education that 
prepare regular prisoners for their return to society add up to a harsh regime, especially 
considering the long period irregular migrants can be legally detained in Germany and the 
Netherlands. From the perspective of new penology their societal exclusion for a longer 
period of time can already be measured as a policy effect. Prison then simply functions as a 
‘factory of exclusion’ that keeps irregular migrants off the streets and out of sight for a longer 
period of time. That alone is considered a valuable proceed of policy. An added value, and a 
slightly more ‘rational’ line of reasoning from the perspective of migration control, is the idea 
that the long and harsh detention regime may serve as a deterrent for current and future 
irregular migrants. One might speculate that the authorities hope that the harsh detention 
regime ‘stimulates’ these irregular migrants to try their luck elsewhere after they have been 
turned back on the streets. The fact that there were ‘returning’ prisoners in Van Kalmthout’s 
sample of irregular migrants means that at least a number of them are not deterred. For them 
the detention system risks becoming a revolving door, for others it may indeed be an 
experience that brings them to leave the country. However, both in terms of human and 
economic costs these long detentions seem a high price to pay for an unknown and 
immeasurable contribution to the effectiveness of expulsion policies.  
 
The de facto functioning of the detention system as a deterrent brings the notion of the state 
of exception into mind. There is evidence that both countries are stretching their policies to 
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adapt to the circumstances and problems they face in order to increase effectiveness. In doing 
so they also undermine ‘traditional principles, standards and procedures of criminal law’ 
amounting to the use of counter law (Ericson 2007). The length and conditions of immigrant 
detention (especially in the Netherlands where illegal residence is not even a criminal 
offence) and some of the efforts of immigration authorities to expel irregular migrants (such 
as presenting aliens to various countries and ‘informalizing’ diplomatic relations to increase 
expulsion rates (Germany) all brush against the limits of the legal system and allow degrees 
of exception. Writing on the use of surveillance in immigration matters Lyon (2007: 134) 
even maintains that Agamben’s notion of the ‘state of exception’ has actually become 
‘business as usual’. That may be a bit too all encompassing for the Dutch and German 
situation, but there is no doubt that legal constraints are increasingly bent or bypassed.  
 
The concept and legal status of citizenship emerges from this state of exception as a central 
but ultimately Janus-faced status. In essence the lack of a known citizenship of irregular 
migrants both facilitates the ‘exceptional’ handling of immigrants by the state, as well as 
restricts the state in achieving its aims. Firstly, the fact that irregular migrants willingly hide 
their legal identity and citizenship makes them all the more vulnerable vis-à-vis the state. To 
some extent it puts them in a legal no-man’s land. Lack of citizenship is often also a lack of 
legal/diplomatic representation, which gives the detaining state authorities more ‘leverage’ in 
their dealings with irregular migrants. The immigrant’s valuable lie comes at a high cost. 
With the growing importance of immigrant detention the individual irregular migrant finds 
himself increasingly cornered between the rock of prison and the hard place of expulsion. On 
the other hand, the lack of citizenship puts the state authorities in an impossible position at 
the international level, as the lack of citizenship blocks the state’s possibilities to deport 
irregular migrants. Both the irregular migrant and the (supposed) country of origin are well 
aware of this and use this politico-legal restriction on the deporting state to their advantage. 
In turn, this strengthens deporting countries in their resolve to find new means of 
identification. For founding EU and Schengen members such as Germany and the 
Netherlands the obvious place to develop new initiatives lies at the European level.  
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5 EUROPEAN TOOLS FOR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS.  
 
5.1 Introduction21 
In a Europe without internal borders migration control cannot be determined and executed 
at ‘just’ the national level. In practice this means that the EU and especially the Schengen 
states have a joint agenda when it comes to border control, visa policy and immigration and 
asylum policy. These are issues on which a significant policy agenda – that is primarily aimed 
at the exclusion of ‘unwanted’ immigrants – has developed in the last two decades since the 
Schengen cooperation began in 1985. Measures that were taken on irregular migration were 
usually related to border control issues, the countering of human smuggling and the closing 
of certain migration ‘routes’ into the territory of the Schengen states. Internal migration 
control on irregular migrants has long been considered a national matter. Not in the least 
because of an – informal - recognition of the large differences between the member states in 
their political perception and handling of the issue of irregular migration. The differences 
between the Northern member states, where irregular migrants are considered a problematic 
presence and the Southern member states, where irregular migrants are a much more 
tolerated part of the informal economy (and society), seem to stand in the way of a common 
stance on internal migration control on irregular migrants. Yet, as has been made clear in the 
previous chapters, countries such as the Netherlands and Germany are quite serious about 
the development and implementation of internal surveillance on irregular migrants. At the 
same time they are confronted with the obvious limitations of a purely national approach. As 
a result of frustrations with readmission and expulsion policies at the national level, member 
states have increasingly been looking at the EU level of policy making, hoping that the 
Union’s political weight will increase the leverage on unwilling and uncooperative countries 
of origin. The biggest frustration of expulsion policies, the impossibility of identifying 
irregular migrants, could also potentially benefit from a European approach. Considering 
that an irregular migrant could have entered the European Union at any external border 
means that he may have left traces of his identity and itinerary in any other EU member 
state, information that may be made accessible through a European approach. It may be 
national politics and laws that declare an irregular migrant to be ‘undesirable’ or even 
‘criminal’, but if the national instruments can only do part of the job, these member states are 
likely to look at the European Union to provide additional tools.           
 
This chapter analyses the ‘policies’ and instruments that have been developed at the level of 
the EU that can (also) ‘aid’ member states in their domestic ‘fight against illegal migration’, 
                                                        
21  Parts of this chapter are based on two earlier  studies: Broeders (2007) and Broeders (forthcoming) 
as it is phrased in the official documents of the European Union. The EU initiatives will be 
analysed in terms of two theoretical questions set out in paragraph 5.2. The first is derived 
from the general theoretical framework and basically asks what the contribution of these EU 
policies and instruments is to the working of the first and second logic of exclusion. The 
second is linked to debates in political science and political sociology about the nature of EU 
cooperation. To what extent can EU policies and instruments on irregular migration be 
characterised as a common solution to a common problem? Or should it be viewed as the 
instrumental use of EU resources for domestic agenda’s and policy problems? Paragraph 5.3 
sketches a brief historical outline of the European cooperation in matters of (irregular) 
migration, originating outside of the legal framework of the EU and slowly edging towards 
(partial) integration into the EU’s structures. Paragraph 5.4 deals with two policy initiatives 
that try to alleviate some of the difficulties in domestic expulsion policies. The first is the 
negotiation of joint readmission agreements and the second is the negotiation of a return 
directive. Paragraph 5.5 focuses on the development of European ‘instruments’. Here the 
emphasis is on the development, and the politico-technical changes within the development, 
of an emerging network of EU migration databases consisting of the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) and its aptly named successor the SIS II, the Eurodac system and the Visa 
Information System (VIS). These systems have an important function in the exclusion of 
irregular migrants, both at the external borders of the EU and, as will be argued and shown 
below, in the internal migration control in individual member states such as Germany and 
the Netherlands. This paragraph will analyse the character, development and potential of 
these data systems and where possible the practical use of the system, highlighting the cases 
of Germany and the Netherlands. Conclusions will be drawn in paragraph 5.6.  
 
5.2 EU policy making: transfer of competence or a European tool shed?  
European unification has been a long history of nation states overcoming their national 
interests to achieve common goals and ultimately to prevent the repetition of the disaster of 
(world) war originating in Western Europe. The original rationale of the post war European 
cooperation was to restrict national states in their possibilities to develop the capacity for 
new wars. Coal and steel being the raw materials for the weapons of mass destruction of the 
immediate postwar days, the European nations decided to bring production thereof under 
the supervision of the European Coal and Steel Community, Europe’s first truly 
supranational organization. Even today, and in contrast to most international organizations, 
the core of the European Union still is an in essence very supranational treaty: the EEC treaty 
which is now referred to as the first pillar of the European Union. In the first pillar the 
European institutions are fully involved in the development of common policies, through the 
so called community method, and the implementation of these policies is subject to judicial 
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review by the European Court of Justice. Even though European cooperation has known 
periods of serious stagnation and revived nationalism it is usually seen as a process that 
limits and diminishes the national sovereignty of its member states. The general direction of 
Europeanization has been that of ‘an ever closer union’ as it is phrased in the Treaty of Rome 
and in the preamble of the rejected “constitutional” treaty. European integration is therefore 
also often associated with restrictions on national policies and discretionary space. From a 
national perspective ‘Brussels’ is often a restrictive power: fishermen can’t fish because of 
quota, firms get fined because of breaches of EU regulations for competition and national 
decisions have to be revoked because the European Court of Justice determines they are in 
violation of the EU-treaties. In other words, the EU molds the behavior of national 
governments so that it complies with the joint decisions taken at the European level. In this 
reading the commonality takes precedence over the national. However, in the literature on 
European migration policy the emphasis on the national perspective is still very much 
dominant. To a certain extent this is logical because the sensitive EU policy terrain of what 
we now call “Justice and Home Affairs’, which includes immigration, asylum and visa, was 
originally the result of international negotiations within the Schengen group (and hence 
outside of the EU legal order). And even when it was taken into the framework of the 
European Union, it was still kept firmly intergovernmental and outside of the normal EU 
decision making process (Monar 2001, WRR 2003). Cooperation in matters of Justice and 
Home Affairs has been a project of reluctant and hesitant nation states, although one has to 
add that Europeanization usually is (Broeders 2009).  
 
However, in addition to the traditional scheme of ‘resorting’, albeit reluctantly, to the EU to 
deal with problems that manifest itself at a European scale, there is another theoretical 
perspective that argues that national actors, or more precisely (parts) of the executive, seek 
out the European level not so much to devise common solutions for common problems, but 
to escape domestic constraints on policy making (Wolf 1999, Guiraudon 2000, 2003, Lahav 
& Guiraudon 2006, Lavenex 2006, Boswell 2007). Branches of the executive, such as 
immigration authorities, ‘go European’ to avoid parliamentary scrutiny or judicial 
accountability that would impede their activities at the national level (Boswell 2007). 
Guiraudon (2000) refers to this behavior as ‘venue shopping’: agencies making a vertical 
‘escape’ from the various domestic constraints on policy making resulting from democratic, 
judicial and public scrutiny (see also Lahav & Guiraudon 2006, Lavenex 2006). The 
European scene makes it possible to escape domestic constraints and open up new spaces for 
action (Guiraudon 2003: 265).This logic especially applies to the organizations that are 
responsible for control and security, such as police and intelligence organizations operating 
at the international level, but also increasingly for the immigration authorities responsible for 
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the EU’s ‘fight against illegal migration’. The policy frames and (usually) soft law resulting 
from international cooperation do not constrain nation states but rather sanction national or 
protectionist initiatives: “International organisations and supranational participation 
legitimize the role of certain actors in policy-making that defend a logic of control” (Lahav & 
Guiraudon 2006: 207). Instead of being restrained in their autonomy, the EU level of policy 
making makes it possible to avoid national constraints and to strike alliances with their 
(ministerial) counterparts from the other EU member states. According to Wolf (1999: 336) 
the opening up of an additional political arena dominated by government representatives 
strengthens the executive as they alone can operate at both the national and the international 
level. According to him the strategic use of this new arena can be seen as an new version of 
the ‘ancien’ raison d’état, as this old notion of state interest highlights the “(…) fact that 
governments’ strive for autonomy has always been of a double-edged character, i.e. it has 
been directed to the international and the domestic context simultaneously” (Wolf 1999: 337, 
see also Lavenex 2006: 331). This instrumental use of the EU’s capacity would account for 
both a selective Justice and Home Affairs policy agenda – focusing on control and not so 
much on rights – and an intergovernmental organization of decision making. Even so, 
allowance has to be made for the fact that most EU cooperation started from a very national 
and narrowly framed perspective, while developing along the way into a common policy 
framework, including the community method of decision making. Trading in Francs, Guldens 
and Deutschmarks for Euro’s wasn’t achieved overnight either. It remains to be seen whether 
national governments can maintain the EU as an ‘escape’ route and withstand the 
communutarisation of (parts of) the Justice and Home Affairs agenda, especially considering 
the fact that “(…) the EU has hitherto proved to be particularly resistant to long-term 
instrumentalisation by national actors” (in Lavenex 2006: 346, see also Broeders 2009). 
  
Most of the policies adopted at the EU level under the caption ‘migration management’ are 
primarily focused on the prevention of unwanted migration (Guiraudon 2003: 266, Lavenex 
2006: 335). So far migration control is the de facto undisputed aim of policy development 
explaining the advances made in the development of (soft law) instruments and restrictive 
policies and the limited and sometimes even lack of progress on the more substantive 
dossiers concerning for example the rights of third country nationals and common norms for 
the handling of asylum claims (see par. 5.3). Migration control, especially when it is aimed at 
irregular migrants, is control through exclusion: barring access to legal procedures and 
geographical borders. Increasingly, it is also a matter of expulsion policies, which may be 
regarded the ultimate exclusion. That also means that migration control is increasingly part 
of the foreign policy agenda of the EU, especially where readmission agreements are 
concerned (Lavenex 2006). Furthermore, as shown in the preceding chapters on national 
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Dutch and German policies, the exclusion of irregular migrants is increasingly a matter of 
digital surveillance. The rapid technological advances in database technology and biometrics 
also influence the possible contributions that the EU can make to the ‘fight against illegal 
migration’. This raises the question how policies and instruments such as these migration 
databases developed at the EU level contribute to the two logics of exclusion: at the level of 
the (Schengen) community as a whole but, in light of the focus on policies of internal 
migration control, especially at the level of the national state.  
 
From a perspective of internal migration control the defining characteristic of an irregular 
migrant is his irregular residence. Irregular residence however does not presuppose irregular 
entry. There are three basic categories of irregular migrants: those who enter and stay 
illegally (the irregular migrant ‘proper’), those who apply for asylum and become irregular 
after their application is rejected and those who travel to the EU on a legal (tourist) visa and 
become irregular after the validity of the visa expires. It is these migration histories that lay at 
the base of the development of the EU migration databases and their use for the exclusion of 
irregular migrants. The EU migration databases dealt with in this chapter have either been 
developed for, or adapted for, the storage of data on irregular migrants, visa applicants and 
asylum seekers and combinations thereof. As these systems are not devised to shield the 
access to societal institutions such as the labour market or the welfare state, they are less 
likely to make a contribution to the first logic of exclusion. However, the systems may contain 
functions that delegitimize and criminalize institutions or networks that irregular migrants 
need and use for their irregular stay. The main function of these systems in migration control 
is primarily linked to the external borders of the EU – the geographical borders and the 
access to legal procedures for asylum and visa– and therefore to external migration control. 
For the internal migration control the main contribution of these systems can be expected in 
the support and instrumentalization of the second logic of exclusion: that of exclusion 
through documentation and registration. The EU wide scale of these systems that will 
document and register important legal migration flows into all of the EU member states, 
brings the level of ‘identity management’ (Muller 2004) by means of database technology to a 
whole new level. Documenting identities and itineraries can be used for internal migration 
control as it may provide links to the missing information that frustrates national level 
expulsion policies. When these systems become operational in the context of the ‘fight 
against illegal migration’ and especially in the internal control on irregular migrants they 
should become vital tools for the exclusion through registration, as their principal function is 
to re-identify irregular migrants (Broeders 2007). 
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Information and communication technology has made it possible to link various databases, 
create networks between them and it has ‘liberated’ registrations and administrations from 
fixed places and locations through remote accessibility. This interconnectivity and 
accessibility of information makes cross-referencing potentially a matter of seconds. 
Considering the ‘state of the art’ technology applied in the setting up of these new EU 
databases the limit may indeed be approaching the sky from a purely technological 
perspective. Whether or not governments connect and combine different bodies of 
information will increasingly become a matter of political choices and legal constraints, as the 
technological constraints are losing their relevance quickly. Technological advances and 
possibilities often underlie ‘function’ or ‘surveillance creep’, meaning that systems originally 
intended to perform narrowly specified functions are expanded as a reaction to new 
(political) circumstances (Lyon 2007), often sidestepping or pushing back the limits of the 
original legal framework and safeguards. European integration offers new challenges and 
possibilities for member states in the field of (irregular) migration control. Whether or not 
they will be used for the domestic internal surveillance on irregular migrants depends on (1) 
if and to what extent national governments (can) use the EU in an instrumental manner, 
pushing for common policies and instruments that suit national needs and (2) if and to what 
extent the systems actually make a practical contribution to solving the problems national 
states experience in the internal control of irregular migrants, either through the first or the 
second logic of exclusion.  
 
5.3 Schengen, Amsterdam & Prüm: a bird’s eye view of European cooperation 
in Justice and Home Affairs 
EU ‘policies’ on illegal migration weren’t always embedded in a discourse of security and the 
irregular migrant wasn’t always seen as a threat to the Fortress Europe. The changes in policy 
kept pace with the gradual change in perception of the irregular migrant. Cholewinski (2004) 
distinguishes three periods in the development of a ‘comprehensive common EU policy’ on 
illegal immigration that, according to him, lost its human rights component along the way. 
The first period runs from 1974 to 1989 and is characterized by member states displaying 
many reservations and a lack of political will to develop substantial common initiatives. 
However, the proposals and analyses in this period took a balanced approach to the problem: 
the vulnerable position of illegal immigrants was recognized and taken into account. A 
Commission proposal to counter illegal employment stipulated that member states should 
ensure the fulfillment of employer obligations and safeguard the rights of migrant workers so 
that the cost of an irregular migrant worker would be equal to or even exceed that of a legal 
worker (Cholewinski 2004). Even though this proposal was never translated into a common 
policy, the discourse on and analysis of the problems posed by irregular migration was 
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distinctly different from that in later years. The second period, running from 1990 to 1999, is 
characterized by intergovernmental cooperation outside the institutions of the EU proper and 
the so called ‘post-Maastricht Treaty’ measures. This period includes cooperation in semi-
formalized intergovernmental groups such as the Ad Hoc Immigration Group, EU working 
groups and especially the Schengen Group. All of these functioned outside of the Community 
legal framework and were therefore free of judicial or democratic control by the European 
Court of Justice or the European Parliament (WRR 2003, Samers 2004a). The best-known is 
the Schengen Group that negotiated the Schengen agreement (1985) and Convention (1990). 
The original Schengen agreement outlined the ambition of the original five signatory states22, 
including Germany and the Netherlands, to abolish their internal borders and give real 
meaning to the long standing European goal of free movement. However, it was the later 
Schengen Convention (1990) – that was basically an inventory of ‘flanking measures’ – that 
associated or even equated ‘Schengen’ with securitization and the image of the Fortress 
Europe. The Convention and the ever more voluminous rules and manuals that came along 
with it (known as the Schengen Acquis) were considered a necessary condition for the 
implementation of free movement within the Schengen area. It regulates a long series of 
crucial issues concerning national and common external border controls, cross-national 
police cooperation, practical issues such as ‘hot pursuits’ across borders by the national police 
and data cooperation, including registration of persons and objects. The convention is the 
starting point for a wide range of instruments for the registration and surveillance of large 
population groups in the countries concerned (Mathiessen 2001). First and foremost among 
those instruments is the Schengen Information System (SIS), the Convention’s ‘database-
flagship’. With the entry into force of the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht) in 1993 
much of the ad hoc commissions and working groups on various issues of migration, asylum 
and security were taken up into the new structure of the European Union. “Combating 
unauthorized immigration, residence and work by nationals of third countries on the 
territory of the Member States” was identified as a common interest for cooperation in the 
intergovernmental third pillar of the new European Union (Cholewinski 2004). Though the 
cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs, as it was now called, became a formal part of the 
new EU treaty, decision making basically sidelined the European Commission and remained 
outside normal EU procedures for democratic and judicial review. Intergovernmental 
cooperation between nation states weary of losing sovereignty remained the norm. Most of 
the ‘measures’ aimed at illegal immigration that were adopted in this period focused on the 
detection of illegal employment, facilitation of expulsion and readmission and the problem of 
trafficking and smuggling of human beings (Cholewinski 2004).   
                                                        
22  France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg.  
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 The entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 set off the third period. Amsterdam 
brought two major changes into the policy domain of Justice and Home affairs. The first was 
the incorporation of the Schengen-acquis into the European Union. The second was the 
transfer of some parts of the Justice and Home Affairs cooperation from the 
intergovernmental third pillar to the community first pillar of the EU23. Under the lofty new 
heading of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (as Justice and Home Affairs is now 
also known) the policies on immigration, asylum, external borders and cooperation in civil 
law were transferred to the first pillar, while police cooperation and cooperation in criminal 
law remained in the intergovernmental third pillar. The Schengen acquis, containing 
provisions and regulations on all these matters, was divided over the two pillars accordingly 
(WRR 2003). EU policy on illegal immigration has developed rapidly in the period following 
Amsterdam. Though the treaty makes it much easier to adopt legally binding measures (in 
both the first and the third pillar) the member states retain a preference for soft law and 
operational measures. The political discourse on illegal immigration in the post-Amsterdam 
era gradually took on a grim tone: policy on illegal immigration became the ‘fight against 
illegal immigration’. Measures taken in the post-Amsterdam period include strengthening of 
borders and carrier sanctions, the adoption of a regulation for determining the member state 
that is responsible for an asylum application (known as Dublin II, as it replaced the original 
Dublin Convention). Dublin II is linked with the Eurodac central database that contains the 
fingerprints of all asylum claimants over the age of fourteen. A database that has gradually 
taken on the secondary aim of preventing illegal immigration (Aus 2003, Cholewinski 2004). 
Visa policy was also stepped up for those countries considered to be the major sources of 
illegal immigration. In order to create an effective common visa policy the member states are 
working on a Visa Information System (VIS), a database aimed at registration of issued and 
refused visa, copies of travel documents and biometric identifiers. Furthermore, initiatives 
were taken to promote cooperation among member states in matters of expulsion policy and 
‘illegal immigration’ became part and parcel of EU foreign policy and development aid 
through the recording of readmission agreements in for example the Contonou Agreement 
between the EU and the ACP-countries (African, Caribbean and Pacific countries). The fight 
against illegal immigration also targeted the traffickers and smugglers who facilitate illegal 
migration to the EU (Cholewinski 2003, Mitsilegas, Monar & Rees 2003, Samers 2004a).  
 
                                                        
23  Justice and Home Affairs matters in the first pillar were not fully brought under the community framework 
with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. They became subject to a special transitional regime of 
five years in which the European Council continued to take decisions unanimously and in which the 
Community institutions (European Commission, European Parliament and the European Court of Justice) 
do not have their usual role and rights. The ending of this transition period requires a unanimous decision 
thereto by the European Council (see WRR 2003).   
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At the top of the political agenda is the comprehensive plan to combat illegal immigration, 
formalized in the Commission’s ‘Communication on a common policy on all aspects of illegal 
immigration’ of June 2o03. The comprehensive plan centers around eight points for action: 
visa policy, information exchange and analysis, pre-frontier measures, financial support of 
actions in third countries, border management, improvement of co-operation and co-
ordination at the operational level, the advanced role of Europol, aliens law and criminal law 
(including illegal employment) and readmission and return policy (Samers 2004a: 31, see 
also Mitsilegas, Monar & Rees 2003: 93). The ambition to develop a comprehensive plan for 
all aspects of illegal immigration indicates that EU member states are slowly recognizing the 
importance of internal migration control. Indeed, border management, though vital and 
politically visible, is just one of the main issues on the list. The notion that erecting gates 
alone lacks effectiveness if migrants who pass the hurdle of border controls – legally or 
illegally - are able to live an unimpeded life in illegal residence has sunk in at the EU. This is 
most clearly expressed in the European Commission’s Return Action Plan of 2002 which 
would have to ensure that ‘the message gets across that immigration must take place within a 
clear legal procedural framework and that illegal entry and residence will not lead to the 
desired stable form of residence’ (European Commission quoted in Samers 2004a: 41).  
 
Some member states were eager to speed up the Justice and Home Affairs agenda even 
further. In May 2005, seven member states of the EU, again including both Germany and the 
Netherlands, signed a new treaty in the German city of Prüm. The Prüm treaty is also – 
unofficially – known as ‘Schengen III’ as there are some striking similarities: it was 
negotiated outside the EU legal order, among a limited number of member states and deals 
with ‘Justice and Home affairs issues’. Furthermore, information exchange is the dominant 
theme of the treaty. The preamble states that the treaty seeks to establish “…the highest 
possible standard of cooperation especially by means of exchange of information, particularly 
in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration…” (in Balzacq et al. 2006: 
1). The treaty outlines the role of (additional) ‘document advisors’ that are to assist and 
advise consulates, carriers and host country border control authorities in their task of 
separating real from false documents and also introduces new procedures for mutual 
assistance and cooperation among signatory states in matters of repatriation. The treaty 
seems to rest on the view that ‘data exchange will bring greater security to all’ and aims to 
facilitate the exchange of the following types of data: DNA profiles, finger prints, vehicle 
registration, non personal and personal data’ (Balzacq et al. 2006: 13). This adds to, and in 
many cases doubles with, all kinds of data exchange that are already in effect at the European 
level, especially the data collection and surveillance equipped by EU migration data systems, 
such as the SIS, Eurodac and VIS.  
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 From Schengen to Prüm, via Maastricht and Amsterdam, Germany and the Netherlands have 
always been at the forefront of the European cooperation in matters of borders, asylum and 
‘the fight against illegal migration’. Especially Germany, using its political weight within the 
Union, has often initiated new schemes or pressured existing ones into a ‘match’ with the 
German policy agenda (see Aus 2006: 8; Aus 2008). On the issue of internal migration 
control on irregular migrants the EU provides a possible solution to the big bottlenecks in 
expulsion policy: the lack of cooperation of countries of origin and the identification problem.     
As this study focuses at the development of internal migration control, the development of a 
common European border strategy, including ‘Schengen’, and the setting up of a border 
control agency such as FRONTEX are by and large left out. The remainder of this chapter will 
focus first on the European efforts to come to a common ‘Return Policy’ and the efforts to use 
the political clout of the EU to negotiate readmission agreements with both countries of 
origin and countries of transit. In addition to these rudimentary forms of policy, the 
European cooperation on Justice and Home Affairs resulted in the construction of a number 
of ‘instruments’ or tools of migration policy. In terms of instruments this chapter will analyze 
the development of a European network of immigration databases that can be used to control 
migratory movement and help with the (re-) identification of irregular migrants that try to 
hide their identity (see also Broeders 2007, Broeders forthcoming).  
 
5.4 Matters of scale and weight: EU return and readmission policies 
The trouble that individual member states have with sending back irregular migrants as a 
result of a lack of cooperation from countries of origin and transit (see chapter 4) have made 
member states look for answers at a higher level. The negotiation of readmission agreements 
is now placed firmly on the EU’s external relations policy agenda and the Commission has 
been given the mandate to negotiate them (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 366). The idea is that 
the political weight of the EU is an effective tool to negotiate readmission agreements with 
uncooperative countries (Mitsilegas, Monar & Rees 2003, Lavenex 2006). However, there is 
fierce resistance from countries of origin against these policies, as they consider them to be 
an instrument for ‘externalizing’ European problems. Nonetheless some progress has been 
made: a number of readmission agreements have been negotiated successfully. But even a 
celebrated ‘success’ such the insertion of readmission clauses in a large scale multilateral aid 
program as the Cotonou Agreement, which covers 69 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries, proved problematic as soon as the ink was dry. Ever since the entry into force of 
the agreement in 2003, the status of article 13 (which covers the readmission issue) remains 
unclear and disputed between the parties (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 371). Negotiating 
readmission clauses has proven to be difficult, but the EU consequently makes it even more 
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difficult by trying to negotiate the double deal of getting countries to take back not only their 
own citizens, but also those migrants that are believed to have transited through their 
country en route to the EU. That means taking ‘back’ transit migrants who are not nationals 
and for which there is no obligation to do so under international law. However, the European 
Commission views “(…) readmission agreements with transit countries as an alternative to 
repatriation to countries of origin of irregular migrants, whose itinerary, but not their 
identity, can be established” (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 365). In the negotiations with 
neighboring countries in Eastern Europe and in the southern Mediterranean which are the 
most important sending and transit countries it is especially the transit clause that frustrates 
negotiations. As countries like Turkey and Morocco have similar difficulties to negotiate 
readmission clauses with their own sending countries, they fear to get stuck with European 
problems (Roig & Huddleston 2007, Cassarino 2007). Or as a Turkish official phrased it: they 
fear that Turkey will become a ‘dumping ground for unwanted immigrants by the EU’ (Apap 
et al. 2004: 22). Moreover, if these countries of transit lack the political will, the political 
leverage and the capacity to send these transit migrants back to their own countries of origin 
they are likely to stay in that country, where their only option is to look for a new opportunity 
to gain access to the EU. These transit countries would then function as ‘the doormen to the 
EU’s revolving door’ instead of the Cordon Sanitaire that the EU is looking for’ (Roig & 
Huddleston 2007: 382).  
 
Though there has been a significant increase in the number of EU readmission agreements 
that are negotiated or are under negotiation – testimony to the political importance attached 
to them – the negotiations are usually only successful in specific cases and under specific 
circumstances. The successful negotiations are those with the countries that are in line for EU 
membership, such as the CEE countries during the 1990s, or with Balkan countries that were 
simultaneously negotiating the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU 
(Cassarino 2007: 187). That meant negotiations carried both a stick and a carrot. Where 
there is no prospect of big spoils such as EU membership, the EU refuses to bargain with its 
(next) best chips. The Commission, charged with negotiation of the EU readmission 
agreements, was painfully aware of this in 2002 on the basis of the experience of negotiating 
the first set of six readmission agreements: ‘As readmission agreements are solely in the 
interest of the Community, their successful conclusion depends very much of the “leverage” 
at the Commission’s disposal” (Ellermann 2008: 185-186). This leverage has so far been 
sought in the strategic use of development aid and other funds, such as the Aeneas 
programme. In practice this has not gotten the EU very far (Lavenex 2006, Monar 2007). In 
some cases the deal on a readmission agreement was struck but practical cooperation 
remained lax to non-existent, in other cases negotiations were simply stalled (indefinitely). 
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For some countries neighboring the EU the most important carrot the EU can offer are so-
called visa facilitation agreements, that can make the Schengen border less hard for (some of) 
their citizens. However, many of the EU member states do no find this a very attractive 
option, as they fear that they will ‘close a door on irregular migration only to open a window 
on new potential irregular flows of visa overstayers, already the largest category of irregular 
migrants in the EU’ (Roig & Huddleston 2007: 377). Frustrated with the negotiations on the 
formal level, some EU member states - France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Greece - have 
entered in more informal arrangements with especially the Mediterranean countries of 
Northern Africa. The pressing problem of ‘re-documentation, the delivery of travel 
documents or laissez passers by the consular authorities of these countries’ has led these 
member states to form new cooperative patterns with North African countries such as 
Morocco, Algeria and Libya (Cassarino 2007: 187). The low public visibility and the 
adaptability of these arguments make them more attractive for the countries of origin and 
thus more effective for the member states concerned. Even though this practice seems to 
work for individual member states, it might turn out to be harmful for further EU attempts to 
negotiate formal readmission agreements with these countries.  
 
The troublesome practice of expulsion policies has also led to other EU initiatives. Over the 
years a number of binding and non-binding ‘policies’ have been negotiated, such a Council 
directive on the mutual recognition of expulsion decisions on third country nationals and the 
Council decision on the organization of joint flights for the removal of third country nationals 
(Canetta 2007: 437). Taking the cooperation on return one step further is the current 
negotiation of a new Directive for a Common European Return Policy, also known as the 
Return directive. This directive is slowly taking form, but it is also highly controversial to the 
member states themselves, as well as an important source of strain in the relation between 
the European Council and the European Parliament. As this proposed directive contains a 
number of chapters that may require Member states to make some serious adjustments to 
their national policies negotiations are tough. Some member states are weary of any clause 
that will lessen their (national) control on irregular migration. For example, they do not want 
the Directive to apply to the so-called international zones at airports as they fear it will limit 
their ability to stop and send back immigrants at the border (Canetta 2007: 439). The 
directive also stresses ‘the principle of voluntary return’ meaning that a migrant should be 
given the time to organize his trip back to his country of origin autonomously after being 
issued with a return decision and a removal order by the state. According to Canetta (2007: 
442) member states fear to lose control over the management of migration because of the risk 
that immigrants disappear into illegality during the phase reserved for the (self)organization 
of their voluntary return. Moreover, they worry about the loss of the general deterrent effect 
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of forced removals on potential future irregular migrants. From the perspective of migration 
control, the member states are enthusiastic about another element in the proposed directive: 
that of the re-entry ban. According to the proposal a removal decision shall include a re-entry 
ban for a period of up to five years that applies to the whole of the EU (a horizontal provision 
that applies to all member states). Controlling such a re-entry ban would imply the 
organization of an EU-wide data system able to conduct checks at the border to detect 
migrants under a re-entry ban when they apply for a visa for the EU, apply for asylum or are 
apprehended when they cross the border illegally. The EU is currently developing data 
systems for all of these ‘categories’ (see paragraph 5.5) but the data storage limits for these 
systems are much shorter than the five years that would be necessary to control for the 
proposed 5-year re-entry ban. For example, the current ‘re-entry-ban in the Schengen 
Information System is only two years (IOM 2004: 259). It remains to be seen how the EU 
chooses to deal with this issue. The logical choice is between shortening the re-entry ban 
period and lengthening the data storage limits in the EU immigration databases. The most 
sensitive proposal in the directive is a fixed maximum length of the ‘temporary custody’ 
(administrative detention with a view to expulsion) of six months for all member states. 
Concerning the very wide variation in practices among the members states of the EU (Van 
Kalmthout et al. 2007) this is a very difficult point. Especially for Germany and the 
Netherlands, which both exceed this limit by a wide margin (Canetta 2007: 445). The 
‘solution’ for this problem, as can be read from the latest version of the directive of May 16th , 
2008, has been to keep the limit of 6 months, yet allow a further extension 0f maximum 
twelve months if removal is delayed as a result of a lack of cooperation from the irregular 
immigrant himself or difficulty obtaining documents from third countries (CEU 2008: 24). 
Considering that these are the main causes for most delays of expulsion, the room to 
maneuver for member states such as Germany and the Netherlands has hardly been 
‘restrained’ by the current version of the directive. It also suggests that ‘deterrence’ of 
irregular migrants by the possibility of a lengthy stay in administrative detention is valued 
highly by the member states, even in the knowledge that effective expulsion is usually 
achieved within the first months of detention (see chapter 4). The fate of the new directive 
has not been decided yet as it is now basically stuck between the Council and the European 
Parliament24.  
 
                                                        
24  This is the first test case of the recently introduced co-decision procedure in matters on illegal immigration. 
The European Parliament, which has been pretty much structurally ignored in the past when it only had the 
right of advice, is not going to making the negotiations on this directive easy. The proposed European Return 
Fund (that will contain €676 million for the timeframe 2008-2013) is basically being held hostage by the EP 
that has coupled the decision on the fund to that on the directive (Canetta 2007: 447-449). 
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5.5 Creating digital borders: a network of EU migration databases  
The EU migration databases developed over a long period of time starting with the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) as part of the Schengen Convention in 1995 and extending into the 
near future with the expected launch of the SIS II and the Visa Information System in 2009. 
Along the way of their development the set up and functions of most of these databases have 
been adapted to changing circumstances. Two developments stand out in this respect. Firstly, 
the fact that irregular migration, and irregular residence, grew into a political problem during 
these years accounts for number of changes in the development, scope and functions of these 
systems. Secondly, the political prominence of ‘the fight against terrorism’, gaining in 
strength after the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London has led to what Boswell 
(2007: 606) calls “(…) the appropriation of migration control instruments for the purposes of 
enhancing surveillance by security agencies”. The successive development of the SIS, Eurodac 
and VIS and the increasing ambitions for and demands on these systems will be analysed 
below.  
  
5.5.1 Schengen Information System (SIS), SIRENE and SIS II 
‘Schengen’ operates two comprehensive registration and surveillance systems. The first is the 
Schengen Information System (SIS), a data based registration and surveillance system. The 
SIS is in operation, but is also under renegotiation and redevelopment in light of its 
operability in an enlarged EU of 25 member states. The need to design a SIS II also prompted 
member states to place new ‘wish lists’ on the table. The other system, SIRENE which stands 
for Supplément d’Information Requis a l’Entrée Nationale, is twinned with the SIS as an 
auxiliary or supplementary system.  
 
The SIS is made up of a central database (called C-SIS) that is physically housed in a heavily 
guarded bunker in Strasbourg and of national SIS-databases (called N-SIS) in all of the 
Schengen states. Its purpose is to maintain ‘public order and security, including state 
security, and to apply the provisions of this convention relating to the movement of persons, 
in the territories of the contracting parties, using information transmitted by the system’ 
(article 93 of the Schengen Convention, quoted in Mathiesen 2001: 7). This broadly defined 
purpose provides the legal base for a large data system that stores information on both 
persons and objects. There are five categories of persons on whom information may be 
entered into the SIS. In light of the internal surveillance on irregular migrants the entries 
under article 96, ‘persons to be refused entry to the Schengen area as unwanted aliens’, are 
the most important. Of the objects than can be entered into the SIS the most important 
category is that of lost and stolen ‘identity papers’, which already in 1998 constituted the 
largest number of entries. The information on persons that may be stored in the SIS is a 
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rather basic and limited list: first and last name, known aliases, first letter of the second 
name, date and place of birth, distinctive physical features, sex and nationality, whether 
persons are considered to be armed and/or dangerous, reason for the report and action to be 
taken. Data are entered according to national standards and the national authorities are 
responsible for their accuracy. Not all authorities have overall access to the system; 
immigration authorities for example only have access to the data on irregular migrants. The 
system is a so-called hit/no hit system: a person is fed into the computer and produces a ‘hit’ 
if he or she is listed in the database. Even in case of a hit, not all information is readily 
accessible. Rather, the computer ‘replies’ with a command, such as ‘apprehend this person’ or 
‘stop this vehicle’ (De Hert 2004: 40). According to the German Interior ministry there were 
more than 30.000 terminals in the Schengen area on which the SIS can be accessed in 2005.  
 
All in all, the SIS is a rather basic system, with a limited range of options for the user, which 
is exactly why SIRENE was added. The SIS was not designed for detailed data exchange and 
in practice it serves as an index to the associated SIRENE system that facilitates the exchange 
of complementary information, including fingerprints and photographs. Although SIRENE is 
often described as the operational core of Schengen, there is no reference to the system in the 
Schengen Convention (Justice 2000: 19). The factual data are stored in the SIS but the 
SIRENE system makes it possible to exchange ‘softer’ data such as criminal intelligence 
information. In order to make this a ‘convenient’ arrangement the national SIS and the 
SIRENE bureaus are in most countries entrusted to the same organization, usually a central 
police department responsible for international cooperation. It is mandatory to notify the 
state that made an entry when the SIS produces a hit. After all, this state is responsible for its 
accuracy and is able to double-check. When it comes to irregular migrants however, the rules 
are less strict. Hits are only reported in exceptional cases and the standard procedure is to 
refuse entry (at the border) or to arrest, interrogate and turn over to the authorities 
responsible for expulsion when detected inside the country (Justice 2000: 22). Though the 
SIS is an instrument intended to maintain ‘order and security’, its main preoccupation seems 
to be with illegal immigration (Guild 2001). In 1999, the overwhelming majority of the 
entries on persons were on ‘unwanted aliens to be refused entry to the Schengen countries 
(Justice 2000: 8). The figures on the SIS since 1999 suggest that this still holds true. The total 
number of entries is increasing at a firm pace: in 2007 the SIS held about 17.6 million entries. 
Entries on persons in the SIS are not the main contributors to this increase as its yearly 
averages vary between the 800.000 and 900.000 entries. But, as can be seen from table 5.1, 
the entries on irregular migrants (art. 96) in turn do take up the lion share of the entries on 
persons. Moreover, some countries, most notably Germany and Italy, interpret the criteria 
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for listing unwanted third country nationals rather widely, and are therefore responsible for 
the majority of the data stored in this category (Baldaccini 2008: 39). 
 
Table 5.1: Selected entries and hits in the SIS, 1999-2007 
Year Entries Entries on 
wanted persons 
Entries on art. 
96 
Hits on art. 96 
1999 8.687.950 795.044 703.688 21.711 
2000 9.697.252 855.765 764.747 21.170 
2001 9.856.732 788.927 701.414 26.363 
2002 10.541.120 832.312 732.764 35.856 
2003 12.274.875 874.032 775.868 32.856 
2004 11.746.847 883.511 785.631 21.957 
2005 13.185.566 818.673 714.078 21.090 
2006 15.003.283 882.627 751.954 21.836 
2007 17.615.495 894.776 752.338 n.a. 
Sources:  Bundesministerium des Innern 2002-2005, House of Lords (2007: 22), CEU 2005b 
  and 2007b  
 
The hits on irregular migrants are relatively low and recently even dropping. Over the years 
the hits represent about 3 to 5 per cent of the entries on irregular migrants. The last couple of 
years about 21.000 irregular migrants annually produce a ‘hit’ in the SIS, which means that 
they will be refused entry or a visa or, when they are inside a member state, there may be an 
information exchange through SIRENE to make expulsion possible. Van Kalmthout’s (2005: 
158) research among 400 detained irregular migrants in the Netherlands indicates that of the 
total of 400 detainees, 144 were checked in the SIS database, 17 per cent of which turned out 
to be registered in the SIS. However, on the basis of this study it is not possible to ascertain if 
the detection in the SIS led to an information exchange through SIRENE. More in general 
there are no data available that document whether or not expulsion is effectuated on the basis 
of an information exchange through SIS/SIRENE.  
 
One needs to realise that the current version of the SIS was developed in a time when 
political minds were predominantly attuned to the problem of border controls and the 
compensation for the ‘loss’ of national borders. Internal migration control was not much of 
an issue in the early Schengen years. When looking at the national figures on the hits for art. 
96 for Germany and the Netherlands (see table 5.2) we can make a distinction between 
internal and external hits. An internal hit for Germany occurs when the German authorities 
check an individual who has been registered (entered) by another country into the SIS under 
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art. 96. An external hit is the result of a check on an individual in another member state who 
produces a hit because of a German entry into the SIS under art. 96. The German statistics 
indicate that the external hits have consistently been higher than the internal hits (though the 
differences are getting smaller in recent years). Roughly translated that means that there are 
more (illegal) migrants being refused at the EU border and at European consulates in third 
countries, or expelled from other member states because of information entered into the SIS 
by Germany, than the other way around. In short, immigrants declared ‘unwanted’ by 
Germany are stopped at other member states’ borders and consulates. That means that for 
Germany the SIS contributes more to border control than to internal migration control, in 
the sense of creating a ‘remote control’ (Zolberg 2002) or ‘moving the border outside of the 
state’ (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000). It’s a preventive mechanism that extends the German 
border outwards.     
 
Table 5.2: ‘Internal’ and ‘External’ hits on art. 96 in Germany and the 
Netherlands, 1999-2006  
Germany The Netherlands  
Internal hits1 
 
External hits2 Internal hits1 External hits2 
1999 1.650 4.275 421 126 
2000 1.646 3.823 385 156 
2001 1.879 4.911 334 146 
2002 2.033 4.123 155 369 
2003 2.224 3.718 218 330 
2004 1.895 2.978 298 228 
2005 1.589 2.702 388 368 
2006 1.919 2.711 498 418 
Source: CEU 2007b 
1. Hits recorded internally in response to an alert entered abroad 
2. Hits recorded abroad in response to a national alert 
 
The distribution of internal and external hits for the Netherlands suggests that the internal 
migration ‘use’ of the system is slightly more important (in relative terms) to the Dutch 
authorities. On the whole the numbers for both countries are relatively low and do not 
suggest a vital contribution to the internal migration control irregular migrants. The SIS has 
distinct limits when judged from this perspective. These limitations and a number of others, 
as well as new ambitions for the use of the system have led to a redevelopment of the 
Schengen Information System.  
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The SIS has also proved to be a popular instrument. The rapid growth of the Schengen-group, 
even outside of the EU through association agreements with Norway, Iceland and 
Switzerland, and the prospect of further enlargement of the EU led to the decision to develop 
a second generation of the system as early as December 1996. This so-called SIS II should 
accommodate the new members and facilitate new, additional functions (De Hert 2004). The 
system should have been up and running by now, but various delays have pushed the date 
back a number of times. At the time of writing  SIS II is still not in operation and recently the 
Commission announced that its latest scheduled ‘end of the test phase’ - which was set for 
September 2009 – will not be met (CEC 2009). In terms of options and functions of the new 
system the Justice and Home Affairs Council in 2003 made it very clear that SIS II would 
have to be a ‘flexible tool that will be able to adapt to changed circumstances’ (CEU 2003: 
18). The prospect of a new generation of the system prompted member states to put forward 
all kinds of suggestions to increase the possibilities and the use of the system. The Joint 
Supervisory Authority of Schengen (2004: 14) signalled two major trends. It noted repeated 
moves to add new categories of information, especially biometric data, and a second trend to 
allow other (new) organizations, such as Europol, access to the data held in the SIS. Many of 
these proposals amount to a departure from the hit/no hit character of the SIS, making it 
more of an ‘investigative’ system. Suggestions to link the SIS II with other European systems 
are an even bigger step further in the architecture of the European network of databases and 
some documents even opted to integrate all systems into one European Information System 
(Brouwer 2004: 5). Uncertainties about the functionalities of the SIS II were dealt with in a 
‘flexible manner’. In 2003 the Commission wrote in a communication that, pending the 
decision by the Council ‘SIS II must be designed and prepared for biometric identification to 
be implemented easily at a later stage, once the legal basis, allowing for the activation of such 
potential functionalities, has been defined’ (CEC 2003: 16). In other words, politics would 
only have to follow the path laid out by the technology. SIS II will not be a cheap system. 
Between 2001 and 2006 the European Commission spent about €26 million on the 
development of the central database and infrastructure of SIS II. Between 2007 and 2012 the 
EU budget will be charged a further €114 million to get the system up and running (House of 
Lords 2007: 15).  
 
Now that the definitive regulation on the establishment, operation and use of the SIS II (EP 
and CEU 2006) entered into force in January 2007 the additions to and expansions of its 
functions are clear. Most importantly, the new legislation provides for the inclusion of 
biometric information into SIS II, more specifically the storage of fingerprints and 
photographic data. In the future it might even be possible for the system to hold DNA profiles 
and retina scans, but this would require amendments to the legislation (House of Lords 
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2007: 20, 43). The addition of biometrics makes new searches possible. The data can be 
searched in two ways. Firstly, in a ‘one-to-one’ search, using the data to confirm a ‘known’ 
person’s identity, i.e. comparing Jim Jones’ fingerprints with the fingerprints in the SIS II 
that are registered to Jim Jones. Secondly, a ‘one-to-many’ search, in which the fingerprints 
of a person are fed into the SIS II to compare them to all stored fingerprints. The possibility 
of making broad searches, or ‘fishing expeditions’ on the basis of biometric data changes the 
SIS into an investigative tool for law enforcers and immigration authorities (Baldaccini 2008: 
37-38). Especially the ‘one-to-many’ searches cause concern among many observers as these 
ideally require a very high levels of accuracy of the biometric data (in order to prevent faulty 
hits). The European Data Protection Supervisor warned in 2006 against a tendency to 
overestimate the reliability of biometrics and their use as a unique means of identification 
(see in House of Lords 2007: 21). The circle of organisations that will have access to new 
generation of the SIS database has also been significantly widened. Europol and Eurojust 
have been granted access and the list of national authorities that have access to (parts of) the 
database also grew longer (Balzacq 2008). Some authorities are described in such general 
terms that there seems to be ample room for expanding the list of organisations that have 
access, and for a (wide) variation between member states. As Boswell (2007) has argued 
these developments add up to security agencies utilizing migration policy tools for counter 
terrorism and other security aims, rather than a securitization of migration policies as such. 
The vast collection of personal data on migrants is a tempting source of information for 
security agencies in a time of global crime and terrorism. In sum, moving from the first to the 
second generation of the system has been much more than a technological affair. The scope, 
functions and possibilities of the system have changed and with it, its character. 
 
5.5.2 Eurodac 
A second important European database is the Eurodac system, which is linked to the Dublin 
II regulation, and its predecessor, the Dublin Convention. The objective of the Dublin 
Convention was to curtail the possibilities for ‘asylum shopping’ - i.e. individuals entering 
into the asylum procedure in more than one country successively - and to determine which 
state is responsible for an asylum claim. In order to do this the member states devised a 
system that could determine whether or not an asylum claimant had already lodged an 
application in another member state. To this end they decided to create a community-wide 
system for the comparison of fingerprints of asylum claimants named Eurodac (an acronym 
that stands for European Dactylographic system). The development of the system was a long 
and politically rocky ride (See Aus 2006 for a detailed analysis). The decision to set up the 
system may have been taken in 1991, but it would take until January 2003 for the system to 
become operational. By then, the scope of Eurodac had been significantly widened. Originally 
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it was meant to contain just the fingerprints of asylum seekers, but in 1998 Germany pushed 
for the inclusion of irregular migrants, even threatening to veto Eurodac if the inclusion was 
not accepted (Aus 2006: 8). Irregular migrants were already following in the footsteps of 
asylum seekers as the ‘most problematic’ group of immigrants. In 1997 the Schengen 
Executive Committee had concluded, ‘that it could be necessary to take the fingerprints of 
every irregular migrant whose identity could not be established without doubt, and to store 
this information for the exchange with other member states’ (quoted in Brouwer 2002: 235). 
As the SIS could not accommodate the registration of fingerprints the member states had to 
look elsewhere. Mathiesen (2001: 18) asserts that the ‘history of the issue of fingerprinting 
“illegal immigrants” shows how Schengen and Eurodac concerns are intertwined’.   
 
Eurodac became operational in January 2003 and started with an empty database. Since this 
date the database has been ‘filled’ with three categories of fingerprints. Category 1 comprises 
the prints of all individuals of 14 years and older who apply for asylum in one of the member 
states. These are the prints that are necessary to detect cases of ‘asylum shopping’ in light of 
the original goal of the Dublin Convention. Category 2 contains the fingerprints of irregular 
migrants apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of an external border and 
who could not be turned back. Category 3 contains the fingerprints of aliens found illegally 
present in one of the member states. These last prints are checked against category 1 and 2 
but are not stored. Furthermore, the transmission of this category of data is optional, 
member states can decide for themselves if they want to use this option (CEC 2004). It is 
especially this category that is an indication for the use of EU surveillance systems such as 
Eurodac for the development of internal migration control on irregular migrants in the 
individual member states of the EU. Like the SIS, Eurodac is a hit/no hit system and the 
database contains only limited information: the member state of origin, place and date of 
application for asylum, finger print data, sex, reference number used by the member state of 
origin, date on which the finger prints are taken, and date on which the data were 
transmitted to the central unit (Brouwer 2002: 237). The use of the system in terms of entries 
and hits can be read from table 5.3.  
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Table 5.3: Entries and ‘hits’ in Eurodac (2003 -2006) 
 2003 
 
2004 2005 2006 
Category Entries 
 
‘Hits’ Entries ‘Hits’ Entries ‘Hits’ Entries ‘Hits’ 
Asylum 
claimants (cat. 
1) 
 
246.902 19.247a 232.205 40.759a 187.223 31.636 a 165.958 27.014a 
Aliens 
crossings the 
external 
border 
irregularly 
(cat. 2) 
 
7.857 673b 16.183 2.846b 25.163 4.001 b 41.312 6.658b 
Aliens found 
illegally 
present in a 
member state 
(cat. 3) 
16.814 1.181c 39.550 7.674c 46.229 11.311 c 63.413 15.612c 
Source: CEC 2004, 2005a, 2006, 2007  
a: fingerprints of an asylum seeker sent in by a member state were matched against the stored 
fingerprints of an existing asylum applicant (cat. 1 against cat. 1)  
b: fingerprints of an asylum seeker sent in by a member state were matched against the stored 
fingerprints of an alien who illegally crossed the external border (cat. 1 against cat. 2) 
c: fingerprints sent in of an alien found illegally present within a member state are matched against the 
stored fingerprints of an existing asylum applicant (cat. 3 against cat. 1) 
 
The Eurodac database filled up rather quickly in its first years of operation. Most of the 
entries are related to asylum claimants and most of the hits are ‘detections’ of double (or even 
multiple) asylum claims filed by one individual (its main function for the Dublin system). 
More significantly, the number of entries and ‘hits’ on irregular migrants apprehended inside 
a member state (cat. 3) are steadily rising as well. The Commission considers the entries in 
category 2 to be too low when compared to the expectations and calls upon the member 
states to ‘carry out their legal obligations’. Aus (2006: 12), in a less diplomatic phrasing, calls 
this category ‘a near complete failure’. Some authors (Brouwer 2002, Aus 2003) point to the 
fact that fingerprinting individuals who were apprehended while crossing the border illegally, 
is hardly the logical ‘thing to do’ from the perspective of border states. As this fingerprinting 
can only have as result that the person concerned, who is later found in another member 
state, will be sent back to the former member state; one can reasonably doubt if the 
authorities of the first state will be very willing to execute this part of the Eurodac Regulation 
(Brouwer 2002: 244)25. 
                                                        
25  Aus (2006: 12) points out that even though the overwhelming majority of the entries in category 2 are from 
the southern border states Greece, Italy and Spain, the interesting thing is not their high share but the overall 
low volume of data transmitted to Eurodac. Furthermore, the problem of late transmission of data to 
Eurodac is also primarily caused by the Greek and Italian authorities, a logical and convenient delay from 
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Through the use of category 3 data, the Eurodac system is steadily becoming more important 
for the European ‘fight against illegal immigration’. The number of hits for irregular migrants 
found inside member states went from 1.181 in 2003 to 15.612 in 2006. These are fast rising 
numbers considering that Eurodac contains only asylum data from 2003 onwards which 
means that only irregular migrants who have a recent asylum history will produce a hit in the 
system. Many of the irregular migrants currently present in the member states will have an 
older asylum history – if they have an asylum history at all – and will not show up in a 
Eurodac search. As the database fills up and holds information from a longer period of time, 
the number of hits is therefore likely to increase. The main value of the system for the 
member states lies in its contribution to solve the problem of the lack of information on the 
identity and country of origin of irregular migrants, without which expulsion is practically 
impossible. A ‘hit’ in the Eurodac system can provide a link to a dossier on an asylum 
application made in another member state that will contain information and perhaps 
documentation on the identity and the country of origin of an irregular migrants that is silent 
about his identity. In other words, it could ‘re-identify’ him or her (Broeders 2007). Just as 
the SIS and SIRENE system can be used to exchange supplementary information to help 
make expulsion possible, Eurodac can function in a similar way. It is primarily Northern 
members states (Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and the Czech Republic) that use this 
optional category for the identification of irregular migrants. Table 5.4 zooms in on the 
German and Dutch use of the category three data, indicating that these two countries are the 
most enthusiastic users of the Eurodac system for identifying irregular migrants.  
  
Table 5.4: Dutch and German entries and hits on domestically apprehended 
irregular migrants (category 3 data) in Eurodac, 2003-2006  
 ‘Entries’ 
 
‘Hits’ 
 Germany  The 
Netherlands 
All Eurodac 
states 
Germany The 
Netherlands 
 
All Eurodac 
states 
2003 
 
9.833 223 16.814 985 42 1.181 
2004 
 
16.82 1.805 39.550 3.884 1.102 7.674 
2005 
 
16.757 8.492 46.229 4.628 2.868 11.311 
2006 
 
16.295 15.166 63.341 4.648 4.092 15.621 
Source: CEC 2004, 2005a, 2006, 2007 (statistical annexes) 
 
If we look at the data for 2006 we see that Germany and the Netherlands account for about 
half of the entries in category 3 (roughly 31.000 of a total of 63.000) and more than half of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
their national perspective because queries on transit migrants found in other member states do not yield 
results as long as they are not registered in Eurodac.  
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the hits on category 3 data (almost 9.000 of a total of 15.621). Moreover, the hits are on a 
steady increase, especially for the Netherlands, over the years that the system has been in 
operation. Again, there are no figures available that can directly link category 3 hits to actual 
expulsions that were made possible by identification data obtained through Eurodac. 
However, the increasing use of Eurodac data by Germany and the Netherlands suggests that 
the category 3 data are considered useful in helping to solve the domestic ‘identification 
problems’. The ‘popularity’ of the category 3 data among certain member states did not go 
unnoticed. In June 2007 the Commission published an evaluation of the first three years that 
the Eurodac system was in operation (CEC 2007) which emphasized the future possibilities 
of this specific category of data. The high use of this category led the Commission to propose 
that the data on irregular migrants found in member states should in the future also be 
stored in the database, instead of just checked against the data stored under the categories 1 
and 2. This takes Eurodac another step into the direction of being a database on irregular 
migrants in addition to an asylum related database. Furthermore, the Commission intends to 
explore the possibilities “to extend the scope of Eurodac with a view to use its data for law 
enforcement purposes and as a means to contribute to the fight against illegal immigration” 
(CEC 2007: 11). In short, Eurodac’s future –like its past-  is likely to be a textbook example of 
‘function creep’.  
 
5.5.3 Visa Information System 
From the perspective of ‘the fight against illegal immigration’, the Visa Information System 
(VIS) is the next logical step in the emergent network of databases. In general irregular 
migrants have three possible ‘migration histories’. They either crossed the border illegally 
(with or without help), they were asylum seekers and stayed after the claim was rejected or 
they came on a legal visa and stayed after its validity expired. The network of databases 
developed accordingly. Irregular immigration itself defies registration, but irregular migrants 
found in member states can be registered in the SIS (II), and in the future perhaps also in 
Eurodac. Those who enter through asylum procedures will be registered in Eurodac and 
those who enter on a legal visa will, in the future, be registered by the VIS. Control over 
identity has taken a central place in much EU discussion on (illegal) immigration, terrorism 
and the (perceived) ‘links’ between them. According to Guild (2003) this emphasis on 
identity control has elevated visa to the prime, and in the eyes of the member states, most 
trustworthy method of identification of third country nationals: ‘Documents issued by non-
Member States are no longer definitive for determining identity. (…) The Union takes over 
the task of identifying all persons who seek to come to the Union and determines where they 
belong’ (Guild 2003: 344). Under the heading of ‘measures to combat illegal immigration’ the 
European Council conclusions of Seville (June 2002) called for ‘the introduction, as soon as 
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possible, of a common identification system for visa data’ (CEU 2002: 8). This new system 
became the Visa Information System that is currently being developed. Unsurprisingly, the 
initial proposal to develop a Visa Information System came from Germany (Aus 2006b: 17).  
 
In December 2004 the Commission presented a proposal for a regulation on the VIS to the 
Council and the European Parliament (CEC 2004b) which was amended and finally adopted 
by the Council and the European Parliament in June 2007 (CEU 2007). With regard to the 
use of this latest database in ‘the fight against illegal immigration’ the phrasing has become 
more diplomatic, but the substance remains the same. In 2004 the VIS was “to assist in the 
identification and return of illegal immigrants”, while in 2007 it is to “assist in the 
identification of any person who may not, or may no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, 
stay or residence of the territory of the Member States”. The central importance of the system 
is for visa and immigration policy, but for the purpose of internal surveillance on irregular 
migrants the VIS can serve as an instrument to detect and identify them when found and 
apprehended on the territory of member states. It will make it possible to identify those 
irregular migrants that travelled into the EU legally at any border, and then ‘overstayed’. 
Once identified, the system can facilitate the provision of travel documents for 
undocumented illegal residents, on the basis of the exchange of information through the VIS 
(Samers 2004a). In this way the VIS will also function as a system of re-identification for 
illegal aliens that travelled legally into the EU, but try to hide their identity when 
apprehended.  
 
The VIS is a very ambitious project and requires a technically powerful system. On the basis 
of its feasibility study on the VIS the Commission aimed for a system with a capacity to 
connect at least 27 member states, 12.000 VIS users and 3.500 consular posts worldwide. 
This was based on the estimation that the Member States would handle 20 million visa 
requests annually (CEC 2003: 26). In 2007, the press release accompanying the political 
agreement on the adoption of the VIS regulation stated that the VIS will store ‘data on up to 
70 million people’. The technical set-up of the system is an exact mirror of the SIS (II). Just 
like the SIS, the new Visa system will have a central database (C-VIS), an interface at the 
national level (N-VIS) and local access points (terminals) for the police, immigration 
authorities and consular posts. The magic words in the development of SIS II and the VIS are 
‘interoperability’ and ‘synergy’. The systems are ‘sharing’ in the development costs and more 
importantly they will ‘share a common technological platform’ so that the systems are 
compatible, interoperable and able to cross-reference, connect and maybe even exchange 
information. The database themselves will remain separate (containers) but at the functional 
level SIS users can (will? must?) have their entries and queries checked against the VIS 
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database and vice versa. The central systems of the VIS and the SIS will even be direct 
neighbors in a physical and geographical sense, as they are to be ‘hosted in the same 
location’, which means they will both be housed in the SIS bunker in Strasbourg. The political 
wish of an increased interoperability also includes the Eurodac system, as was clearly set out 
in the so-called ‘The Hague Programme’, which is the agenda for the next five years for EU-
policies on Justice and Home Affairs the council agreed upon in 2005. Article 1.7.2 of this 
new agenda calls for maximization of the ‘effectiveness and interoperability of EU 
information systems in tackling illegal immigration’ and specifically names Eurodac 
alongside the SIS II and the VIS (CEU 2005, see also CEC 2005b). As with the SIS (II) the 
European Council already proposed to grant ‘internal security authorities’ access to the 
system. This new example of function creep caused the European Data Protection Supervisor 
(2006: 2) to remind the member states that the VIS was developed in ‘view of the European 
visa policy, not as a law enforcement tool’. As with Eurodac the member states agreed that 
the VIS should start with an empty database. The data to be stored in the VIS have a broad 
scope. In the first place there are the so-called alphanumeric data on the applicant (a digital 
version of the application form) and data on visas requested, issued, refused, annulled, 
revoked or extended. The alphanumeric information also includes the details of the person or 
company that issued an invitation or is liable for the cost of living during the stay. This means 
that the family members and companies that ‘vouch for’ the visa-recipient – and who may be 
held accountable should he or she overstay the visa - are also registered. For these groups the 
registration by the ‘panopticon Europe’ may well have a direct disciplining effect. By making 
it more difficult for irregular migrants to use their networks to gain access, the system 
contributes to the first logic of exclusion. Secondly, the system will include biometric data: 
each applicant will be fingerprinted for all 10 fingers and will have his photo entered into the 
VIS. This will make the VIS the largest ten fingerprint system in the world. The use of 
biometrics on such an unprecedented scale will bring the system, according to a 2003 
feasibility study by the Commission, into a new and largely unknown dimension, both 
technically and financially (CEC 2003: 26). In the best scenario (optimal synergy with the SIS 
II) and including biometrics and supporting documents the development investment will 
amount to almost €157 million and the annual operating costs will be around €35 million 
CEC 2003: 29-30). The commission intends to make the VIS operational in 2009 (CEU 
2007: 3). 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
In recent years the EU’s ‘fight against irregular migration’ has been taken to a new level. The 
real progress is found at the level of EU instruments, rather than common EU policies. In 
terms of policies there have been only some minor breakthroughs in the negotiations of 
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readmission agreements and the development of a rudimentary return policy. However, EU 
readmission agreements suffer from the same structural flaw as those negotiated at the 
national level (see chapter 4). The inherently uneven distribution of benefits in these 
agreements between the contracting parties turns ‘readmission’ in practice often into a paper 
reality rather than improved cooperation. Furthermore, the advantage of negotiating with the 
full weight of the EU seems to be undone by the insistence of the member states to not just 
negotiate readmission agreements with their neighbours in their role as countries of origin 
but also in their role as countries of transit. Having to take ‘back’ transit migrants in addition 
to their own citizens gives some of these countries the (well founded) impression that the EU 
tries to externalize its migration problems. The fact that the EU refuses to bring valuable 
stakes such as visa facilitation agreements to the negotiation table further reduces the 
chances of effective readmission agreements. Frustrated with formal negotiations at both the 
national and the EU level some member states have now turned to ‘informalizing’ the issue of 
readmission. The negotiation of a Common Return Policy also shows every sign of national 
states hanging on to sovereignty and at the same time looking for new instruments to curtail 
and manage migration. Common elements, such as agreeing to limit the administrative 
detention of irregular migrants, are stretched up to the point where even the strictest 
member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, hardly have to adjust their legislation. 
Restrictive elements such as the 5 year re-entry ban are enthusiastically embraced. In short, 
progress is slow and does not stray much from the domestic agenda’s of those states where 
irregular residence is politically considered a problem.  
 
In terms of instruments the EU’s ‘fight against illegal immigration’ is being equipped with 
state of the art database technology. The analysis of the SIS (II), Eurodac and the VIS shows 
that these systems (will) operate on an unprecedented scale that is likely to grow even further 
as a result of technological advancements and the political desire to increase the 
‘interoperability’ of the systems. Steps towards linking the various databases have been taken 
and have not met with substantial resistance. For example, Eurodac’s goals have been 
significantly ‘broadened’ along the way. Though originally devised for the prevention of 
‘asylum shopping’, the German intervention in 1998 made the system just as important for 
the internal control on irregular migrants. The active use of Eurodac for internal migration 
control by a small number of member states, first and foremost Germany and the 
Netherlands, underlines the value of this EU database for domestic use. The fact that all of 
the EU migration databases (will) include biometric identifiers signifies a crucial new step in 
the internal surveillance on irregular migrants. The biometric database turns ‘internal 
migration control’ into ‘internal migration control 2.0’, so to speak. The second generation of 
the SIS will include biometric identifiers and the VIS will even become the largest ‘ten finger 
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print’ database in the world. The amount of data stored on potential irregular migrants is 
enormous and is set to grow at great speed as the Eurodac database fills up and the VIS and 
the SIS II will go online. These European databases seek to register as many immigrants from 
‘suspect’ legal categories (asylum) and ‘suspect’ countries of origin (visa) as possible, in order 
to get at the much smaller group of immigrants that crosses the line into irregularity at a later 
stage. These systems can be used to re-identify irregular migrants that try to conceal their 
identity in order to avoid expulsion and thus contribute to solving the main problem of 
domestic expulsion policies. However, the more effective these systems will turn out to be, 
the more likely irregular migrants are to adapt to changing circumstances. If the ‘identity 
routes’ of asylum and visa will be cut off due to a high risk of identification by the new 
network of migration databases, this might provoke a counter reaction. A possible side effect 
may be an increasing dependence of irregular migrants on smuggling and trafficking 
organizations (Broeders & Engbersen 2007). 
 
In theoretical terms the European efforts in readmission and return and the development of a 
European network of migration databases primarily point in the direction of national 
governments ‘going European’ to serve national, rather than common agenda’s. So far the 
European level has primarily served the interests of the member states and truly common 
policies have by and large been avoided. It can be argued that national authorities, especially 
those of the interior and immigration, have ‘gone European’ to achieve what they could not 
achieve at the national level. In part they could not achieve their goals because the scale of 
the problem had become truly European (common external borders, common visa policy) 
and so the solution had to be found there as well. For another part the EU level provided a 
convenient venue to negotiate new initiatives and instruments that suit national agendas but 
lack national constrains: a policy laboratory for new migration control measures far away 
from national democratic and public scrutiny. The ‘pick and choose’ use of EU instruments 
according to national agenda’s can also be seen from the selective use of the Eurodac 
database in its first years of operation: member states that consider irregular migrants a 
serious domestic policy problem use the system heavily for detection and identification, while 
member states that that are relatively unconcerned about the presence of irregular migrants 
on their territory do not actively use the system. So far, instrumentalization of the EU by 
national actors seems to be the norm when it comes to internal migration control.  
 
In terms of the two logics of control the development of the three databases follows and 
confirms the paradigm shift that identification, i.e. the second logic, is a vital issue for 
internal migration policy that has to supplement the first logic. Whereas the SIS was an 
instrument of external border control, primarily meant to exclude at the border, the Eurodac 
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system, on German insistence, already caters to domestic needs: exclusion at the border and 
identification to facilitate expulsion for the internal part of migration control. The SIS II and 
the VIS are set up from the outset as instruments that (also) serve the second logic of 
exclusion, in addition to their functions for external border control. For those member states 
that are serious about the internal migration control on irregular migrants, SIS, VIS and 
Eurodac are valuable instruments to execute both ‘logics of exclusion’ domestically. For 
example, the VIS will also register companies and family members that vouch for the 
applicant which may have a disciplining effect on their willingness to act as guarantor. Here 
registration is aimed at the networks irregular migrants need for travel and residence and 
follows the logic of exclusion from documentation. But the introduction of biometric 
identifiers in all systems is a ‘killer application’ for internal migration control, especially for 
the second logic of exclusion, that of exclusion through documentation and registration. The 
migration databases are massive efforts to identify irregular migrants themselves in their 
capacity as an irregular migrant, i.e. confirming at the same time their irregular status and 
(re-)affirming the legal identity they often successfully try to hide. The swift increase in the 
use of the Eurodac system for internal migration control - the only biometric system 
operational at the time of writing – in Germany and the Netherlands is an important 
indication that the immigration authorities in these countries are more than likely to become 
‘heavy users’ of the new systems when they come online. The inclusion of more information 
in the system that can link an irregular migrant with formal documentation (visa application, 
request for asylum) and the overall application of biometric identifiers to make the link as 
‘watertight’ as possible, illustrates the European preoccupation with identification of 
irregular migrants, especially in some of the northern member states.   
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6 CONCLUSION: BREAKING DOWN ANONIMITY 
 
If nothing else, the preceding chapters have proven that the border is a social fact in this so-
called borderless Europe. Though this dissertation is not about the border in the sense of 
territorial lines demarcating countries, the various translations of that border in terms of 
eligibilities and rights, and the translations of border patrol into registrations, internal 
control and surveillance are its core objects of study. The border is indeed everywhere (Lyon 
2005) and can therefore be crossed anywhere. Irregular migrants often do not even cross the 
territorial border illegally, a useful reminder of the often missing link between ‘illegal 
immigration’ and ‘illegal’ or ‘irregular’ resident migrants. Some only cross the border of 
‘legality’ when their visa expires or when they choose to remain in the country after their 
asylum application has been rejected. Once over the border of ‘illegality’, they (have to) cross 
various other borders and boundaries illegally because of the direct link between legal 
residence and all but the barest rights in contemporary Dutch and German society. He or she 
who is without legal residence also has no legal right to work, to be housed, to pay taxes, to 
receive benefits or more than just the basic healthcare. Legally, the state expects nothing 
more of irregular migrants than to fulfill their only legal obligation to their country of 
residence: the imperative to leave the country. 
 
Of course, most irregular migrants are not willing to fulfill that legal obligation. They usually 
came for a reason. Most of them came in search of a better life and in the belief that they 
could find that in Europe. Though their exact numbers are unknown most European states 
that consider the residence of irregular migrants a problem are now convinced that bringing 
down their numbers requires active state policies. In order to get irregular migrants to leave 
the country the state developed policies aimed at exclusion and discouragement. These are 
meant to cut off access to the institutions, resources and networks that irregular migrants 
need to sustain and prolong their irregular residence. Being cut off from work, the housing 
market and institutional and social networks should force them to give up their irregular stay 
in Germany or the Netherlands. Both countries have been implementing policies of internal 
migration control on irregular migrants for a long time and they have stepped up their efforts 
since the mid 1990s. Elaborate schemes of registrations and documentary requirements have 
been devised to guard the access to the most important (formal) societal institutions. 
Blocking an irregular migrant’s access to the legal documents and registrations that would 
give him access to these institutions has been labeled ‘the first logic of exclusion’ in this 
study. It is the ‘traditional’ policy of internal migration control on irregular migrants. Over 
the years the effectiveness of this strategy has proven to be limited. Even under the condition 
of being unable to count irregular migrants, it is clear that their presence is still a fact of life 
in most European countries. If exclusion and discouragement do not get irregular migrants to 
leave the country and try their luck elsewhere, another strategy is needed, one that involves 
‘taking’ irregular migrants physically across the border. This time it is the territorial border 
that is on the mind of state officials. This means that the state will have to invest in a ‘second 
logic of exclusion’, one that leads to the actual expulsion of irregular migrants from the 
country. Given the impossibility to expel anonymous irregular migrants the central notion in 
the second logic is identification. This study has documented a paradigm shift in the internal 
migration control on irregular migrants in countries such as Germany and the Netherlands. 
In this shift, the more traditional policies following the first logic of exclusion are increasingly 
supplemented with policies meant to put the second logic of exclusion into effect.  
 
A crucial factor in this shift is the role that modern systems of surveillance and especially 
database technology play in this development. Internal migration control on irregular 
migrants is expected to be a prime site for the use and development of new technological 
surveillance instruments focused on documenting and registering access and eligibility on the 
one hand and on the identification of irregular migrants on the other. Information and 
communication technology can serve both logics of exclusion. For the first logic it is an 
indispensible tool to guard and shield off the institutions of the welfare state to anyone who is 
labeled as ‘not belonging’. For the second logic, database technology, increasingly equipped 
with biometric identifiers, is used to identify irregular migrants. Connecting them with their 
correct legal identity is a vital link in the process of expulsion. Without a proper 
identification, expulsion is impossible and the expulsion order is likely to remain a dead 
letter. However, the two logics make very different and almost oppositional demands of the 
database systems that the state uses. The first logic merely requires the systems to recognize 
irregular migrants as ‘not belonging’, while the second logic requires them to be able to 
identify and document the individual irregular migrant. These considerations about the 
intensification and the direction in which internal migration control in the Netherlands and 
Germany will develop and about the role that modern technologies of surveillance are 
expected to play, led to the formulation of the following research questions in chapter one, 
which will be answered in this chapter.  
 
How do national and EU-policies of internal migration control aimed at the exclusion of 
irregular migrants develop? Do states increasingly supplement more ‘established’ policies 
of societal exclusion with policies of exclusion focused on identification and expulsion? And 
what is the role of (modern) systems of information and surveillance in the construction of 
these policies of exclusion and control?  
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As explained in chapter one Germany and the Netherlands were selected on the assumption 
that they are comparable cases when it comes to internal migration control. However, the 
focus is on the development of state surveillance on irregular migrants itself, not in 
comparing the two cases per se. In three empirical chapters central issues of policy 
intensifications, a shift towards policies operating under the second logic of exclusion and the 
use of modern techniques of surveillance and database technology were analyzed. Chapter 
three dealt with “Guarding access to the labour market”, which is the most classic site for 
internal migration control following especially the first logic of societal and institutional 
exclusion. Chapter four on ‘police surveillance, detention and expulsion’, focused on the 
chain of government agencies charged with the organization of the expulsion process. There 
the emphasis shifts to the organization and implementation of the second logic of exclusion. 
Chapter five took the issue of the internal migration control on irregular migrants to the level 
of the EU. In a ‘borderless’ Europe instruments have to be invented to create and patrol new 
borders that will enable its member states to separate the ‘ins’ from the ‘outs’. EU solutions 
are especially expected to help with the issue of immigrant identification, contributing to the 
second logic of exclusion.  
 
6.1 A new regime of internal migration control 
In the field of labour market controls the dominant trend is one of intensifying policies of 
internal migration control, summarized by Vogel’s (2006) characterization “higher, faster, 
more”. The main emphasis in this intensification is on fine-tuning the first logic of exclusion.  
The turn towards the second logic in this policy sector can be seen at the level of political 
priorities, but hardly shows in the available data on the implementation of policy. At the level 
of implementation the facts and figures gathered in this chapter can only give indications for 
certain developments, some more clear than others. Both countries are rather similar in their 
political determination to fight the problem of irregular migrant labour and have intensified 
policies aimed at blocking irregular migrants’ access to the labour market (policies following 
the first logic of exclusion). There is also a minor trend towards incorporating the second 
logic of exclusion, aimed at the irregular migrant himself, into the labour market control 
system. In the Netherlands the government seems more explicit in its stated aim to target the 
irregular migrant himself. Both trends are characterized by an increasing use of database 
technology and the creation and refinements of digital boundaries: more registration is 
combined with networked registration. Blocking access to documents and institutions has 
also increased the role of employers (for controls and information) and the general public 
(for information and tips) for labour market controls. This trend is illustrative for the shift 
‘out of the state’. Political priorities have also been translated into increased funding and 
staffing: the labour market control agencies have definitely been on the receiving end of 
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Dutch and German government spending. These intensifications have resulted in more 
controls, more (and higher) fines and more arrests. The main emphasis is on the demand 
side of irregular (migrant) labour and hence on employers. For policies aimed at the irregular 
migrant himself the trend is to invest in new databases aimed at identification, fighting 
identity fraud and establishing the authenticity of documents and identities.  
 
When it comes to the second logic of exclusion it becomes more difficult to see how political 
priorities are translated into day-to-day surveillance. Identification has become a more 
central feature of the control system. In the Netherlands the police are (supposed to be) more 
involved in the labour market control regime and in Germany the Customs authorities – 
solely responsible for labour market controls since 2004 – even have been given police-like 
duties and competences. How this translates into a control regime that functions along the 
lines of the second logic of exclusion, and thus aimed at the irregular migrant, his 
apprehension and ultimately expulsion, is however not so clear. The data on the 
apprehension of irregular migrants as a result of labour market controls – which would 
indicate a turn towards the second logic in the labour market control regime – display very 
low percentages and/or may not be adequately registered. It is therefore impossible to 
distinguish between irregular migrants apprehended during worksite controls and those 
apprehended during the course of some other form of control. The ‘real’ number of labour 
market apprehensions is anywhere between the very low percentage that is officially 
registered and the unknown percentage that may be hidden in the figures registered under 
general  breaches of the Aliens or the Residence Act. In either case the authorities apparently 
do not feel the need or the political pressure to register these figures more accurately. On the 
other hand, the steadily mounting political pressure in recent years and the investments in 
identification procedures and databases suggest that the control regime targets – or will 
target - the individual irregular migrant now more than it did in the past. But to what extent 
is impossible to say as the numbers are simply not gathered and calculated. 
 
The policy developments within the chain of government agencies responsible for the 
expulsion of irregular migrants (police, detention and immigration authorities), show both a 
marked intensification of their tasks and budgets, as well as a distinct turn towards the 
second logic of exclusion. In this realm of internal migration control the ship of state is 
clearly turning towards identification. There is an intensification and professionalization of 
policies for the identification of irregular migrants with the aim of expulsion. Both countries 
are investing in the identification process in all parts of the bureaucratic chain leading to 
expulsion. The police and immigration authorities introduce procedures and instruments 
that make identification possible and foreign policy is aimed at diplomatic relations with 
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important countries of origin and the negotiation of readmission agreements. The detention 
capacity for the ‘administrative detention’ of irregular migrants has been increased, resulting 
in a fast growth of this part of the prison population. Furthermore, both countries are 
exploring the possibilities provided by the ‘brave new world’ of modern surveillance 
techniques. Increasingly the immigration authorities turn to EU database systems for the 
identification of irregular migrants. Especially the newer database systems (will) work with 
biometric identifiers that can link immigrants to their legal identity and other personal data 
without needing the active cooperation of migrants themselves. Given the enormous problem 
of uncooperative irregular migrants hiding their identity or lying about it to the immigration 
authorities, biometrics may make it possible to ‘skip’ the immigrant himself in terms of 
identification. A tempting prospect for the immigration authorities. A ‘surveillant 
assemblage’ aimed at (irregular) migrants is clearly emerging at both the domestic level, as 
well as at the European level. Germany and the Netherlands are increasingly operating their 
policies of internal migration control as ‘factories of identification’ for irregular migrants. The 
desired ‘end products’ of these ‘factories’ being a rise in the number of identified and 
successfully expelled irregular migrants.  
 
However, notwithstanding the investments in policies of identification and exclusion, an 
increase in the number of expulsions is not achieved. If anything, the numbers are declining 
rather than rising. The intensification in policing and especially the rising incarceration rates 
are not translated into more expulsions. This important contra-indication for a policy 
development in the direction ‘identification and exclusion’ has a number of possible 
explanations. For example, expulsions may vary with the general volume of migration that 
can lead to irregular residence. This is however only part of the story. The fact that irregular 
migrants are well aware of ‘the importance of not being earnest’ is one of the main reasons 
for the dropping expulsion rates. Another reason is the tough stance of many countries of 
origin that are considered sources of ‘irregular migration’ on taking back migrants which 
cannot be identified beyond a doubt as their own citizens. Taking back these immigrants is 
often not in their political and economic interests and, especially in the case of transit 
migrants, they refuse to get stuck with what they consider to be ‘European problems’. Both 
the irregular migrant and the (supposed) country of origin are well aware of the Achilles’ heel 
of identification in the expulsion procedure and use this politico-legal restriction on the 
deporting state to their advantage. In turn, this frustration of expulsion policies strengthens 
deporting countries in their resolve to find new means of identification. So dropping 
expulsion rates are also the prime motivation for further investment in solving the problem 
of identification of irregular migrants. In the case of Germany and the Netherlands the state 
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does not just look for domestic solutions: many new initiatives and investments in the 
‘factory of identification’ take place at the European level.  
 
As the internal borders between the Schengen member states have been dropped, the entry of 
irregular migrants into the EU, be it legal or illegal, can be at any border in any member state. 
The fact that an irregular migrant is apprehended in Germany or the Netherlands does not 
say anything about his entry into the EU or the bureaucratic ‘places’ where he or she may 
have left (documented) traces of his entry, identity, origin and itinerary. Irregular migration 
is a phenomenon on a European scale. This means that internal migration control on 
irregular migrants can benefit from initiatives taken and instruments constructed at the EU 
level. So, in recent years the EU’s ‘fight against irregular migration’ has been taken to a 
higher policy level. In terms of policies there have been some breakthroughs in the 
negotiations of readmission agreements and the development of a rudimentary return policy. 
However, the uneven distribution of benefits between the contracting parties in EU 
readmission agreements turns ‘readmission’ in practice often into a paper reality rather than 
enhanced cooperation. The advantage of negotiating with the political mass of the EU is 
undone by the insistence of the member states to negotiate readmission agreements not just 
for the return of nationals but also for the “return” of transit migrants. Again, the issue of 
transit migrants gives some of these countries the (well founded) idea that the EU tries to 
externalize its migration problems. The negotiation of a Common Return Policy shows every 
sign of national states hanging on to sovereignty and at the same time looking for new 
instruments to curtail migration. Common elements, such as agreeing to limit the maximum 
length of administrative detention of irregular migrants, are stretched up to the point where 
even the strictest member states, such as Germany and the Netherlands, hardly have to 
adjust their legislation. Restrictive elements such as the five year re-entry ban are 
enthusiastically embraced. These initiatives are however unlikely to tip the balance in the EU 
and domestic ‘fight against illegal immigration’.  
 
The real progress can be found on the level of EU instruments. Especially the development of 
a network of EU migration databases, equipped with state of the art biometric database 
technology, will be an enormous push for the internal migration control on irregular 
migrants. These systems are potentially the newly installed ‘turbines’ of the Dutch and 
German ‘factories of identification’, or those of any other member state that is developing 
policies of internal migration control following the second logic of exclusion. The SIS (II), 
Eurodac and the VIS (will) operate on an unprecedented scale that is likely to grow even 
further as a result of technological advancements and the political desire to increase the 
‘interoperability’ of the systems. Steps towards linking the various databases have been taken 
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and have not met with substantial resistance. These systems will block access for some 
migrants at the border (as registration may lead to a refusal at the border or at a consulate 
when trying to obtain a visa) serving an EU wide version of the first logic of exclusion. They 
will however be of the highest value for the internal migration control at the member state 
level, as these systems may be able to re-identify parts of the irregular migrant population 
apprehended and detained in EU member states. The use of these systems for internal 
migration control is the result of political pressure from those member states that consider 
‘irregular migrants’ an important (policy) problem. For example, even though Eurodac was 
originally devised for the prevention of ‘asylum shopping’, the German intervention in 1998 
made the system just as important for the internal control on irregular migrants. The active 
use of Eurodac for internal migration control by a small number of member states, first and 
foremost Germany and the Netherlands, underlines the value of this EU database for 
domestic use. The fact that all of the EU migration databases (will) include biometric 
identifiers signifies a crucial new step in the internal surveillance on irregular migrants. The 
biometric database turns ‘internal migration control’ into ‘internal migration control 2.0’, so 
to speak. The second generation of the SIS will include biometric identifiers and the VIS will 
even become the largest ‘ten finger print’ database in the world. The amount of data stored on 
potential irregular migrants is enormous and is set to grow at great speed as the Eurodac 
database fills up and the VIS and the SIS II will go online. These European databases seek to 
register as many immigrants from ‘suspect’ legal categories (asylum) and ‘suspect’ countries 
of origin (visa) as possible, in order to get at the much smaller group of immigrants that 
crosses the line into irregularity at a later stage. These systems can be used to re-identify 
irregular migrants who try to conceal their identity and thus contribute to solving the main 
bottleneck of domestic expulsion policies. However, the more effective these systems will 
turn out to be, the more likely irregular migrants are to adapt to changing circumstances. If 
the ‘identity routes’ of asylum and visa will be cut off due to a high risk of identification by the 
new network of migration databases, this might provoke a counter reaction. A possible side 
effect may be an increasing use and dependence of irregular migrants on smuggling and 
trafficking organizations (Broeders & Engbersen 2007). 
 
In sum, Germany and the Netherlands, with a little help from their European partners, are 
constructing a policy approach to internal migration control that is ultimately meant to break 
down the anonymity of irregular migrants. The intensifications of policies of societal and 
institutional exclusion are supplemented with the new policy priority of immigrant 
identification, for which new policies and instruments have been developed and (will be) 
taken into use. Surveillance by means of database technologies and biometrics are set to 
become an integral aspect of internal migration control over the years to come, making it 
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harder and harder for irregular migrants to keep their identity a secret once they are 
apprehended by the police. Information and exclusion were always kindred phenomena and 
the digital age has greatly enlarged the information base of the modern state which now 
stretches far beyond its own borders encapsulating the citizens of other nations instead of 
‘just’ its own.    
 
However, there is a classic distinction between information and knowledge. Information is 
just raw date that has been structured and made accessible; it becomes knowledge only after 
it has been selected, validated and interpreted (WRR 2002: 38). That means that vast 
amounts of data can be both a valuable source of information and knowledge, but can also 
lead to an information overload. It takes well organised procedures and often the input of the 
human factor to make good use of the information stored. It remains to be seen if and to what 
extent state authorities will be able make useable knowledge of the information gathered. The 
information gathered in this study gives only limited insight into this question for the 
systems currently available. However, the rather early stage of digitalizing borders with a 
view to internal migration control combined with the already heavy use of the Eurodac data 
system makes it likely that the Netherlands and Germany will push through to make these 
systems ‘work’ for them: producing knowledge to increase expulsions.  
 
Throughout this study it has been noted that the information that government agencies 
publish, even in combination with the various academic studies that provide data for smaller 
or larger parts of the policy process, do not add up to a picture that enables one to get a full 
view of policy implementation or a clear view of its effectiveness. Data gathering, or at least 
those data that are published, do not allow for more than indications of developments and 
effectiveness of policy. This lack of reliable data means that governments themselves are 
‘dancing in the dark’ even though they are bound to have more information than is out in the 
open. However, it also means that scientists, journalists and parliament for that matter, have 
no way of evaluating the control system and the recent changes in its operation in any real 
empirical sense.  
 
6.2 Policy gaps: ‘white spots’ and ‘black holes’  
Even though it is clear that internal migration control in Germany and the Netherlands is 
developing into an increasingly active policy approach that takes both logics of exclusion on 
board, it is certainly not a development without setbacks and limitations. Cornelius et al.’s 
(2004) statement that the policy gap in immigration policy has to be seen as a fact, rather 
than a hypothesis, does not need to be questioned on the basis of this study. The translation 
of political agendas into policy programmes and finally into the daily practices and activities 
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of government control agencies, allows for many possibilities of frustrating or watering down 
the original intent of policy makers. Even though a policy gap is hardly an unexpected 
empirical finding, the nature of this gap or more accurately gaps, can offer insight into the 
flaws of the policy-programmes or into the flaws of the political choices behind those policy 
programmes. After all, not every frustration of policy has to be considered a loss for a 
democratic, constitutional state. The ‘policy gaps’ will be discussed below under the headings 
of ‘white spots’ and ‘black holes’. The white spots can be likened to the white spaces on old 
maps indicating that this was unchartered and unmapped territory. Strictly speaking, black 
holes are to a large degree unchartered too. However, in the context of this study black holes 
are policy venues chosen and maintained by the government even though there is not much 
light at the end of the tunnel. These are policies in which governments stretch their own legal 
framework to get the job done, even though the chances of achieving policy goals remain slim 
and the costs may be considered high. Black holes then, are usually harsh on its policy 
subjects although it should be realised that the unchartered white spots on the old maps also 
came with a caution for danger: hic sunt dragones! Being outside government control – in a 
white spot - also means being outside government protection. The fact that governments 
resort to strategies that lead to black holes has much to do with the fact that their ‘fight 
against irregular migration’ is a fight in which action and reaction follow each other at a fast 
pace. New policy initiatives are often quickly ‘countered’ by innovations on the side of 
irregular migrants and the (bastard) institutions that help them sustain their irregular 
residence. The results may often be a stalemate between government agencies and irregular 
migrants .  
White spots are those sectors of society and the economy where irregular migrants are to be 
expected, but which are left unchartered or even left alone altogether. In this study they are 
mostly found on the labour market. From the perspective of the state white spots can be the 
result of policy choices or of circumstances. It is no secret that irregular migrant workers are 
especially found in specific sectors of the economy and there are some indications that 
governments have turned a blind eye in some cases (for example the Berlin construction 
sector during the ‘building boom’). Furthermore, there are notorious ‘white spots’ where the 
authorities cannot and/or will not intervene with controls. Governments are restricted as well 
as reluctant to control private households, thereby de facto – and knowingly! -consenting to 
widespread fraudulent domestic work, including domestic work by irregular migrant 
workers. This lack of control also places domestic workers in a vulnerable position in a 
potentially exploitative environment. White spots are not necessarily safe places. White spots 
also develop simply because the state’s resources are too limited in comparison to the 
problem it tries to counter. In spite of intensifications in funding and manpower, leading to 
more controls with higher fines, policy gaps cannot altogether be avoided: there are simply 
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too many companies to control. The Dutch government now estimates that it annually 
controls less than 2 per cent of all Dutch companies. That is after the ranks of the Labour 
Inspectorate have been doubled in the past two decades. The 2007 European Commission 
proposal to control 10 per cent of all companies every year would require beefing up staff 
levels from the current 180 to 930 inspectors, hardly something that can be achieved – 
politically and practically - in the short term. White spots are therefore inevitable and result 
in a certain degree of labour market segmentation in the Dutch and German economies. 
There is a demand for irregular (migrant) labour in parts of the economy that is de facto ‘left 
alone’. Even though labour market segmentation is not the intention of policy, some 
foreseeable segmentation results from the policy choices that are made, or in some cases 
simply cannot be avoided.  
 
Black holes are those instances where policies take on elements of the ‘state of exception’, 
in which the law is stretched up to, and sometimes even over its limits. The main example of 
a black hole in the development of internal migration control in Germany and the 
Netherlands is the functioning of the system of administrative detention. Given the 
difficulties with identification, immigrant detention cannot optimally function as a clearing 
house for irregular migrants, i.e. being a (short) stop over preparing them for expulsion. This 
is especially noteworthy in light of the fact that the data strongly suggest that the overall 
majority of successful expulsions in both countries are effectuated in the first weeks and 
months of detention. The longer detention lasts, the less likely that the outcome will be 
expulsion. Still, both governments keep significant numbers of irregular migrants in a 
lengthy, harsh and very costly detention regime. Considering that these irregular migrants 
will eventually end up on the streets again makes it an irrational policy approach in terms of 
expulsion policy, whereas making detention capacity available for newly apprehended 
irregular migrants with a higher chance of being deported would seem a more effective and 
rational approach. It seems however that the Dutch and German governments place much 
value on the idea that the long and harsh detention regime may serve as a deterrent for 
current and future irregular migrants. ‘Undeportable’ irregular migrants are held for a long 
time in a detention system that is essentially not meant for long stays. The regime is usually 
harsher than that of normal prisons as the facilities and circumstances are sober. 
Overcrowding, a lack of medical and legal aid, poorly or even unqualified staff and a lack of 
all preparatory activities and education that prepare regular prisoners for their return to 
society add up to a harsh regime, especially considering the long period irregular migrants 
can be legally detained in Germany and the Netherlands. The detention regime should 
therefore also be considered a black hole. One might speculate that the authorities hope that 
the harsh detention regime ‘stimulates’ these irregular migrants to try their luck elsewhere 
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after they have been turned back on the streets. The de facto functioning of the detention 
system as a deterrent brings the notion of the state of exception into mind. Both countries are 
stretching their policies to adapt to the circumstances and problems they face in order to 
increase effectiveness. The length and conditions of immigrant detention (especially in the 
Netherlands where illegal residence is not even a criminal offence) and some of the efforts of 
immigration authorities to expel irregular migrants (such as presenting aliens to various 
embassies and ‘informalizing’ diplomatic relations to increase expulsion rates (Germany) all 
brush against the limits of the legal system and allow degrees of exception.  
 
With the intensification of internal migration control policies, irregular migrants have 
‘responded’ with what can be called evasive manoeuvres. Closing off the formal labour 
market and access to certain institutions, such as education and the housing market, led to a 
turn towards the informal economy and the ‘creation’ of new informal institutions and 
networks paralleling those in the ‘formal’ labour market and society. The intensifications of 
labour market controls in those sectors of the economy where analysis showed irregular 
migrant labour to be a common phenomenon, seems to lead to sectoral shifts, in which 
irregular migrants migrate to other, less controlled sectors of the economy. In the 
Netherlands there is evidence that the increase in the control regime and the overall societal 
exclusion resulting from internal migration control leads to an increasing resort to (petty) 
crime among irregular migrants. With other avenues closed to them this subsistence crime 
helps them to get the money they need to enable their stay in the Netherlands. The most 
important ‘weapon of the weak’ that irregular migrants have, is of course their ability to 
destroy or hide their legal identity in order to avoid expulsion. Despite all efforts of the police, 
the detention and immigration authorities and the diplomatic corps a simple lie still goes a 
long way in frustrating government policy. The latest bid by the state to outwit the irregular 
migrant is the overall application of biometric identifiers in the new systems of digital 
surveillance that are being set up at both the national and the international level. These 
biometric databases aim to break to the anonymity that now so soften shelters irregular 
migrants from expulsion. Even though these systems cannot cover all irregular migrants, 
they will make the ‘identity routes’ into Europe (irregular migrants that originally came on a 
legal visa or through the asylum procedure) a dangerous route for migrants that wish to avoid 
expulsion. Biometrics may prove to be a ‘killer application’ in the struggle between the state 
and the irregular migrant. Only time can tell what the situation will look like in a few years 
from now when the application of biometrics in immigration procedures is rolled out and the 
stored data available for the identification of irregular migrants increases. No doubt, a new 
evasive maneuver will follow and it will most likely follow the direction of previous moves: 
deeper down into irregularity.  
 183 
 6.3 Follow the leader? 
This study draws its empirical material from the cases of Germany and the Netherlands. 
Those countries were chosen on the assumption of being most likely cases in light of the 
developments in internal migration control. Obviously that does not mean that these are the 
only two countries that could be fitted into the mould of likely cases. Just as there are 
relevant differences between Germany and the Netherlands, there are relevant similarities 
between these two countries and other EU member states. Though nothing can be said about 
the developments in the internal migration control on irregular migrants in other countries 
in any empirical sense, there are some reasons to assume that policy innovations in some 
countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, may ‘spread’ to other countries if they come 
to be regarded as possible solutions for their problems with irregular resident migrants. 
Immigration policy is a policy area where the EU member states have take a keen interest in 
each other’s policies and copied them if they were deemed to be successful. Especially during 
the 1990s when asylum migration to Europe was at its height, member states copied policy 
innovations of each other (that is those geared to restricting access to asylum procedures) out 
of fear of becoming the ‘most attractive country’ for asylum seekers. The large numbers of 
asylum applicants primarily affected the Northern member states which subsequently tried 
to shift the ‘burden’ to one another by competing with restrictive policy innovations. It is not 
unlikely that states will also look over each other’s shoulders to see what is done about the 
problem of irregular migrants. Successful policy innovations are always of interest to 
government agencies and policy makers working on the same problem. The European 
Commission’s reaction to the successful use of Eurodac for the domestic surveillance on 
irregular migrants is a case in point. As the figures indicated a success in the domestic ‘fight 
against illegal migration’ the primary reaction was to increase the effectiveness and spread 
the success by making the use of category 3 data obligatory for all member states. If the new 
digital infrastructure will increase identifications and expulsions in Germany and the 
Netherlands, it is also likely that the (use of) digital infrastructure itself will spread wider 
over Europe.  
 
6.4 Breaking down anonymity, marginalizing citizenship?  
Immigration, whether it is legal or illegal, and immigration policy are directly linked with 
citizenship. As Torpey wrote in 2000 nation states are both territorial and membership 
associations, indicating that there are always geographical and bureaucratic lines that 
separate those that belong from those that do not. So far, nothing new: immigration policy 
was always about exclusion and exclusion – at the level of nation states – was always about 
citizenship. However, in much of the contemporary debate on citizenship the focus has been 
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on the positive side of citizenship; on the build up of rights and on the active citizenry. An 
important strand of migration studies literature focused on the development of denizen’s 
rights - despite government attempts to limit rights - and the positive influence of 
international legal norms and their constitutional translations on the acquisition of 
immigrant rights. Though these studies document a very real development, there are also 
studies that document developments that are less about expanding rights and more about 
marginalizing the value of the citizenship of third country nationals. This study, dealing with 
the presence of the ‘ultimate’ non-citizen in the eyes of the state where he has taken up 
residence, also documents such a development. Especially in the context of detention and 
expulsion the concept and legal status of citizenship emerges as a central but Janus-faced 
status. In essence the lack of a known citizenship of irregular migrants both facilitates the 
‘exceptional’ handling of these immigrants by the state, as well as severely restricts the state 
in achieving its policy aims. Firstly, the fact that irregular migrants willingly hide their legal 
identity and citizenship makes them all the more vulnerable vis-à-vis the state. Lack of 
citizenship is often also a lack of legal/diplomatic representation, which gives the detaining 
state authorities more ‘leverage’ in their dealings with irregular migrants. The immigrant’s 
valuable lie comes at a high cost. With the growing importance of immigrant detention in 
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, the individual irregular migrants finds 
himself increasingly cornered between the rock of prison and the hard place of expulsion. On 
the other hand, the lack of citizenship puts the state authorities in an impossible position at 
the international level, as the lack of citizenship blocks the state’s possibilities to deport 
irregular migrants. This is the stalemate between third country nationals and western states 
today. Question remains what the digitalization of internal migration control will do to the 
already vulnerable status of the citizenship of irregular third country nationals. What does 
the breaking down of anonymity mean for their citizenship?  
 
The new digital reality has altered many aspects of citizenship and not just for irregular 
migrants. The new digital environment we all use and have grown accustomed to, has 
produced new rights and opportunities, but also new vulnerabilities. This goes especially for 
citizenship in the sense of a legal identity; registrations proving who you are and codifying 
which rights are granted to you by the state and other institutions. The fact that ‘identity 
theft’ is one of the fastest rising crimes in the United States, underlines that the digital 
environment does not just serve the interests of citizens, but also comes with new 
vulnerabilities. Citizenship has become identity management (Muller 2004). It is increasingly 
about being in control of the many data doubles that exist of personal (legal) identity in the 
registrations and databanks of government agencies and private companies. Most citizens of 
the western world have at least a certain level of control over their own data doubles or are 
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backed by (government) institutions and procedures that may help them correct faulty 
information or the misuse of their digital identities. But even for them control over their 
various digital identities, often built upon their legal citizenship, is becoming harder and 
harder. For irregular migrants there is no personal identity management or control over their 
data doubles. They can manipulate their identity through maintaining silence or telling lies 
about it as a poor man’s version of identity management, but they do not have ‘administrator 
access’ to most of the data stored about them. Control over their data doubles is in the hands 
of government authorities, mostly those of European states. Moreover, their data doubles 
were often created with the proclaimed purpose of exclusion. This is of course more a result 
of the political choices made in internal migration policies, then a result of the digital 
techniques used. There are however, also consequences for the citizenship of irregular 
migrants that result directly from the use of the new database technology that aims to break 
down their anonymity. For one thing, the breaking down of their legal anonymity through 
biometric identifiers linking them back to their legal identity, may lead to a (further) increase 
of anonymity on many other aspects in the process of migration control. The use of these 
large databases makes the individual in the process of migration control and identification to 
a large extent irrelevant. If surveillance systems are ‘in charge’ of identification this leads to a 
double de-personalization in the identification process (Broeders 2009b). There is no point 
in asking a migrant who he is and what his story is, if you can just run his fingerprints 
through the system to get the answer. There is no point in giving any thought to a migrant of 
whom the SIS says he should be refused at the border, as the decision has already been taken 
when he was entered into the system. Personal elements both on the side of the migrant as 
well as on the side of the immigration official are taken out of the equation. The official 
‘becomes’ the procedure (as delivered to him by the system) and the migrant ‘becomes’ what 
the system says he is. To a certain extent this is a logical development as digitalizing the 
border is a reaction to the successful immigrant strategy of hiding his identity. The 
marginalization of immigrant citizenship, adding a new layer to their ‘alienation’, is however 
a sad and worrying side effect.     
 
Return to sender……. 
So the paradoxical situation evolves that the second logic of exclusion puts the spotlight on 
the individual irregular migrant, while the new technologies used to do that depersonalize 
and de-individualize him. The second logic of exclusion requires an exact legal identity, as 
only a documented irregular migrant can be expelled, whereas the first logic broadly excludes 
everyone that cannot prove he has a right of access. At the same time, the second logic takes 
the narrowest focus on individual identity possible. All that matters is the required 
identification and documentation that will make expulsion possible. Hindress (2000: 1487) 
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wrote about citizenship and immigration and characterized citizenship as a vital marker in 
the international system “advising state and nonstate agencies of the particular state to which 
an individual belongs”. The current development in the internal migration control on 
irregular migrants using database technology for identification and expulsion may take the 
value of citizenship even a step further down and reduce it to an international address label.  
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DUTCH SUMMARY/NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
Irreguliere migranten, of illegalen zoals ze in het Nederlands meestal worden aangeduid, 
worden in een aantal West-Europese landen steeds meer gezien als een belangrijk politiek en 
beleidsmatig probleem. Met name in de jaren negentig, als het probleem van de asielmigratie 
zich enigszins stabiliseert, neemt de beleidsaandacht voor illegalen sterk toe. Naast 
maatregelen aan de grens en in het immigratiebeleid, ontwikkelen sommige landen een 
beleid van interne migratie controle. Immers, illegalen die de horde van grens genomen 
hebben en zich in een Europees land vestigen, zullen dat land niet snel ‘spontaan’ verlaten. 
Het migratiebeleid richt zich naar binnen, resulterend in een ‘illegalenbeleid’ dat kan worden 
gekarakteriseerd door het  centrale principe van uitsluiting. Illegale migranten horen 
juridisch niet te zijn waar ze zijn en dienen bijgevolg uitgesloten te worden van alle 
mogelijkheden, bronnen van inkomsten en diensten die een illegaal verblijf kunnen 
verlengen. Dit beleid van uitsluiting heeft twee mogelijke vormen. Een meer ‘traditionele’ 
vorm van uitsluiting van maatschappelijke instituties en een tweede vorm van uitsluiting die 
zich richt op de identificatie van illegalen teneinde ze uit te kunnen zetten. Gezien de 
politieke aandacht voor illegalenbeleid kan worden verwacht dat het illegalenbeleid zich 
intensiveert. Tegen een achtergrond van snelle technologische ontwikkelingen en de brede 
toepassing van ICT in het overheidsbeleid kan bovendien worden verwacht dat de overheid 
daarbij steeds vaker gebruik zal maken van digitale registratie- en identificatiesystemen. 
Deze overwegingen leiden tot de volgende onderzoeksvragen voor dit proefschrift: 
 
Hoe verloopt de ontwikkeling van het beleid voor interne migratie controle op nationaal en 
op EU niveau? Vullen staten het meer ‘traditionele’ beleid van maatschappelijke uitsluiting 
in toenemende mate aan met uitsluitingbeleid gericht op identificatie en uitzetting? En wat 
is de rol van (moderne) informatie- en surveillancesystemen in de vormgeving van dit 
beleid van uitsluiting en controle?     
 
Om deze vragen te kunnen beantwoorden is gekeken naar het beleid in twee EU-lidstaten, te 
weten Nederland en Duitsland, en naar de ontwikkelingen op het Europese niveau. Het 
onderzoek richt zich op de vraag of er een bepaalde ontwikkeling in het beleid waar te nemen 
is en hoe deze eruit ziet. Daarom zijn de cases geselecteerd op basis van relevante politieke, 
economische en beleidsmatige overeenkomsten die het waarschijnlijk maken dat als de 
ontwikkeling zich voordoet, die bij deze landen waarschijnlijk het eerst te zien zal zijn. 
Nederland en Duitsland zijn dus zogenaamde ‘most likely cases’. De Europese dimensie is 
voornamelijk van belang vanwege de ontwikkeling van een nieuwe infrastructuur van 
immigratiedatabanken die in het nationale illegalenbeleid kan worden ingezet.  
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Het theoretische raamwerk voor deze studie (hoofdstuk 2) is ontleend aan twee 
wetenschappelijke disciplines: ‘immigratie studies’ en de opkomende discipline van de 
‘surveillance studies’. De immigratie studies literatuur geeft inzicht in de redenen waarom 
grenscontrole steeds meer aangevuld wordt met ‘binnenlands’ migratie beleid en gaat in op 
de politieke preoccupatie van overheden met het controleren, of minimaal het schijnbaar 
controleren, van migratiestromen. De surveillance literatuur geeft inzicht in de wijze waarop 
bureaucratieën door middel van documentatie en registraties de bevolking inzichtelijk en 
controleerbaar probeert te maken. In een digitaliserende wereld nemen de mogelijkheden 
voor het registreren, opslaan en bewaren van persoonlijke data exponentieel toe. Overheden 
maken dankbaar gebruik van deze mogelijkheden en het immigratiebeleid is daarop beslist 
geen uitzondering. Het tegendeel is eerder waar; in toenemende mate zijn juist immigranten 
het onderwerp van de registraties van verschillende overheden. Vanuit het perspectief van 
interne migratie controle zijn er twee redenen voor deze ‘migranten administratie’ die 
samenhangen met twee verschillende logica’s van uitsluiting die in dit proefschrift worden 
bestudeerd.  
 
De eerste logica is die van ‘uitsluiting van documentatie en registratie’. Onder deze logica 
wordt surveillance ingezet om migranten uit te sluiten van de kerninstituties van de 
samenleving, zoals de formele arbeidsmarkt, het onderwijs, de woningmarkt en de regelingen 
van de verzorgingsstaat. Dit zijn de meer ‘klassieke’ vormen van het illegalenbeleid, met in 
Nederland als belangrijke ijkpunten de koppeling tussen een legale verblijfstitel en het 
verkrijgen van een Sofinummer en de invoering van de koppelingswet. Door het migranten 
onmogelijk te maken zekere documenten of registratienummers te bemachtigen, terwijl deze 
als voorwaarde gelden om toegang te krijgen tot bepaalde instituties, is het nettoresultaat de 
uitsluiting van die instituties. De staat trekt een muur op van documenten en juridische 
regels en vereisten rondom zijn maatschappelijke instituties en ‘patrouilleert’ deze met 
moderne identificatie- en datasystemen. Het doel is de ontmoediging van illegaal verblijf, het 
middel is rigoureuze maatschappelijke uitsluiting. Illegalen die zich niet laten ontmoedigen, 
zullen door de overheid zelf echter over de grens gebracht moeten worden. In recente jaren 
staat daarom het uitzettingsbeleid centraler in de interne migratie controle. Omdat anonieme 
illegalen praktisch en juridisch onuitzetbaar zijn, vereist dit een andere bureaucratische 
aanpak. Deze aanpak volgt de tweede logica van uitsluiting, die van de ‘uitsluiting met behulp 
van documentatie en registratie’. De tweede logica wordt van belang als de eerste niet 
optimaal werkt en ongewenste migranten zich niet laten ontmoedigen en illegaal (ver)blijven. 
De aandacht verschuift dan naar de ongewenste migrant zelf. Beleid dat deze logica volgt, 
probeert de migrant zelf juist te registreren en documenteren om hem met behulp van die 
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informatie uit te sluiten. Deze logica stelt alles in het werk om de anonimiteit, die illegalen 
relatief effectief beschermt tegen uitzetting, af te breken. De twee logica’s zijn complementair 
in termen van hun bijdrage aan het illegalenbeleid , maar stellen heel verschillende eisen aan 
de inrichting, dataverzameling, werking en gebruik van de datasystemen die voor interne 
migratie controle aangesproken worden. Bij het klassieke illegalenbeleid, volgens de eerste 
logica, doet het er niet toe wie de illegaal is, zolang het systeem maar aangeeft dat hij geen 
recht op toegang heeft. Dat is eenvoudig te bepalen als iemand niet de juiste papieren heeft of 
niet kan laten zien dat hij op de juiste plaats geregistreerd staat. Bij de tweede logica van 
uitsluiting gaat het erom dat een onbekende illegaal geïdentificeerd kan worden en 
verbonden kan worden met officiële registraties en documenten die zijn identiteit en land van 
herkomst bewijzen en documenteren. Identificeren, in tegenstelling tot blokkeren, vereist een 
ander soort informatie en deels een ander soort databank, namelijk databanken die 
migranten kunnen traceren en identificeren. Ook ‘de bureaucratie’ zal daarmee, deels, anders 
georganiseerd moeten worden.  
 
In drie empirische hoofdstukken is gekeken naar de ontwikkeling van de interne migratie 
controle op illegale migranten in Nederland en Duitsland om te zien of, hoe en in welke mate 
zich een ontwikkeling voltrekt waarbij de eerste logica van uitsluiting wordt aangevuld met 
beleid en instrumenten die zich op de tweede logica richten. Daarbij is gekeken naar de 
politieke en beleidsmatige ontwikkelingen en zoveel als mogelijk naar de ontwikkelingen in 
de implementatie van het beleid.  
 
In het arbeidsmarktbeleid (hoofdstuk 3) staat traditioneel de eerste logica centraal. De 
arbeidsmarkt is immers de grootste ‘magneet’ voor illegale migranten. De afgelopen jaren is 
het beleid aangaande illegalen op de arbeidsmarkt sterk aangescherpt: de budgetten van de 
overheidsinstanties die verantwoordelijk zijn voor arbeidsmarktcontroles zijn sterk gestegen. 
De personeelssterkte is sterk toegenomen en de technologische toepassingen en systemen om 
werkgevers en werknemers te controleren en traceren zijn behoorlijk uitgebreid. De politiek 
verkondigde prioriteit om illegale arbeid aan te pakken heeft zich dus vertaald in een flinke 
(financiële) injectie in het systeem en de capaciteit van de autoriteiten op het gebied van 
arbeidsmarktcontroles. De nadruk ligt daarbij overduidelijk bij het investeren in de eerste 
logica van uitsluiting: meer controles, meer en hogere boetes, ‘slimmere’ controles – 
gebaseerd op een analyse van risicosectoren – en een bredere aanpak door de controletaak 
ook steeds te beleggen bij partijen buiten de overheid, met name de werkgever (de werkgever 
als hulpsheriff). De politieke wens om de arbeidsmarktcontroles ook bij te laten dragen aan 
de tweede logica van uitsluiting, is in de uitvoering nog niet of nauwelijks terug te zien. 
Aangezien de arbeidsmarkt één van de meest gecontroleerde sectoren is, zou het een logische 
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sector zijn om niet alleen te controleren op illegale arbeid, maar ook om gecontroleerde 
illegalen daadwerkelijk aan te houden over te dragen aan de autoriteiten die verantwoordelijk 
zijn het uitzettingsbeleid. Dit zou betekenen dat arbeidsmarktcontroles zich sterker dan 
voorheen ook op identificatie van illegalen zouden richten en, nog belangrijker, dat bij 
controle aangetroffen illegalen aan de politie worden overgedragen met als doel verdere 
identificatie en uiteindelijk uitzetting. De in de officiële registraties aangetroffen percentages 
voor illegalen die zijn aangehouden voor overtredingen van de arbeidswetgeving voor 
vreemdelingen zijn in beide landen echter extreem laag. Dat betekent dat deze aanhoudingen 
of zeer beperkt zijn of dat ze schuil gaan onder de bredere categorie van aanhoudingen die 
worden geregistreerd onder de algemene noemer van  overtredingen van de 
vreemdelingenwetgeving (illegaal verblijf). Voor dat laatste zijn weliswaar aanwijzingen, 
maar het zicht op wat dan wel een realistisch percentage is, ontbreekt. Dat gebrek aan inzicht 
geldt echter ook voor de politiek die de prioriteit van meer aanhoudingen zelf heeft 
geformuleerd. 
 
In de keten die loopt van toezicht door de politie, via vreemdelingendetentie naar uitzetting 
(hoofdstuk 4) is de tweede logica van uitsluiting dominant, zeker naarmate men meer aan het 
einde van de keten komt. De politieke nadruk op het uitzettingsbeleid als het sluitstuk van 
het illegalenbeleid mist zijn uitwerking  niet op de organisatie en de inzet van de politie, het 
detentiewezen en de autoriteiten die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het uitzettingsbeleid. Waar 
de politie (traditioneel) nog betrekkelijk veel ruimte heeft om eigen prioriteiten te destilleren 
uit de vele claims op hun operationele inzet, geldt dat veel minder voor detentie- en 
uitzettingsautoriteiten. De procedures, technieken en systemen die in de gehele keten zijn 
geïntroduceerd om identificatie van illegalen mogelijk te maken, wijzen erop dat de 
vreemdelingendetentie – als spil in het proces – steeds meer gaat functioneren als een 
‘identificatiefabriek’. De capaciteit van de vreemdelingendetentie is bovendien in het 
afgelopen jaren spectaculair toegenomen. Juridisch gaat het hierbij om een administratieve 
detentie die in principe bedoeld is om uitzetting voor te bereiden. De omstandigheden in dit 
detentieregime zijn echter  beduidend slechter dan in reguliere gevangenissen, hetgeen nog 
verergerd wordt door het feit dat vreemdelingendetentie in Nederland en Duitsland zeer lang 
kan duren (in Duitsland maximaal 18 maanden, in Nederland in theorie niet beperkt in 
duur).  Al deze investeringen in detentie en identificatie leveren echter niet het reultaat op 
waar men op ingezet had. Het aantal uitzettingen loopt eerder terug dan op. De overheid 
loopt stuk op het verzet van landen van herkomst (die hun onderdanen vaak liever niet zien 
terugkomen en geen papieren ter beschikking stellen) en met name op de illegaal zelf, die met 
leugens over of het verzwijgen van identiteit en land van herkomst het uitzettingsbeleid zeer 
effectief weet te frustreren. Deze zeer effectieve frustratie van het uitzettingsbeleid ligt ten 
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grondslag aan het teruglopende aantal uitzettingen. Maar hij ligt ook ten grondslag aan een 
reeks van doorgaande en nieuwe investeringen door nationale en Europese overheden in 
nieuwe systemen van identificatie die tot doel hebben om steeds minder afhankelijk zijn van 
de illegalen zelf voor informatie over identiteit en herkomst.    
 
De volgende stappen in de strijd om identificatie en uitzetting worden gezet op het niveau 
van de Europese Unie (hoofdstuk 5).  Sinds het einde van de jaren negentig zijn de Europese 
lidstaten bezig met de opbouw van een netwerk van migratiedatabanken die in de toekomst 
een groot belang kunnen krijgen voor de interne controle op illegalen in landen als Nederland 
en Duitsland. Door aanpassing, uitbreiding en het oprekken van functies gedurende de 
ontwikkelingsfase van het Schengen Informatie Systeem (SIS),  zijn opvolger het SIS II, 
Eurodac en het Visa Informatie Systeem (VIS) heeft de Europese Unie straks nieuwe digitale 
grenzen die de identificatie van grote delen van de illegalenpopulatie mogelijk sterk 
vereenvoudigen. Een illegaal kan op drie manieren in Nederland terecht gekomen zijn: hij 
reist illegaal in (de ‘ware’ illegale migrant), hij vraagt asiel aan en wordt illegaal als hij in 
Nederland blijft nadat zijn verzoek is afgewezen of hij reist legaal in op een toeristenvisum en 
wordt illegaal als de geldigheid daarvan verloopt (de zogenaamde overstayers). In een 
Europa zonder grenzen kan natuurlijk ook een andere lidstaat de asielaanvraag in 
behandeling hebben gehad of het visum hebben verleend. Deze drie achtergronden van 
illegaliteit vormen de bauwdruk voor het netwerk van Europese immigratie databanken.  
 
Wie bij de grens, of later in bijvoorbeeld Nederland aangehouden wordt, kan worden 
geregistreerd in het Schengen Informatie Systeem (SIS). De andere twee routes van 
asielaanvraag en de visumaanvraag laten sporen na in de administraties van de immigratie- 
en asielautoriteiten van de lidstaten van de EU. Deze zogenaamde identiteitsroutes worden 
vastgelegd in twee nieuwere systemen: het Eurodac systeem en het Visum Informatie 
Systeem (VIS). Alle asielaanvragen die in de Europese Unie worden gedaan worden sinds 
2003 in het Eurodac systeem geregistreerd en in de toekomst zullen alle toegewezen en 
afgewezen aanvragen voor een visum voor de Europese Unie worden geregistreerd in het VIS. 
Deze systemen zijn voor alle lidstaten toegankelijk. Het doel is dat deze databanken de 
onidentificeerbare en dus onuitzetbare illegalen kunnen ‘re-identificeren’ op basis van de 
digitale voetsporen die ze hebben achtergelaten in de Europese bureaucratieën. Al deze 
databanken zijn technische hoogwaardige systemen  die van alle geregistreerde migranten 
ook biometrische identiteitskenmerken – meestal de vingerafdrukken –vastleggen. Een 
illegaal die is opgenomen in deze systemen, is strikt genomen niet meer ‘nodig’ voor zijn 
eigen identificatie: een vingerafdruk volstaat. Met name voor de tweede logica van uitsluiting 
kan de toepassing van biometrie op een Europese schaal gerust een ‘killer application’ 
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genoemd worden, aangezien het in potentie grote delen van de voorheen onidentificeerbare 
populatie via een vingerafdruk naar een asieldossier of een visumaanvraag kan herleiden.         
 
In het slothoofdstuk (hoofdstuk 6) wordt de balans opgemaakt van de ontwikkelingen in het 
nationale en Europese ‘illegalenbeleid’. Er wordt geconstateerd  dat het schip van staat in het 
interne migratiebeleid steeds meer in de richting van identificatie en uitsluiting draait. Met 
andere woorden: naast de intensiveringen in de ‘uitsluiting van documentatie en registratie’ 
wordt er in toenemende mate geïnvesteerd in het operationaliseren van de ‘uitsluiting met 
behulp van documentatie en registratie’. Dat geldt het minst voor het arbeidsmarktbeleid, 
veel sterker voor het detentieregime en potentieel het meest voor de toekomstige integratie 
van de nieuwe Europese databanken in de nationale uitvoering van het interne toezicht op 
illegalen. Daarnaast worden nog enkele kanttekeningen geplaatst bij de voorziene en 
onvoorziene gevolgen van deze beleidsontwikkelingen. Door politieke keuzes en (gebrek) aan 
capaciteit ontstaan op de arbeidsmarkt zogenaamde ‘witte vlekken’: sectoren waarvan bekend 
is dat er veel illegale tewerkstelling is, maar die desondanks met rust gelaten worden. Ook 
ontstaan er ‘zwarte gaten’ als gevolg van het overheidsbeleid. Met name de langdurige 
administratieve detentie van onuitzetbare illegalen is vanuit het perspectief van het 
uitzettingsbeleid in hoge mate irrationeel en gaat gepaard met hoge humanitaire en 
economische kosten. In het beleid en de praktijken rondom detentie en uitzetting stuit de 
overheid tegen de grenzen van zijn eigen wetgeving en rekt deze soms zelfs doelbewust op. 
Tot slot werpt de ontwikkeling in het illegalenbeleid die in deze studie wordt gedocumenteerd 
een bijzonder licht op het begrip burgerschap dat in zaken van immigratie en 
immigratiebeleid zo’n centrale rol speelt. Enerzijds is burgerschap – in de juridische zin van 
nationaliteit -  de cruciale variabele in het uitzettingsbeleid die bepaalt of uitzetting mogelijk 
of onmogelijk is. Anderzijds heeft de jacht op de identiteit van de illegaal tot gevolg dat zijn 
burgerschap tot op de kleinst mogelijk noemer wordt uitgekleed: de overheid is slechts nog 
geïnteresseerd in die informatie die een uitzetting mogelijk kan maken, alles daarenboven 
wordt in toenemende mate irrelevant geacht. De wetenschap waar iemand naar 
teruggestuurd kan worden is voldoende. Het burgerschap van illegalen devalueert daarmee 
tot het niveau van een adreslabel.         
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